JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. :- This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the Third Additional District Judge, Merrut, dated 13.2.1978. By the said judgment, the Additional District Judge dismissed the revision filed by the petitioner under Section 18 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 2. The facts, which led to the filing of the present writ petition, are these. One Smt. Mandhar Pyari Mehta purchased a house in the New Market, Meerut. There were a number of shops on the ground floor and a residential flat on the first floor. She died in 1965 leaving behind two sons and four daughters, namely Kuldeep Lal Mehta. Purshottam Prakash Mehta (sons), and Pushpa Madan, Santosh Kumari, Kanti Handa, Saroj Kapoor (daughters). Smt. Kanti Handa was living in house No. 449 (Old 249) situate in Begam Bagh, Meerut City. 3. Two applications were filed by Ishwar Chand Tyagi and Sarju Prasad Tyagi for allotment of the aforesaid premises No. 449, Begam Bagh, Meerut, on the ground that as Smt. Kanta Handa had acquired the properties in the New Market, including flat no. 16, the house in question would be deemed to be vacant under Section 12 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. After receiving those applications, a report was called by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer from the Inspector. The Inspector submitted the report to the effect that the house could not be deemed to be vacant as Smt. Kanti Handa was living in the same. He also reported that the properties situated in the New Market were the joint family properties of Smt. Kanti Handa along with her brothers and other relations. On the basis of this report, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 11.1.1977 declared that the premises was vacant. 4. The petitioner filed a civil suit challenging the validity of the order dated 11.1.1977. She also filed an application for interim injunction restraining the respondent no. 2 from passing any allotment order in respect of the premises 449, Begam Bagh, Meerut. The application for injunction was rejected by the Munsiff. Against the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Civil Judge. The appeal was dismissed on 28.4 1977. Against the aforesaid order of the learned Additional Civil Judge, the petitioner filed a revision before the District Judge, which was also dismissed on 8.8.1977. The application for injunction was rejected by the Munsiff. Against the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Civil Judge. The appeal was dismissed on 28.4 1977. Against the aforesaid order of the learned Additional Civil Judge, the petitioner filed a revision before the District Judge, which was also dismissed on 8.8.1977. It, however, appears that in the meantime, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotted the premises on 20.5.1977 to Sarjoo Prasad Tyagi, respondent No. 3. While making the allotment order, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that as Smt. Kanti Handa had acquired certain properties from her mother, the premises in question would be deemed to vacant under section 12(3). The petitioner filed a revision to the District Judge. The revision was also dismissed on 13.2.1978. Against the aforesaid order, the present writ petition was filed. 5. Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, counsel appearing for the respondent no. 3, raised a preliminary objection that as the petitioner had filed a suit challenging the order dated 11.1.1977 declaring the vacancy, the present writ petition was not maintainable. He urged that the petitioner having availed the alternative remedy, should not be heard in the present proceedings. He emphasised that on the date on which the writ petition was filed the suit was pending trial before the court. The submission has no substance. In fact, an order declaring vacancy is only a step in aid towards the passing of an order of allotment. Such an order declaring vacancy does not confer any cause of action on a party aggrieved. The petitioner, therefore, had no cause to file a suit. If the suit was not maintainable, the mere fact that the petitioner had taken recourse to the same would not debar her of the remedy available under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to a case reported in Triloki Singh and Company v. District Magistrate. Lucknow, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1988 in which the Supreme Court observed that a person can have no grievance against the notification of a vacancy. 6. In this connection, it may also be mentioned that the respondent no. 3 himself raised an objection before the trial court as well as before the learned District Judge while dealing with the injunction application that the suit filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. 6. In this connection, it may also be mentioned that the respondent no. 3 himself raised an objection before the trial court as well as before the learned District Judge while dealing with the injunction application that the suit filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. In fact this objection prevailed with the Additional District Judge and the revision preferred by the petitioner against the order refusing to grant the injunction was dismissed. It may be true that the consent of a parry does not confer jurisdiction on a court which it does not have. It only shows the conduct of respondent no. 3. It is also a settled principle that a party cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold at the same time. When the respondent no. 3 himself raised the objection regarding the maintainability of the suit in the civil court and succeeding in getting the injunction application rejected on that basis, his objection that the writ petition was not maintainable, does not appear to be bona fide. 7. Now coming to the main controversy, the question was whether the house could be deemed vacant under sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act. Section 12(3) applies to a case where a tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential building in the same city. Therefore, for attracting Section 12(3), it is necessary that a tenant should have built or otherwise acquired in a vacant state a residential building after the coming into force of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Where the acquisition of property was made by a tenant or a landlord, as the case may be, before the coming into force of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 sub-section (3) of section 12 cannot be pressed into service. My view is supported by the decision of full Bench of this Court in Ram Kumar v. First Additional District Judge, 1968 All. L.J. 272. In this case, the Full Bench was called upon to consider the scope of Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the said Act. Section 21(l) is in pari materia to Section 12(3). In that case, the Full Bench held that the phrase "has build or has otherwise acquired" has been used in presenti, and the acquisition of the property must have been made after the enforcement of the Act. Section 21(l) is in pari materia to Section 12(3). In that case, the Full Bench held that the phrase "has build or has otherwise acquired" has been used in presenti, and the acquisition of the property must have been made after the enforcement of the Act. It was, therefore, necessary for the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Additional District Judge to have found whether the property was acquired by the petitioner after the enforcement U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 or whether she had obtained possession of the property after the aforesaid date and had let out the same to the tenants. 8. In the instant case, both counsel for the parties made efforts to find out the finding in their favour. But, both of them failed and did not succeed. In this view of the matter, it appears that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as the Additional District Judge held that a deemed vacancy occurred, without giving the relevant finding. Accordingly, it appears appropriate that the orders of the two authorities be set aside, and the case be sent back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for deciding it afresh. It is, however, made clear that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has to determine the question of letting out flat no. 16 alone. 9. For these reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgments of the two courts below are quashed, and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to determine the question of letting out flat no. 16 afresh. I make no order as to costs.