Judgment K.C. Agrawal, J. 1. THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for a Writ of Certiorari quashing the judgment of the District Judge, Bulandshahr, dated 17-12-1977, allowing an appeal filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 22 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 2. THE dispute in the present case with respect to a house situate in Ano-opshahr, District Bulandshahr. This had been let out to the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs. 8.50 Paise. THE premises had been originally let out to the petitioner for the purposes of residence. An application was filed under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of the Section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for release of the premises by respondent No. 3 on two grounds. THE first ground was that the premises was required by the respondent No. 3 for her son Om Prakash Singhal for manufacturing of Ayurvedic medicines. In the alternative, the respondent No. 3 claimed that the premises was in a dilapidated condition and was required to be reconstructed. The application was contested by the petitioners. He alleged that he was using the premises for the purposes of residence and for manufacturing sweets, boora and Batasha. According to his case, as the dominant purpose for the premises was residential, the premises could not be released in favour of the respondent No. 3 for non-residential purposes. 3. THE Prescribed Authority rejected the application, against which the appeal filed by Respondent No. 3 was also dismissed. Hence, this writ. 4. AS the argument made in the writ petition was confined to the question that since the dominant purpose of letting out the premises was residential, it could not be released in favour of respondent No. 3 for non-residential purposes. I am not dealing with the other pleas raised by the petitioner. It was the admitted case of the parties that the premises was let out to the petitioner for residential purposes. The respondent No. 3, however, alleged that the same was being used exclusively for business purposes. On the contrary, the case of the petitioner was that he was using it for composite purposes viz., residential as well as nonresidential in order to find the real use to which the property had been put to by the petitioner, the Prescribed Authority appointed a Commissioner and also made a local inspection himself. On the contrary, the case of the petitioner was that he was using it for composite purposes viz., residential as well as nonresidential in order to find the real use to which the property had been put to by the petitioner, the Prescribed Authority appointed a Commissioner and also made a local inspection himself. He found that the petitioner was using the premises in dispute for the business purpose exclusively, and that he was residing with the members of his family elsewhere. Accepting the evidence of respondent No. 3 as well as his report, the Prescribed Authority although rejected the application filed by the said respondent, but held that the user of the premises was business. In appeal, the learned District Judge agreed with the finding of the Prescribed Authority and held that the premises were not being used for residential purposes but were used only as a godown for business purposes. 5. CLAUSE (ii) to the Third Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act contains a bar that no application for release of the premises under Section 21 (1) (a) can be entertained in respect of a residential building for occupation for business purposes. The object of the provision is obvious. The same was that there being scarcity and paucity of residential accommodation, a landlord should not be permitted to get such a premises released for non-residential purposes. This restriction would put a check on the conversion of a residential building into a non-residential one. In the instant case, as already stated above, the finding given by the two courts below was that the premises were being used for non-residential purposes. 6. SRI S. N. Agrawal, counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, contended that as the premises was taken by the petitioner for residential purposes, the Court had to look into the original purpose. The submission made does not appear to be correct. It is no where provided in the Act or the Rules framed under it laying down that the purpose to be looked into for allowing an application made by a landlord would be the one for which the building was taken initially by the tenant. The provision made is only with respect to the present use. In fact, the purpose for which the building was originally let out is immaterial if its user had been changed by the tenant. The provision made is only with respect to the present use. In fact, the purpose for which the building was originally let out is immaterial if its user had been changed by the tenant. In case by user a building ceased to be a premises let out for residential purposes, the Prescribed Authority would be fully justified in looking into the present user for applying clause (ii) to the Third Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. Another aspect of the matter which impels me to take the above view is that a tenant having changed the purpose of the user himself, cannot be permitted to argue that since originally he had taken the premises for a different purpose, the original purpose had to be seen. After having changed the user himself, a tenant cannot be permitted to take the plea about the bar on the ground suggested above. 7. SO far as the question of comparative hardship is concerned, it would suffice to mention that the finding recorded on the said controversy is one of fact. It is not possible for this Court to reappraise the evidence and to record its own finding. A finding of fact, even if erroneous, is binding under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The counsel for the petitioner failed to satisfy me that the finding on the question of comparative hardship was illegal or erronous. 8. FOR the reasons given above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order is discharged. The petitioner is granted three months' time to vacate the premises. Petition dismissed.