JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. This is a defendants' revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, decreeing in plaintiffs' suit for defendants ejectment. The plaintiffopposite parties filed a suit against the defendantapplicants for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment. The defendants raised two pleas, firstly, they contended before the courts below that since they had deposited the entire rent in the court they were entitled to the protection of section 20 (4) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. The second plea raised by them was that no notice as contemplated by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act demanding rent and terminating their tenancy had been served on them prior to the filing of the suit. The trial court decided the first question in favour of the defendants and granted benefit of section 20 (4) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. On the second question the trial court held that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served on the defendants. On these findings the trial court decreed the suit for arrears of rent but it dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for ejectment of the defendants. The plaintiffs filed revision application under section 26 of the Small Cause Court Act against the decree of the trial court. The Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, allowed the plaintiffs' revision and decreed the suit for defendants ejectment. The Additional District Judge held that the defendants had failed to deposit the entire arrears of rent along with interest at the rate of 9% thereon and the costs of the suit on the first date of hearing of the suit as required by section 20 (4) of the Act, therefore, the defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the said section. On the question of service of notice the findings of the trial court were affirmed. Aggrieved, the defendants have preferred this revision against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge. Learned counsel for the defendantsapplicants did not challenge the finding of the court below on the first question relating to the applicability of section 20 (4) of the Act. He confined his attack on the second question only. Aggrieved, the defendants have preferred this revision against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge. Learned counsel for the defendantsapplicants did not challenge the finding of the court below on the first question relating to the applicability of section 20 (4) of the Act. He confined his attack on the second question only. He urged that the courts below exercised their jurisdiction with material illegality in holding that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act determining the defendants' tenancy was served on them. It appears that a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was lent by the plaintiffs through registered post of the defendants' correct address on 181962. The endorsement on the registered envelope made by the postman indicated that the defendants refused to accept the notice on 12.8. 1972. The courts below held that the personal service of the notice was not necessary and as the registered envelope containing the correct address of the defendant had been posted to them and the endorsement made by the postman indicated that the defendants refused to accept the same, therefore the notice must be deemed to have been properly served on the defendants. Learned, counsel for the defendantsapplicants urged that the presumption of service of notice stood rebutted on the defendant's denial of the service of the notice on oath. Thereafter onus to prove service of notice shifted on the plaintiffs. Since the plaintiffs failed to discharge that onus by producing the postman of the witnesses in whose presence the defendants were alleged to have refused to accept the notice, the plaintiffs failed to prove service of notice on the defendantsapplicants. This question has been considered by this court and other Courts on a number of occasions. There appears to be two divergent views. However, there is unanimity on the question of raising presumption. The consensus of the various decisions in that where a registered envelope containing correct address of the addressee is sent to him by registered post and if the same is received back with the endorsement of refusal, in such a case the Court would be entitled to raise a presumption that the notice was duly served on the addressee. This principle was laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in Gana Ram v. Phoolwati.(A.I.R. 1970 Alld. This principle was laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in Gana Ram v. Phoolwati.(A.I.R. 1970 Alld. 446) But the question whether the presumption stood rebutted on a mere denial by addressee was not considered by the Full Bench and there appears to be divergence of opinion on this question. In Asa Ram v. Ravi Prakash (1966 A.L.J. 421) S. S. Dhavan J. held that where the landlords sent a notice terminating the tenancy by registered post and it was returned back by the post office with the endorsement of refusal and the tenant denied receipt of the notice, the denial of the tenant was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of receipt unless he was believed by the Court. In Nirmala Bala v. Provat Kumar Basu, (1946 52 C.W.N. 659) similar view was taken. In Ramnath v. Angan,(1978 U.P. R.C.C. 170) a Division Bench of this Court relied on the presumption of service of notice in spite of the defendants denial of service of notice. In Mushiyat Ullah v. Abdul Wahab, (A.I.R. 1972 Alld. 539) a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the presumption relating to service of notice under section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act on the refusal of the addressee does not stand rebutted on a bare denial of service by the defendanttenant. Contrary view has, however, been taken in a number of decisions where it has been held that once there is denial by the addressee on oath relating to the service of notice, the presumption of service would stand rebutted and the burden to prove the service would again shift on the party who may be relying the service of notice. This view is supported by the decisions in Wasu Ram v. R. L. Sethi, (1963 A.W.R. 472) Meghji Kanji Patel v. Kundaamal Chaman Lal (A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 387) Ram August v. Bindeshwari Tewari, (8) Jagat Ram Khullar v. Sam/ Mai, (9) and A marnath v.Smt. Champa Devi (10). In Warn Ram's case, S. S. Dhavan, J. held that in case of refusal of the money order by the landlord, received back with the endorsement of refusal, it would be sufficient to raise the presumption that it was truly delivered or tendered to the landlord. In Warn Ram's case, S. S. Dhavan, J. held that in case of refusal of the money order by the landlord, received back with the endorsement of refusal, it would be sufficient to raise the presumption that it was truly delivered or tendered to the landlord. The learned Judge however observed that if the addressee stated on oath before the court that he never received the communication the court must decide after considering all the surrounding circumstances whether he should be believed. The question is always one of fact for a denial which is not only but bare faced made by a person who stood to profit by the denial, therefore, he may have all the motive to deny, should also be considered by the Court. In Meghji Kanfi Patel's case a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court held that if the defendant stated on oath that the summons or notice was not served on him, it was sufficient to rebut the presumption and if the plaintiff failed to summon the postman to prove the service of the summons or notice the service would be insufficient. In Ram August's case a Division Bench of the Patna High Court observed that the presumption of service of a registered postcard, stood rebutted on the denial of the addressee in the witnessbox. The Banch observed that the endorsement of refusal was not proved. In Jugat Ran Khuller's case, a learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court held that if the postal cover containing the correct address is sent by registered post a presumption would arise with regard to service and the evidence of actual tender of notice and delivery is not necessary to bring about the presumption. The learned Judge further held that a statement on oath by the Addressee denying the service of the notice would however rebut the presumption so raised and therefore the burden to prove service of notice would shift on the plaintiff, In Amarnath v. Smt. Champa Devi, M. P. Saxena, J. held that the defendant's statement on oath that he never refused the notice was sufficient to rebut the presumption with regard to service of notice. The learned Judge, however, noted that the defendant was not at all crossexamined nor there existed any circumstance on the basis of which the defendants' statement could be discarded. The learned Judge, however, noted that the defendant was not at all crossexamined nor there existed any circumstance on the basis of which the defendants' statement could be discarded. The conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court in Puwada Venkateshwar Rao v. C. V. Ramana (11). The Supreme Court noticed the Bombay High Court decision in Meghji Kanji Patel Kundanmal Chanan Lal, (12) and Culcutta High Court decision in Nirmala Bala v. Provat Kumar Basil, (13) and observed that the two decisions are reconcilable. The Supreme Court observed that the presumption may stand rebutted by the statement of defendant on oath so that the plaintiff could not succeed without further, evidence. Thereafter the Court observed: "It may be that, on a close examination of evidence on record, the court could have reached the conclusion that the defendant had full knowledge of the notice and had actually refused it knowingly. It is not always necessary to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admissions or conduct." In view of the above discussion the conspectous of opinion appears to be that the presumption would stand rebutted on the denial by the addressee oath, but the veracity of the statement must be considered by the court in the light of the evidence available on record having regard to the conduct of the party concerned. No exhaustive principles can be laid down, each case roust be considered on the facts and circumstances of the case as available on the record. It is open to the Court to Judge the veracity of the denial of the party against whom the presumption of service of notice is raised. In a particular case a mere denial of service of notice may be sufficient to rebut the presumption, while in other case such denial may not be worthy of credence having regard to the conduct of the party and the circumstances of the case. I am in respectful agreement with the view of S. D. Dhavan, J. in Wasu Rana's case that the question whether the presumption is rebutted is always a question of fact and the court should consider it having regard to all the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the party concerned. I am in respectful agreement with the view of S. D. Dhavan, J. in Wasu Rana's case that the question whether the presumption is rebutted is always a question of fact and the court should consider it having regard to all the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the party concerned. In Amarnath's case, M.O.P. Saxena, J. followed this principle and he pointed out that the defendant's denial on oath was worthy of credence as he was not crossexamined and there existed no other circumstances to discredit his testimony. In the instant case, counsel for both the parties made a statement before the trial court on 25th July, 1974, that the parties will not produce any oral evidence and the documents filed in support of their case required no proof and the same may be read in evidence. In pursuance of this statement made by the counsel for the parties, the notice sent to the defendant applicants as well as the envelop containing the endorsement were exhibited and read into evidence. In the circumstances, it was not at all necessary for the plaintiff to examine the postman or to prove the endorsement of refusal. Once the document containing the endorsement of refusal was exhibited and admitted as evidence the courts below were entitled to rely on that document and to discard the bare denial of the defendantapplicant. There is yet another circumstance available on the record which shows that the plea of nonservice of the notice was an afterthought. The respondentplaintiffs had clearly stated in paragraph 3 of their plaint that the notice dated llth August, 1972, was sent to the defendant which was refused by him and as such the notice stood served on him. In the written statement the defendant applicants did not deny service notice nor they set up any case that notice was never tendered to them. In paragraph 7 of the written statement a vague assertion was made that the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the plaint are not admitted in the manner they have been stated. The plea of nonservice of the notice was raised by the defendants for the first time by means of an amendment application after two years of the filing of the suit. The plea of nonservice of the notice was raised by the defendants for the first time by means of an amendment application after two years of the filing of the suit. If the notice had not been served on the defendants, the plea of nonservice would have been at once raised, at the first available opportunity and the plaintiffs' case as stated in paragraph 3 of the plaint would have been denied, but this was not done. These circumstances support the finding of the court below that the notice was served on the defendants. It is therefore not possible to hold that the courts below have committed any error of jurisdiction or law in decreeing the plaintiffs' suit on the assumption that notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act was served on the defendants. In the result, the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs.