JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J.—This is an appeal under Article 4 of the Orissa High Court Order read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and is directed against the appellate decision of our learned brother Acharya, J., in an appeal u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. 2. One Dr. Shyamananda Patnaik working as Joint Director of Soil Conservation in the employment of the State Government of Orissa was returning in his own car bearing registration No. ORC 7733 from Berhampur to Cuttack on 18.10.1969. The car was being driven by a driver by name Sk. Piru. By about 11 A.M. the car had to negotiate with a stage carriage vehicle bearing registration No. ORG 2743 belonging to the Orissa Road Transport Company when the car wanted to overtake the bus. This happened on the Bhubaneswar side of the Kuakhai bridge. According to the claimants, the driver had allowed pass for the car by giving appropriate: indication and after the car had overtaken the bus and had come to the left side of the road, i.e., while it was in front of the bus, a truck from the opposite direction came. Suddenly, the bus speeded up from behind and dashed against the car from the rear. As an impact of the dash, the car turned right and dashed against the incoming truck. As a result of the collision, Dr. Patnaik died at the spot. Dr. Patnaik left behind a widow and four children-two being sons and the other two daughters. On their behalf as agent, Sri Brajasundar Mahanti, father-in-law of Dr. Patnaik, laid claim for compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and asked for compensation of Rs. 1,56,000/-. The claim case came to be registered as Misc. Case No. 203 of 1969. The owner of the bus, the owner of the truck and the insurer of the truck were impleaded as parties. The bus owner in its written statement that the car actually dashed against the truck and after being dashed by the truck had collided with the bus. The bus had thus no role to play in the happening of the accident. The amount of compensation was claimed to be arbitrary and excessive and several other technical objections were also raised. The bus owner in its written statement that the car actually dashed against the truck and after being dashed by the truck had collided with the bus. The bus had thus no role to play in the happening of the accident. The amount of compensation was claimed to be arbitrary and excessive and several other technical objections were also raised. The Insurer filed a written statement and it was claimed that the truck had been brought to a stand-still position when its driver noticed that a car and a bus were racing from the opposite direction. The car overtook the bus at a very high speed and there after slowed down. The bus which was behind the car by then did not slow down and dashed against the back of the car. As an impact of the dash, the car came to collide with the truck. The car was thus completely smashed resulting in the death of Dr. Patnaik. In the circumstances, the truck had no role to play for the accident. 3. Though in the written statement, no plea of want of jurisdiction of the Tribunal had been raised, an application was made subsequently and Issue No. 2 was relating to jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the claim. That question was taken up for consideration preliminarily and the plea of want of jurisdiction was negatived. Eleven witnesses were examined in support of the claim while six witnesses were examined for the opposite parties. The Tribunal on the basis of the evidence placed before it came to hold that the claimants were entitled to compensation of Rs. 75,000/- net with interest at six per cent from the date of the order till date of payment and the claim was to be recovered from the bus owner. 4. The bus owner preferred an appeal before this Court being Misc. Appeal No. 29 of 1973. The claimants preferred a cross-appeal. The learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal, but allowed the memorandum of cross-objection by enhancing the compensation from Rs. 75,000/- to Rs. 97,605/-. He modified the direction regarding interest and required interest to run from the date of the claim till payment. 5. Against the decision in appeal, the bus owner has carried this letters patent appeal and here again the claimants have a memorandum of cross-objection. 6. Mr. 75,000/- to Rs. 97,605/-. He modified the direction regarding interest and required interest to run from the date of the claim till payment. 5. Against the decision in appeal, the bus owner has carried this letters patent appeal and here again the claimants have a memorandum of cross-objection. 6. Mr. Murty for the Appellant advances six contentions which are summarised below: (i) The Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge have gone wrong in holding that the Tribunal had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the claim; (ii) The bus had no responsibility for the accident and as such the award of compensation against the Company is entirely uncalled for; (iii) Adverse inference should have been drawn against the claimants for not examining the driver of the car as Sk. Piru is admittedly alive; (iv) The contribution of the deceased should have been calculated at the most at Rs. 510/- per month and there was no justification to round it off to Rs. 600/-. Again there was no justification to enhance the compensation on the basis of the deceased being expected to have continued in service until he attained the age of 58 years; (v) The deductions which are usually allowed out of the estimated compensation have not been made by the learned Single Judge ; and (vi) The monthly contribution being about Rs. 600/- and the claimants having been found entitled to such a sum every month, the Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge should have fixed the compensation at such a sum as would have been adequate to fetch an interest equivalent to that amount every month. There was no justification to award higher compensation. 7. (i) So far as the question of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, we find that no plea on that score had been raised in the written statement. Though the bus owner filed an additional written statement that question was also not mooted. There was no justification for the Tribunal, in the absence of specific plea relating to want of territorial jurisdiction, to entertain the application made subsequently by the bus owner and on the basis of such a plea to have raised issue No. 2. On that score alone, the question of want of jurisdiction should not have been considered at any stage. Even conceding that the question arose for determination we agree with our learned brother that the Tribunal had jurisdiction. On that score alone, the question of want of jurisdiction should not have been considered at any stage. Even conceding that the question arose for determination we agree with our learned brother that the Tribunal had jurisdiction. Want of territorial jurisdiction, is on the ground that the site of the accident was previously located in the district of Cuttack, but by the time the claim was laid, it had been transferred to the district of Puri. The accident took place on 18.10.1969. The transfer was made on 1.11 1969. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, District Judges have been appointed as Claims. Tribunal in their respective jurisdictions. The Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge have found that there was no appropriate notification under the provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act reflecting the change of jurisdiction and, therefore, the territorial jurisdiction created under the earlier notification had been allowed to work. We do not think, there is any merit in the contention of Mr. Murty that the Tribunal had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the claim. (ii) The main contention of Mr. Murty is that the bus had no role to play in the accident and, therefore, creating liability for compensation against the bus owner is wholly unjustified. The learned Single Judge has dealt with the question in paragraph 12 of his judgment. We think, we would do well to extract the same here: Admittedly the car was sandwitched between the bus and the truck. On the evidence on record it is established that the car completely overtook the bus and was moving in front of it. So it was for the bus driver to have steered the bus to its left in order to take it away from the car so that the bus would not have come in contact with the car and the car, on getting a wide space, could have moved forward on its way. Moreover, if the driver of the bus would have acted that way, the bus would not have hit the car from behind even if the car, as suggested by the opposite-party dashed against the truck coming from the opposite direction. In that case the bus would not have been involved in the said accident. Moreover, if the driver of the bus would have acted that way, the bus would not have hit the car from behind even if the car, as suggested by the opposite-party dashed against the truck coming from the opposite direction. In that case the bus would not have been involved in the said accident. From the evidence on record I am inclined to arrive at the finding that after the car crossed the bus, the driver of the bus instead of slowing down its speed proceeded ahead with the same or higher speed, swerved it to the right and dashed against the car from behind as a result of which the car, which had already crossed the bus and was moving in front of it, swerved to its right side and dashed against the truck which was on the extreme left side of the road. In that process the car got sandwitched between the bus and the truck and in consequence the deceased died at the spot. From all that has been discussed above it is quite evident that the bus driver did not act with reasonable care and caution, instead he acted in a rash and negligent manner in driving his vehicle and so such a nasty accident took place. In the facts of the case the car driver cannot be held responsible for any contributory negligence. That being so the owner of the vehicle, i.e., the company of which the Appellant was the Managing Director, is liable to pay proper compensation for the said accident. The conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge is mainly on admissions of witnesses for the bus owner. O.P.W. 2 was travelling in a jeep at the relevant time from Cuttack side and was approaching the spot in question. He saw the accident from a close distance. He has stated: ... The truck was originally moving at a speed but slackened speed and was moving very slowly when it saw the bus and the car coming from its front side. By the time of accident, the car had already crossed the bus. .. Our jeep was at a distance of about 60 ft. from the bus when I saw the car crossing the bus... The bus swerved to right and struck the car. O.P.W. 6 is a Government servant who was coming from Bhubaneswat side towards Cuttack on a motor cycle. .. Our jeep was at a distance of about 60 ft. from the bus when I saw the car crossing the bus... The bus swerved to right and struck the car. O.P.W. 6 is a Government servant who was coming from Bhubaneswat side towards Cuttack on a motor cycle. He was coming at a distance of about fifty to sixty feet behind the bus. The car had overtaken him and also the bus. The car, according to him, went ten feet or so from the bus before striking the truck. The learned Single Judge in coming to his conclusion that the car had already overtaken the bus and was moving in front of the bus is thus supported by admissions of the witnesses examined for the bus owner. Admittedly both the witnesses were competent and there could be no reason to disbelieve them. Mr. Patnaik for the Respondents relying on a decision of this Court in the case of Jagabandhu Senapati and Ors. v. Bhagu Senapati and Ors. ILR 1973 Cut. 553 has pointed out that while sitting in appeal over the judgment of a learned Single Judge in a First Appeal, the Letters Patent Court should be slow to disturb concurrent findings of fact reached in the forums below. Apart from the technical question of approach to the matter, we are inclined to agree that there is positive material for the conclusion that by the time the accident took place, the car had already overtaken the bus and was before it on the road. Every vehicle coming from behind has a duty to control the movement of the rear vehicle in such a way that the vehicle going ahead would not be hit from behind. That is because the driver of the front vehicle would have no control in the matter and would not be able to avoid the knock from behind. Until the road is clear, the rear vehicle would have no right to drive ahead if by such driving it is likely to dash against a vehicle in its front. Every user of the road has an obligation to use the road in such a way that there is safety to himself and at the same time he avoids being a nuisance to others. Every user of the road has an obligation to use the road in such a way that there is safety to himself and at the same time he avoids being a nuisance to others. Once it is found that the car had already overtaken the bus and was in its front, the entire responsibility for the accident which is found to have been caused on account of the bus dashing the car from behind and making the driver of the car lose the balance, would be of the driver of the bus. The learned Single Judge in our view was right in holding that the driver of the car had no contributory negligence. We are inclined also to agree that the truck would have had no role to play in the matter particularly because its front was clear and it was entitled to proceed. The evidence shows that the truck had slowed down almost to a dead stop seeing the racing vehicles from the opposite side. There is, therefore, no force in the contention of Mr. Murty that the bus had no responsibility in the accident. (iii) Admittedly the driver of the car, Sk. Piru has no been examined as a witness. There is no dearth of evidence in this case. The accident took place on the outskirts of the town of Bhubaneswar and on the national highway in broad daylight. Both sides have examined witnesses and the manner of accident has been spoken to at length and with clarity by witnesses for the bus owner. No adverse inference has been drawn by the Tribunal or the learned Single Judge. In the premises, we are not prepared to draw adverse inference and on that score find against the claimants for non-examination of the driver of the car. (iv) P.W.10 is the authorised agent of the claimants. As already noted, he happened to be the father-in-law of the deceased Dr. Patnaik. From his evidence it appears that Dr. Patnaik became Joint Director in 1965 in the pay scale of Rs. 1,300/- to Rs. 1,500/-. According to him, he was spending about Rs. 850/- per month towards maintenance of his family and education of his children. The deceased had left behind four issues apart from his widow. As it appears, the first child is a daughter and was aged about 19 years by the time of accident. 1,300/- to Rs. 1,500/-. According to him, he was spending about Rs. 850/- per month towards maintenance of his family and education of his children. The deceased had left behind four issues apart from his widow. As it appears, the first child is a daughter and was aged about 19 years by the time of accident. Then came the sons aged about 11 and 8 and the last issue happens to be a daughter who was then aged about 6 or 7. Undoubtedly, over the education of these children, in the minimum, a monthly expenditure of about Rs. 350/- to Rs. 400/- would have been necessary. P.W.10 in his cross-examination has stated that the average monthly expenses of maintenance of the widow and the children came to about Rs. 500/-. It is on this evidence that the Courts below have come to hold that the contribution of Dr. Patnaik to the family was in the average Rs. 600/-. We do not understand how the contribution would work out at Rs. 600/- when the positive evidence is that Shyamananda was spending about Rs. 850/- towards maintenance of the family and education of the children. The dependents were certainly deriving a benefit of Rs. 850/- per month from Dr. Patnaik. As it appears, Dr. Patnaik had built a house on taking some loan from the Government and the loan was being recovered in instalments. There is evidence to show that the house had been rented out and rent of Rs. 300/- per month was coming. After deduction of maintenance and meeting of tax liability, the income from the property was estimated at Rs. 250/-. The learned Single Judge at one place of his judgment rightly came to hold that the income from the property was not to be taken into account in estimating the contribution by the deceased to his family, because whether Dr. Patnaik was alive or dead, the income would have come. We are inclined to agree with that view of the learned Single Judge. If that be so, there was no occasion to proceed on the footing that the contribution of Dr. Patnaik to the family was Rs. 600/- per month. We are inclined to agree with the counsel for the Respondents that the monthly contribution of Dr. Patnaik would have been Rs. 850/- by the time of the accident. If that be so, there was no occasion to proceed on the footing that the contribution of Dr. Patnaik to the family was Rs. 600/- per month. We are inclined to agree with the counsel for the Respondents that the monthly contribution of Dr. Patnaik would have been Rs. 850/- by the time of the accident. We are also agreeable to find on the basis of the materials on record, therefore, that the contribution of the deceased to the family was in the range of about Rs. 850/- per month and not Rs. 600/-. In view of what we have found now, there would be absolutely no force in the contention of Mr. Murty that the learned Single Judge went wrong in calculating the compensation on the basis of contribution at Rs. 600/- per month. What would be the appropriate estimate of contribution to be adopted for determining the compensation will be again considered while dealing with the cross-appeal. Mr. Murty next contended that the compensation had been claimed on the basis that Dr. Patnaik was to retire at the age of 55. Admittedly, Dr. Patnaik was born on 26.12.1923 as indicated in column 3 of the claim petition and, therefore, by the date of the accident he was around 46 years of age. By then the date of superannuation from Government service had been reduced from the age of 58 to that of 55 years. In the claim petition, therefore, the claim had been worked out on the basis of superannuation being due at the age of 55. By the time the matter came to be considered by the learned Single Judge, the age of retirement had been enhanced and Government had restored it to 58 years of age. If Dr. Patnaik had not been snatched away from the world through the medium of the accident, he would have still been alive and superannuation for him would have been an event due sometime in 1981. In the circumstances, he would certainly have had the advantage of serving Government till the age of 58 years and superannuation would have only been due then. Therefore, we find nothing wrong in the learned Single Judge calculating the compensation on the basis of retirement being due on the 58th year. In the circumstances, he would certainly have had the advantage of serving Government till the age of 58 years and superannuation would have only been due then. Therefore, we find nothing wrong in the learned Single Judge calculating the compensation on the basis of retirement being due on the 58th year. After all, it is the duty of the Tribunal as also the forum of appeal from the award to determine just compensation and on undisputed facts, it is open to the appellate authority to modify the compensation to meet the ends of justice. Here there was a cross-appeal where that question was mooted. (v) Mr. Murty has contended relying on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sabite Pati and Others Vs. Rameshwar Singh and Another , that in view of the fact that the: widow became entitled to the usufructs of insurance policies as also dues from the provident fund, a deduction of one-eighth of the compensation should have been allowed. It is true that in the reported decision this Court indicated: ... Considering the immediate payability of the insurance policy and other service benefits which must have accrued to the benefits of the deceased under the rules we are prepared to make a further deduction of l/8th of the compensation estimated as above. There shall thus be a total deduction of l/6th plus l/8th that is, 7/24th.... Mr. Patnaik, on the other hand contends that there can be no invariable rule for allowing deduction on such ground out of the compensation. It would depend upon the evidence in a given case as to what exactly is the nature of insurance policies, if any, and how much premium had been paid and what exactly is the ultimate benefit which arose out of the sudden death of the policy holder. In the instant case, there is indeed absolutely no evidence to show as to how much premium had already been paid and what was the extent of benefit directly co-relatable to the untimely death of Dr. Patnaik. We do not propose, however, to take a different view. In the instant case, there is indeed absolutely no evidence to show as to how much premium had already been paid and what was the extent of benefit directly co-relatable to the untimely death of Dr. Patnaik. We do not propose, however, to take a different view. In view of the fact that there is evidence that the widow received immediate payment under the policy and other dues to the deceased were also paid over to her, we are inclined to agree that the compensation which may be found due may be reduced by one-eighth as done in Sabite Pati and Others Vs. Rameshwar Singh and Another One cannot lose sight of the fact that in the matter of determination of compensation under the Act, no mathematical formula can uniformly be adopted and, notwithstanding all care and attention given, there is bound to be some amount of guesswork and arbitrariness. Every Court tries to reduce these elements to the minimum and reach an honest estimate. The learned Single Judge decided to allow the deduction following the ratio of Sabita Pati's case out of the amounts received. Mr. Murty contends that the deductions should have been out of the total compensation and not from the insurance and provident fund amounts. In Sabita Pati's case the deduction had been out of the compensation and we are, therefore, inclined to accept Mr. Murty's contention that here too the deduction should have been so allowed. To this extent the decision of the learned Single Judge has to be modified. (vi) The next contention advanced by Mr. Murty is that if the claimants were entitled to a compensation of about Rs. 7,200/- per annum at the rate of Rs. 600/- per month, at the prevailing bank rate of nine per cent interest, a sum of about Rs. 80,000/- would have been sufficient and there can be no justification for awarding compensation at a higher rate. Mr. Murty has placed reliance on two Bench decisions, one being of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Smt. Sushila Devi and Others Vs. Ibrahim and Another, and the other of the Madras High Court in the case of Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Jagadeeswari and Others, He has also placed reliance on some Single Judge decisions of different High Courts. Ibrahim and Another, and the other of the Madras High Court in the case of Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Jagadeeswari and Others, He has also placed reliance on some Single Judge decisions of different High Courts. No clear principle has been indicated in these decisions as to why such a method of determining compensation should be adopted. Rate of interest varies and there is no provision under the Motor Vehicles Act to obtain review of the compensation once awarded on the basis of variance of the rate of interest. That apart, the persons entitled to compensation should have the control over the compensation amount and there can be no justification to keep it out of their reach and make an annuity available to them. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept the proposition as a general rule in the matter of award of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act and would not accept the contention. 8. We may now proceed to deal with the cross-appeal of the claimants. Mr. Murty has contended that the memorandum of cross-objection is not maintainable. In the instant case before the learned Single Judge there was a cross-appeal and as a fact, the learned Single Judge allowed the cross-appeal and enhanced the compensation. No ground has been taken in the Letters Patent appeal disputing the maintainability of the cross-appeal before the learned Single Judge. Section 110-D (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act provides: Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court: Provided.... The decision rendered by the High Court in an appeal u/s 110-D of the Act would certainly amount to a 'Judgment'. No procedure has been laid down in the Act or the Rules made there under regulating the procedure to be adopted by the Court of appeal. Once the award given by the Tribunal is subjected to an appeal to the Court as such, the procedure applicable to ordinary litigations before the Court would be applicable unless the Legislature provides differently. Therefore, the CPC which makes provisions for regulation of appeals before the High Court would be applicable. It has already been decided by a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Therefore, the CPC which makes provisions for regulation of appeals before the High Court would be applicable. It has already been decided by a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Kuldip Lal Bhandari and Others, that the decision of the Single Judge rendered on appeal u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act is a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. In fact, Mr. Murty's appeal before us is on such footing. Mr. Murty is not able to dispute the position that the disposal of this Letters Patent appeal is also according to the Code of Civil Procedure. It is conceded by Mr. Murty that in this Court the prevailing practice has been that cross-appeals are entertained. In the circumstances the preliminary objection must be overruled as having no force. 9. The entire cross-appeal is addressed against the quantification of compensation and not being satisfied by the enhancement allowed by the learned Single Judge, the claimants have persisted in pressing for more compensation. Mr. Patnaik for the claimants has contended relying on the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Perry v. Cleaver 1969 A.C.J. 363 that no deduction should at all be made on account of the fact that the dues under the insurance policies and other service benefits to which the deceased was entitled have become immediately payable. The question which arose before the House of Lords was whether disablement pension received by an injured should be deducted in the assessment of compensation payable to him. As would appear from the judgment of Lord Reid, the relevant aspect of the matter was posed in the folic wing manner: ...what are the sums which he did in fact receive aS a result of the accident but which he would not have received if there had been no accident ? And then the question arises whether the latter sums must be deducted from the former in assessing the damages. Each of the five Law Lords spoke separately and while in the opinion of the majority consisting of Lord Reid, Lord Pearce and Lord Wilberforce, the amount was not to be deducted, Lord Morris and Lord Pearson dissented. And then the question arises whether the latter sums must be deducted from the former in assessing the damages. Each of the five Law Lords spoke separately and while in the opinion of the majority consisting of Lord Reid, Lord Pearce and Lord Wilberforce, the amount was not to be deducted, Lord Morris and Lord Pearson dissented. A distinction can easily be drawn between the facts of that case and the present case which would indicate that the ratio of the majority decision would not be applicable. The person laying claim to compensation was the disabled policeman sustaining injuries in a motor accident. Therefore, Lord Reid very correctly posed the question as to what were the sums which he did in fact receive as a result of the accident which he would not have received but for it. The question before us is very different. Here the claimants are the heirs ; the insurance money had nothing to do with the service of the deceased. It covered the risk of his life and what would have been due on the termination of the contract of policy if the deceased had survived the entire period, became due upon premature death. Similarly, the provident fund money which would have been admissible at the time of superannuation became due long before the event. There are series of binding authorities where deduction on such score has been made and this Court has more or less been uniformly following the practice of allowing a deduction. We therefore, see no justification for making a deviation. The next contention of Mr. Patnaik is that the quantification of compensation is erroneous, inasmuch as the Tribunal had not taken into account the normal prospects of service and benefits arising there from. Relying on the Civil List of the State Government, it is contended that at the time of death, Dr. Patnaik was in the pay scale of Rs. 1050-50-1500/- and as a fact was drawing Rs. 1450/- per month. The revised pay scales came into force with effect from 1.1. 1974 raising the pay scale from Rs. 1300-1800/-. Dr. Patnaik had about twelve years of service left when he died. In normal circumstances, he was likely to obtain one more lift, i.e., to the post of Director where the pay scale would have been Rs. 2,000-2500/-. It would be in the realm of conjecture to consider that Dr. 1974 raising the pay scale from Rs. 1300-1800/-. Dr. Patnaik had about twelve years of service left when he died. In normal circumstances, he was likely to obtain one more lift, i.e., to the post of Director where the pay scale would have been Rs. 2,000-2500/-. It would be in the realm of conjecture to consider that Dr. Patnaik in normal circumstances would have become Director, but there could be no doubt that if Dr. Patnaik lived, he would have obtained the benefits of higher pay in the revised pay scale which came into force with effect from 1.1. 1974. Superannuating in 1981, for more than seven years, Dr. Patnaik could have drawn higher salary. In Sabita Pati's case,1 this Court took into account prospects of service and while the deceased engineer by the date of death was drawing a smaller pay, while assessing compensation this Court took into consideration the normal prospects of promotion and adopted a basis which was possible only on the footing of promotions. There have been several authorities where such view has been taken. We, therefore, agree with Mr. Patnaik that keeping in view higher salary which Dr. Patnaik would have earned and the corresponding higher contribution he would have made to the family, it would be appropriate to proceed on the footing that his contribution to the family would have been Rs. 850/- upto 1973 and at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- under the new pay scale. Dr. Patnaik died on 18.10.1969. Upto end of 1973, the period works out to fifty months. At the rate of Rs. 850/- per month, Dr. Patnaik would have contributed a sum of Rs. 42,500/-. Dr. Patnaik would have superannuated on 31.12.1981. From January 1974 upto the date of superannuation would have been eight years and for the ninety-six months his contribution would have worked out at Rs. 96,000/-. The total contribution by Dr. Patnaik to the family during this period of service, therefore would have been Rs. 1,38,500/-. The contribution Dr. Patnaik would have made during the post superannuation period would have been Rs. 38,600/-. No serious dispute has been raised about this figure before us. The total contribution, therefore, would have worked out at Rs. 1,72,100/-. We are prepared to deduct out of it one-sixth plus one-eighth, i.e.. 7/24th following the principle indicated in Sabite Pati and Others Vs. Rameshwar Singh and Another . 38,600/-. No serious dispute has been raised about this figure before us. The total contribution, therefore, would have worked out at Rs. 1,72,100/-. We are prepared to deduct out of it one-sixth plus one-eighth, i.e.. 7/24th following the principle indicated in Sabite Pati and Others Vs. Rameshwar Singh and Another . Taking the net compensation at Rs. 1,72,100/- and deducting out of it Rs. 50,100/- representing 7/24 th of it, the compensation, therefore, works out at Rs. 1,22,000/-. We are prepared to deduct a further sum of Rs. 2,000/- and make the compensation at net sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- (One lakh twenty thousand). The memorandum of cross-appeal is allowed by enhancing the amount of compensation to the extent indicated. On the amount of compensation now decreed, the claimants shall be entitled to six per cent interest from the date of the claim till date of payment. The entire claim is recoverable from the Orissa Road Transport Company Limited which happens to be the owner of the bus in question. 10. The appeal is allowed in part on the question of deduction of one-eighth of amount of compensation and the cross-appeal is allowed by enhancing the compensation. Both parties are directed to bear their own costs of this appeal. N.K. Das, J. 11. I agree.