JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. This writ petition is directed against an order of 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad, dated February, 18, 1978, rejecting a revision filed by the petitioner under Section 18 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. House No. 12/1A, Beli Road, Allahabad belongs to one S. V. Deva. It had been let out to a tenant who vacated the same in May 1975. After the house was vacated by the then tenant, Sri Harish Chandra Dwivedi, the petitioner, forcibly occupied the house in May 1975, itself. After the house was occupied, the landlord sent an intimation to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer about its vacancy. It was thereafter that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer got an enquiry made and notified the vacancy. After the vacancy was notified, the petitioner applied for allotment on 10.6.1975. Chandra Bhushan Bhargava, respondent No. 3, also made an application for allotment of the house on 13.6.1975. On December 8, 1977, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dismissed the allotment application of the petitioner and allotted the premises to respondent No. 3. Against the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred a revision to the District Judge. The revision was also dismissed. Hence, the present petition. Two grounds were given by the revisional court for dismissing the revision. The first ground was that as the respondent No. 3 was an applicant, having filed an application for allotment before the petitioner, the application of the respondent No. 3 had to be considered first under Rule 11 of the Rules framed under U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The second ground was that as the petitioner was a trespasser having taken possession forcibly in May 1975, his application for allotment could not be considered because of the prohibition contained in Rule 10 (5) (d) of the Rules. Sri R. A. Sharma, counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the learned Additional District Judge committed an error in holding that the application filed by the respondent No. was prior in time. He submitted that the learned Additional District Judge had misread the evidence in recording the said finding against the petitioner. As I intend to uphold the order of the learned Additional District Judge on the second point, I do not wish to enter into the first point. He submitted that the learned Additional District Judge had misread the evidence in recording the said finding against the petitioner. As I intend to uphold the order of the learned Additional District Judge on the second point, I do not wish to enter into the first point. So far as the question that the petitioner had entered into possession of the house in dispute without the consent of the landlord is concerned, there is no dispute between the parties on the same. Before Rule 10 was amended on 25th May, 1977, the position under the Act and the Rules was that even a trespasser was entitled to the consideration of the application for allotment, there being no prohibition in the Act to the effect that a trespasser could not apply for allotment. The Supreme Court held in R. C. Misra v. Tribunal (A.I.R, 1977 S.C, 447) that as there was no provision in the Act to justify that an unauthorised occupant was disabled from applying for an allotment. It, however, appears that subsequent to the decision of the aforesaid case by the Supreme Court, the State in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 34 with Section 41, amended Rule 10. extracted below: The relevant portions of Rule 10 may be "(5) No building shall ordinarily be allotted to the following persons or for the following purposes: (a) ......... ......... ......... (b) ......... ......... ......... (c) ......... ......... (d) for accommodating a person who has entered into unauthorised occupation of a building or any part thereof without the written consent of the landlord.'' There is no dispute between the parties that the case of the petitioner would squarely fall within the ambitt of this rule. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, was that since this rule came into force much after the filing of the application for allotment by the petitioner, the same would not apply to the facts of the present case. The learned counsel urged that since the application for allotment was filed by the petitioner on 10.6. 19" 5, the same should have been dealt with and decided in accordance with the Rules prevalent at that time. After hearing counsel for the parties, I am not inclined to uphold the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel urged that since the application for allotment was filed by the petitioner on 10.6. 19" 5, the same should have been dealt with and decided in accordance with the Rules prevalent at that time. After hearing counsel for the parties, I am not inclined to uphold the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It has first to be seen as to whether the Act or the Rules confer any right on an applicant for getting a house allotted to him. If to get an order of allotment has been recognised as a right under the Act, the submission of the learned counsel can be correct, but if it not so recognised, then the submission must be repelled. No provision of the Act could be brought to my notice which lays down that a person filing an application has a right to get a house allotted. Section 16 of the Act, which is the only relevant provision on the above controversy confers right on the District Magistrate to make an order of allotment in respect of a premises which may be vacant. Rule 10 has been framed to give effect to Sections 16 and 34 of the Act. About Section 16, I have already made a mention. So far as Section 34 (8) is concerned it provides that for the purposes of any proceedings under the Act and for purposes connected therewith, the said authorities shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure, principles of proof, rules of limitation and guiding principles as may be prescribed. After reading Sections 16(1) and 34(8), one finds that the provision, made in Rule 10, is meant for regulating the procedure which an authority has to follow in making an order of allotment. Even the heading of the said Rule reads "Allotment procedure". It is well understood that the heading given to a provision of an Act or Rules show the bend of mind of the legislature for which a provision is made. The heading indicates that Rules 10 is a matter of procedure which has to be followed by an authority dealing with allotment applications. If that be so, the law is settled that a rule is retrospective unless there is an intention manifested to the contrary. The heading indicates that Rules 10 is a matter of procedure which has to be followed by an authority dealing with allotment applications. If that be so, the law is settled that a rule is retrospective unless there is an intention manifested to the contrary. Accordingly, it appears to me that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the provision made in Rule 10(5)(d) was prospective in nature and not retrospective, cannot be accepted. Reference may also be made to the words "has entered" used in clause (d) of Rule 10(5). The word being in present perfect signifies that something was already taken place and is still in operation. If a person applying for allotment has entered into possession of a building without the consent of a landlord, to him the provisions of Clause (d) will apply, irrespective of the fact that he entered into possession before the enforcement of the Rule on 25th May, 1977. as laid down by the Supreme Court in Abdul Karim v. Deputy Custodian General (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1256) the general presumption is that rules of evidence operate retrospectively. It was held that it is well settled that procedural amendment of law apply, in the absence of anything to the contrary, retrospectively in the sense that they apply to all sections after the day they come into force, even though the action may have begun earlier. Sri R. A. Sharma, counsel for the petitioner, referred to a number of authorities in support of his proposition that the rule was prospective, The decisions on which he placed reliance are: Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan (A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 655) Collector of Customs and Excise, Cochin v. M/s A. S Bara (A.I.R. 1968, S.C. 13) and Calcutta Discount Company v. I, T. Officer (A.I.R. 1952, Cal. 606). The nearest case to the facts of the present case, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, was Moti Ram's case (supra). In that case, it would be noticed that previous to the amendment, a landlord had a right to get a premises belonging to him vacated from a tenant if he wanted to reconstruct the same. By the amendment, the legislature confined the right of reconstruction only to matters specified in Clause (iii) of Section 13(3)(a). In that case, it would be noticed that previous to the amendment, a landlord had a right to get a premises belonging to him vacated from a tenant if he wanted to reconstruct the same. By the amendment, the legislature confined the right of reconstruction only to matters specified in Clause (iii) of Section 13(3)(a). Dealing with this amendment, the Supreme Court held that as the right of landlord was curtailed by the amendment, the same could not be given retrospective effect. It would be seen that the Supreme Court recognised that the landlord had a right to get the house vacated and as an impediment had been created, the same had to be treated prospective. There is nothing either in U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 nor anything was brought to my notice to show that an applicant for allotment has a right to get an order of allotment in his favour. On similar grounds, other cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner can also be distinguished. As is settled, no suitor or litigant has a vested right in the matter of procedure. Therefore, as procedure was changed during the pendency of the application for allotment, the submission made by the learned counsel that the amended rule could not be applied to the petitioner cannot be accepted. It is also not correct that in every case where a person has entered into unauthorised occupation of a building without the consent of the landlord, that an application for allotment by such a trespasser must be rejected. It would be pertinent to note that the provision of Subrule (5) of Rule 10 used the word "ordinarily". That would mean that normally such an application should not be allowed. But, one cannot rule out the possibility, of allotment even in favour of a person who entered into possession unauthorisedly, if the facts of that case warrant allotment to be made in favour of that person. The word 'ordinarily' means 'in the Urge majority of cases but not invariably'. This itself emphasises the fact that normally a premise shall not be allotted to a trespasser but the authority is not bound to do so in all the cases. The authority has been given the option or discretion to allot a premises even to a trespasser in an extraordinary situation. This itself emphasises the fact that normally a premise shall not be allotted to a trespasser but the authority is not bound to do so in all the cases. The authority has been given the option or discretion to allot a premises even to a trespasser in an extraordinary situation. As to what would constitute such a situation is a question of fact and its determination will depend on the individual circumstances of that case. The discretion has to be exercised with caution. It is not a discretion given to an arbitrator. It is a judicial discretion and has to be properly exercised on sound grounds. The term "right" in civil society is defined to mean that which a person is entitled to have, or do, or to receive from others, within the limits prescribed by law. It is also used in the sense of signifying that what recites in a determinate person by virtue of a given law. At the most, the petitioner was entitled to the consideration of the application according to the provisions of the Act and the Rule in operation of the date of the decision. He did not have any right to have the allotment order. The last submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that on the facts of the present case the courts below were not justified in applying Clause (d) of Rule 10'5) and in rejecting the application of the petitioner. As already stated above, it was within the discretion of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, to reject the application of the petitioner on the ground mentioned in Clause (d) of Rule 10(5). The matter being discretionary, it is not open to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the same when nothing could be shown by the learned counsel that the discretion was arbitrarily exercised. For these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. But, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, I grant three months' time to the petitioner to vacate the premises.