JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. :- Premises no. 6 Couper Land, Civil Lines, Allahabad belongs to one H. C. Mukerji. The premises had been let out to Capt. John Crofton Home petitioner no. 1 J. E. Crofton Home, petitioner no. 2 was employed as a teacher at St. Joseph's High School at Allahabad. He was given a quarter by the St. Joseph's High School on November 30, 1977 H. C. Mukerji, the landlord informed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the aforesaid premises was about to fall vacant as the petitioner No. 1 who was the tenant of the said premises had packed all his belongings and was leaving Allahabad permanently for Poona where his wife had obtained possession of a house of her own After having received the intimation from H. C. Mukerji, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer obtained a report from the Rent Control Inspector. The Rent Control Inspector inspected the building and submitted his report dated 9-12-1977. On being satisfied that a vacancy existed, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared that the house was vacant. He further directed that application for allotment be placed before him for making suitable orders of allotment on December 20, 1977. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer issued notices to the landlord as well as to the occupant thereof viz. J. E. Crofton Home petitioner No. 2. The petitioner no. 2 received the notice on December 17, 1977, petitioner No. 1 filed an objection on January 6, 1978 stating that he had not gone to Poona for living there permanently and that he had not removed his belongings from the premises in dispute. 2. It, however, appears that one Kumari Rita Banerji, who was also an applicant for allotment filed an affidavit on January 21, 1978 stating that the petitioner no. 1 had left Allahabad with entire bag and baggage and that the house was vacant Another affidavit to the same effect was filed by Ram Nihore Rakesh, respondent no. 3. After examination of the entire evidence, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer held that the house was vacant. He considered the applications for allotment and found that Ram Nihore Rakesh being the first applicant had to be preferred. Aggrieved by the judgment the petitioners 1 and 2 filed two revisions before the District Judge. These revisions were revision nos. 63 and 80 of 1978. He considered the applications for allotment and found that Ram Nihore Rakesh being the first applicant had to be preferred. Aggrieved by the judgment the petitioners 1 and 2 filed two revisions before the District Judge. These revisions were revision nos. 63 and 80 of 1978. The revisions were transferred to the Third Additional District Judge, Allahabad who dismissed them by the impugned order dated April 13, 1976. While dismissing these two revisions the Additional District Judge found that the petitioner No. 1 who was the tenant of the premises had gone to Poona and that he had also removed his effects from the house in question. Aggrieved by the said judgment the present writ petition was filed in this Court. 3. Before coming to the points urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it may be pointed out that the case of the petitioner No. 1 taken in the objection was that he had gone to Poona where his daughter lived for a short duration and that his only son was living in the disputed premises. Petitioner No. 1 denied that he had removed his effects from the house in question. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as the Additional District Judge held that the petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 2 gave different versions about the visit of the former to Poona and, as such, their case was not worthy of being believed. These authorities further held that the petitioner No. 1 took his entire luggage to Poona after incurring an expenditure of Rs. 5,000/-. These authorities further held that-petitioner No. 2 had been living in teachers' quarter no. 1 given by the St. Joseph's School and that he was not living with the petitioner No. 1 on these findings the courts below held that the house would be deemed to be vacant within the meaning of sub-clause (a) of section 12(1) of the Act. 4. Shri V. P. Misra, counsel appearing for the petitioner frankly conceded that the question that the petitioner no. 1 had removed his effects from the premises in dispute was one of fact and that he was not in a position to challenge the findings recorded thereon by the courts below. Be, however, contended that as the petitioner no. 4. Shri V. P. Misra, counsel appearing for the petitioner frankly conceded that the question that the petitioner no. 1 had removed his effects from the premises in dispute was one of fact and that he was not in a position to challenge the findings recorded thereon by the courts below. Be, however, contended that as the petitioner no. 2 was a member of the family of petitioner No. 1 and that he was living in the house in dispute, the courts below could not have treated the same to be vacant. 5. Section 12 of the Act deals with deemed vacancy of building in certain cases. Sub-section (1) of section 12 lays down ; "(1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if (a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not member of his family ; or (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere." In the instant case the courts below held that the petitioner No. 1 who was the tenant had removed his effects from the building which was in his tenancy and, as such, the house would be deemed to be vacant. The word "deemed" denotes that a thing is not what, in the eye of law, it is supposed to be. In "words and Phrases Judicially defined" by Roland Burrows, 1943 Edition page 47, the learned Author observed : "Generally speaking, when we talk of a thing being deemed to be something, we do not mean to say that it is that which it is to be deemed to be. It is rather an admission that it is not what it is deemed to be and that, notwithstanding it is not that particular thing nevertheless...... it is to be deemed to be that thing." This would show that the word "deemed" is more commonly known for the purpose of creating a legal fiction for the purposes of giving a special expression or an artificial construction to a word or to a thing which does not exist in reality. 6. it is to be deemed to be that thing." This would show that the word "deemed" is more commonly known for the purpose of creating a legal fiction for the purposes of giving a special expression or an artificial construction to a word or to a thing which does not exist in reality. 6. By using the word "deemed" the legislature provides that in the eventualities of one or the other situations mentioned in clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 occurring, the vacancy would be deemed to have taken place. In other words, a legal fiction has been created by the Legislature and that the Court is to assume for all intents and purposes that a vacancy has taken place. It is no doubt true that a person who disputes the fact that a situation mentioned in clauses (a) (b) and (c) does not arise, will be entitled to bring evidence on record to disprove it but once it is established that the facts attracting any one of these clauses are present, the consequence is inescapable and that is that a vacancy has occurred. As observed by Lord Asquith in Best Dwelling Company Limited v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1951 (2) All England Reporter 587 : "The Statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs, it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that." 7. Another feature of sub-section (1) of section 12, which is worthy of being noticed is that it is not necessary for a landlord or a tenant, as the case may be, to establish that the case falls under all the three clauses (a) (b) and (c). It would suffice for a person relying on this sub-section (1) of section 12 to prove and establish that one of the clauses applies. The case of the word 'or in sub- section (1) is indicative of the fact that these three clauses are disjunctive. In Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 Edition) it is statuted at page 322 that "in ordinary use the word "or" is disjunctive that mars an ulternative which generally corresponds to the word 'either' ". It may be correct that some times the word 'or' is used in the sense of 'and' as well. In Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 Edition) it is statuted at page 322 that "in ordinary use the word "or" is disjunctive that mars an ulternative which generally corresponds to the word 'either' ". It may be correct that some times the word 'or' is used in the sense of 'and' as well. But this view is possible to be taken only if the literal reading of the words reduces an unintelligent or absurd result. In the instant case neither the language employed in sub-section (1) of section 12 nor the context justifies a decision that the word 'or' be interpreted as 'and'. If such an interpretation is made that would defeat the very object and the intent of sub-section (1) of section 12. 8. Coming to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the same was that as clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 applies to a residential building whereas clauses (a) and (b) apply to both, clause (c) being special in nature will............override clauses (a) and (b). He further pointed out that since for applying clause (c) it was essential that both the petitioners should have taken up residence elsewhere, the house could not be held to be vacant. In this connection he also pointed out to the definition of the word 'family' given in section 3(g) of the Act and submitted that the petitioner No. 2 would be deemed to be the member of the family of petitioner No. 1 irrespective of the fact that the former was not residing with the latter. I do not find any tenability in the submission. The house was declared vacant under clause (a) and not under clause (c) although clause (c) in special in its nature, the difference only being that unlike clauses (a) and (b) the applicability of clause (c) was confined to residential houses. As already observed, above, the findings of the two courts below concurrently was that the petitioner no. 1 had removed all his effects and had gone to Poona. This being so, the present case squarely falls within clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 12. 9. It is, however, faintly suggested that as the house was permitted to be occupied by the petitioner No. 1 by his son, in these circumstances clause (b) would not come into play and the provisions of clause (a) also could not be applied. 9. It is, however, faintly suggested that as the house was permitted to be occupied by the petitioner No. 1 by his son, in these circumstances clause (b) would not come into play and the provisions of clause (a) also could not be applied. I do not see any rational behind the submission. As clause (a) applies, the question of applicability of either clause (b) or clause (c) does not arise. 10. For these reasons the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.