ORDER K.C. Agrawal, J. - This petition is directed against an order of the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad, dated Nov. 6, 1976. 2. Premises No. 46, Chak, Allahabad, was purchased jointly by one Smt. Lallo Devi and Smt. Urmila Devi wives of Shiv Murat Pande, respondent No. 2 in the year 1967. Urmila Devi was living at that time with her husband in a portion of house No. 94, Mahabiran Gali, Allahabad, which is the portion involved in the present case. Smt. Lallo Devi was living in another house in mohalla Chak, Allahabad. After some time an application was filed by Smt. Lallo Devi under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for release of the premises in possession of the tenant, viz. house No. 46, Chak, Allahabad. Smt. Urmila Devi was arrayed as a co-respondent along with the tenant. The application was compromised. As a consequence thereof, the release application stood allowed on 27-11-1974. 3. After the aforesaid compromise was entered into and Smt. Lallo Devi acquired house No. 46, Chak Allahabad, an application was filed by Mathura Prasad, the owner of house No. 94, Mahabiran Gali, against Sheo Murat Pan-dey, the husband of Smt. Urmila Devi on the allegation that as the wife of the respondent No. 2 had acquired a portion of house No. 46, Chak, the premises No. 94, Mahabiran Gali, in possession of respondent No. 2, would be deemed to be vacant under Section 12 (3) of the Act. The application was resisted by Shiv Murat Pandey. It was alleged on his behalf that house No. 46, Chak Allahabad, was although a joint property of Smt. Lallo Devi and Smt. Urmila Devi (wives of Shiv Murat Pandey), but was exclusively for the purpose of Smt. Lallo Devi, and as such the acquisition of that building for Smt. Lallo Devi could not amount to acquisition of the house by Smt. Urmila Devi (wife of Shiv Murat Pandey). 4. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer allowed the application of the pe-tioner holding that a vacancy occurred within the meaning of Section 12 (3) of the Act. The respondent No. 2 took up the matter in appeal. In the appeal, the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was reversed and the application filed by the petitioner was rejected. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer allowed the application of the pe-tioner holding that a vacancy occurred within the meaning of Section 12 (3) of the Act. The respondent No. 2 took up the matter in appeal. In the appeal, the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was reversed and the application filed by the petitioner was rejected. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, Mathura Prasad, the landlord has filed the present writ petition. 5. The solitary question that arises for determination is whether the release of the house No. 46, Chak, Allahabad, made in 1974 could amount to an acquisition of a house or a building by respondent No. 2. Relying on the fact that the said house belonged jointly to Smt. Lallo Devi and Smt. Urmila Devi, the submission advanced was that the release of the premises in favour of Smt. Lallo Devi would also be for the benefit of Smt. Urmila Devi and, therefore, Section 12 (3) was attracted. I do not find any merit in the submission. It is the settled position that an application under Section 21 can be filed by two landlords for the need of one of them. It is not necessary that such an application must be filed for the need of both and only then the same can be allowed. 6. In the instant case, the application was filed by Smt. Lallo Devi for her benefit on the assertion that she had no accommodation to live in. The compromise entered into in the said case would also show that the premises was released for the benefit of Smt. Lallo Devi. Accordingly, as the premises were taken by Smt. Lallo Devi for occupation by her, the same would not attract the provisions of Section 12 (3) of the Act. For applying Section 12 (3) it is essential that a tenant or any member of his family must have built or otherwise acquired in a vacant state a residential building in the same city. As observed above, the acquisition in the instant case was by Smt. Lallo Devi for her benefit and not by Smt. Urmila Devi for herself, Merely because she joined the compromise entered into between them, that would not mean that the acquisition would enure for the benefit of Smt. Urmila Devi as well. She was, if not necessary, a proper party. She was, if not necessary, a proper party. The fact that she was a party in the compromise would not bring a change in the complexion of the matter. The compromise was exclusively for the benefit of Smt. Lallo Devi. Accordingly, the court below was right in holding that the application of the petitioner filed under Section 12 (1) (b) was liable to be rejected. 7. For these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.