S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) ). The plaintiff filed the present suit aganst the defendant to recover possession of the suit premises on the ground of arrears of rent which were due from 1st December 1969 until 28th February 1972. On 4th March 1972 the plaintiff served upon the defendant notice termi- nating his tenancy. The defendant received it on 4th April 1972. On 5th May 1972 he filed the present suit for possession and for recovering arrears of rent. The learned trial Judge dismissed the claim for possession on the ground that the statutory notice served upon the defendant was invalid. However he passed in favour of the plaintiff decree for arrears of rent. The plaintiff appealed against that decree to the District Court insofar as his claim for possession was dismissed. The learned appellate Judge held that no notice under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 was necessary because the defendant was a statutory tenant. He also observed that no notice terminating the tenancy of the defendant was necessary in view of the provisions of sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (Bombay Act No. LVII of 1947 ). Therefore he set aside the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge that the statutory notice was invalid and passed in favour of the plaintiff decree for possession of the suit premises. ( 2 ) IT is that decree which is challenged by the defendant in this civil revision application. ( 3 ) THE first contention which Mr. R. N. Shah who appears on behalf of the defendant has raised is that notice under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary even when possession is claimed on the ground of arrears of rent as contemplated by sec. 12 of the Bombay Rent Act. The contention which Mr. R. N. Shah has raised is well founded. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 provides as follows:"no suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882"what sub-sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882"what sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 provides is that a notice of demand con- templated by sub-sec. (2) shall be served in the manner provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 It does not lay down that the statutory notice under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 terminating the tenancy of the tenant need not be given or that it is not necessary. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 does not open with any non obstante clause and does not provide that notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 a landlord shall be enti- tled to file a suit for possession only upon serving the notice of demand of arrears of rent upon the tenant. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 affords an additional protection to the tenant inasmuch as where a tenant has fallen into arrears of rent and the landlord seeks to recover possession of the premises on that ground from him it is necessary for the landlord to serve upon him notice of demand and give him one months time to pay the arrears of rent besides terminating his tenancy under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 By no canon of construction it can ever be said that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 dispenses with the statutory notice required to be served by the landlord upon his tenant under sec. 106 of the T. P. Act before he seeks to recover possession of the premises from the tenant. We have no doubt in our mind that a suit by a landlord to recover possession of the suit premises from his tenant must be preceded by two valid notices one under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 and another notice of demand under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12. They may be incorporated in one document. Therefore the finding recorded by the learned Judge that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to serve upon the defendant statutory notice as required by sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 cannot be sustained and is therefore set aside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 cannot be sustained and is therefore set aside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 4 ) IN our opinion therefore it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiffs to serve statutory notice upon the defendant under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 The notice upon which he placed reliance was dated 4th March 1972. The question which has therefore arisen before us is whether that notice was valid. It appears to us from the appellate judgment that the tenancy commenced on the 1st day of every English calendar month and ended on the last day of the month. The notice dated 4th March 1972 Ex. 25 was served upon the defendant on 4 April 1972. It inter alia stated that the defendant should vacate the suit premises and deliver vacant possession thereof to the plaintiff on the expiry of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. We have already stated that notice was received by the defendant on 4th April 1972 Therefore 30 days expired on 4th May 1972. The tenancy was therefore obviously terminated not with effect from 1st May 1972 but with effect from 4th May 1972. The tenancy could not have been term- inated in the midst of the month. It is not necessary to support this proposition by any decision. However if one is required it is in BHAGBANDAS AGARWALA V. BHAGWANDAS KANU AND OTHERS (1977) I RENT CONTROL JOURNAL 572. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in that case that a notice to quit issued under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 must expire with the end of the month of the tenancy. In the instant case the tenancy could have been terminated either with effect from 1st of May 1972 or 1st of June 1972. It could not have been terminated with effect from 4th May 1972. The notice to quit therefore was invalid and claim for possession on the strength of an invalid notice to quit could not have been decreed by the learned appellate Judge. The finding recorded by the learned appellate Judge in that behalf is set aside. Application allowed. .