JUDGMENT - M.P. KANADE, J.:---These three Special Civil Applications are disposed of by a common judgment because the landlord Sakarchand Gujrathi is common in all the three matters. He is the respondent in the petition filed by the tenants, whereas he is the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2566 of 1973. This is the common factor that the petitioner Sakarchand Bhiamdas Gujarathi is the owner and the landlord of an open piece of land bearing City Survey Nos. 2557 and 2597, situated at Amalner, in District Jalgaon. It appears that the petitioner Sakarchand Gujrathi has created identical plots and has let them out to the tenants. It appears that the tenants were directed to have their Kutchha construction and to carry on business in the said Kutchha construction. Tribhuwandas Vithaldas Lohana was a tenant in Plot No. 1, Eknath Rupla Mistry and Vasant Rupla Mistri are the tenants of Plot No. 2, and Subhash Khemchand Mistri, the tenant of Plot No. 5. The landlord-petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2566 of 1973, filed an application under section 13(1)(i) of Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 with the allegation that he wants to reconstruct the said plots and construct some shops on the suit land. He, therefore, obtained necessary permission for the construction alongwith the sanction for the plan for the construction from the Amalner Municipality on or about December 7, 1967. He asked his tenants to vacate the premises so that he could construct those plots. The tenants refused to give vacant possession of the plots to the petitioner on some pretext or other. Ultimately, the petitioner landlord by his notice dated December 8, 1969 terminated the tenancy of the tenants and thereafter filed Regular Civil Suits against the tenants for the recovery of possession on the grounds that the premises are required bona fide and reasonably by the landlord for erection of a new building. In the plaint it is specifically mentioned that he had sufficient and necessary funds for the purposes of the new construction. The opponents denied that he had sufficient funds to construct the new building. They also challenged the bona fides of the landlord and reasonable requirement thereof as contemplated by section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. 2. The opponents denied that he had sufficient funds to construct the new building. They also challenged the bona fides of the landlord and reasonable requirement thereof as contemplated by section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. 2. The trial Court after recording the evidence came to the conclusion that the landlord had not proved his reasonable and bona fide requirement, and in the result dismissed the plaintiffs suit. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decree of dismissal of the suit, the landlord-plaintiff filed an appeal in respect of all the three matters to the District Judge, Dhulia. The Civil Appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1972 was heard by the District Judge, Dhulia, whereas the other two appeals, viz. Civil Appeal No. 85 of 1973 96 of 1973, were placed before the Assistant Judge, Dhulia who allowed those appeals, by his judgment and decree dated May 3, 1975. Against the said judgment and decree the tenants have presented Special Civil Application Nos. 1798 of 1975 and 1799 of 1975. The Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties consented to argue all the three matters together and agreed to dispose of the three matters by a common judgment. 4. Mr. A.T. Patil, who appears on behalf of the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2566 submitted that having regard to the provisions of section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. It is not necessary to prove the financial position of the landlord, and therefore, the lower Court committed an error in holding that the landlord had not proved satisfactorily that he was possessed of sufficient funds in his hand to construct a building. It is true that sufficient funds will not be the main criteria to decide an application under section 13(1)(i) of the said Act. The provisions of section 13(1)(i) lay down that where the premises are land, such land is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the erection of a new building; the landlord can recover possession. The language of section 13(1)(i) is clear. The petitioner, who invokes the provisions of section 13(1)(i) of the Act has to prove that he requires the land reasonably and bona fide for the purposes of the erection of a new building. The language of section 13(1)(i) is clear. The petitioner, who invokes the provisions of section 13(1)(i) of the Act has to prove that he requires the land reasonably and bona fide for the purposes of the erection of a new building. Upon the language of section 13(1)(i) of the Act, the Court is called upon to apply its mind to see as to whether the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and it is bona fide. The word "requirement" in section 13(1)(i) is not merely a desire of the landlord but the word "requirement" must be read with reasonably and bona fide. In order to decide these two tests, viz. reasonable and bona fide requirements one cannot lay down any hard and fast rule or any test for that requirement. That will depend upon the facts of each case, and the Court is supposed to apply its mind and record a finding as to whether that requirement is reasonable and bona fide. Mr. A.T. Patil relied upon the authorities of the Court reported in (Rustam Sorabji Powwalla v. Ramchandra Balaji Gaikwar)1, 62 Bom.L.R. 860, and contended that the petitioner-landlord can erect a building through some person other than the landlord, therefore, the findings recorded by the learned District Judge, that the landlord has not proved satisfactorily that he was possessed of sufficient means in his hands to construct a building, will not be correct. 5. The authority cited by Shri A.T. Patil is not relevant having regard to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. It is laid down in this authority that: "The Judge must come to a conclusion on the facts of the case, and it is impossible for us to lay down any general principle which would guide a Judge in coming to a decision on the facts of the case before him whether the conduct of the landlord is reasonable or not". 6. The second authority relied upon is a judgment reported in the case of (Bhulansingh others v. Ganendrakumar Roy)2, A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 74, which lays that the premises are bona fide required by the landlord for the purpose of rebuilding, if the landlord honestly requires them for the purpose. The equivalent of the phrase "bona fide" is "honestly". It refers to the state of the landlords mind. 74, which lays that the premises are bona fide required by the landlord for the purpose of rebuilding, if the landlord honestly requires them for the purpose. The equivalent of the phrase "bona fide" is "honestly". It refers to the state of the landlords mind. The landlord, therefore, will be entitled to possession as against the tenant if he establishes that he honestly requires the premises for rebuilding. There is no dispute about the principle laid down in this authority. The petitioner will have to satisfy the Court that he only requires the suit premises for purposes of erection of a building. 7. Lastly, Mr. A.T. Patil relied on the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in (Patonwadia Budhaji Bakorji and others v. Desai Shantilal Kishordas and another)3, 1965 L.I.R. Guj. 694. In the said case the plaintiffs suit decreed on the 30th of June, 1952. On 26th of October, 1956, opponent No. 1 sold the suit land together with certain other premises to opponent No. 2 and, in the document of sale, opponent No. 1 also transferred his right to cover possession of the suit land under the decree dated 30th June, 1952. Thereafter, on 17th of June, 1958, opponents filed Darkhast No. 142 of 1958 for possession of the suit land after demolition of the hut erected by the predecessors-in-title of the petitioner. The petitioner resisted the claim for possession on two grounds: (i) that the decree being a personal decree was incapable of being assigned and, therefore, the decree could not be executed for the benefit of the assignee, and (ii) that the decree had become exhausted by virtue of the fact that, after the passing thereof, opponent No. 1 had admitted that he had no means of erecting a residential building on the land in suit. The Darkhast Court upheld both the contentions and dismissed the Darkhast. The opponents went in appeal to the District Court. 8. It is held in this case that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree and it must take the decree as it stands. The real question to be decided in this case was whether a right given to the landlord to recover possion of the property is or is not a transferable right. 8. It is held in this case that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree and it must take the decree as it stands. The real question to be decided in this case was whether a right given to the landlord to recover possion of the property is or is not a transferable right. If the right is transferable, then, unless there is anything to the contrary in the Act or in any other law the decree can be transferred and can be executed by the transferee in the same manner as the decree holder himself can do so. All the three authorities are not relevant for deciding the question in petitions herein. 9. The Appellate Court has recorded the findings after appreciation of evidence. The Appellate Court has held that the landlord has to prove that the suit land is reasonably and bona fide required by him for the purpose of erecting a new building. He has further held that the landlord must prove that: (i) there is reasonable requirement; and (2) that the requirement is bona fide. On the appreciation of evidence, the Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the landlord has not given any estimates and he has also not produced the best evidence, which was available for the appellant to prove his bank-balance or to prove the account books. He has further observed that so far as the account-books are concerned, they were not exhibited in the trial Court. He has proved the extracts of the account books in accordance with the law. Excepting his bare word, that he was got Rs. 30,000/- in the bank, the landlord has not cared to produce any evidence whatsoever, and therefore, the Appellate Court was justified in holding that the landlord has not cared to prove that he was sufficient funds and, therefore, the Appellate Court rightly held that there is no reasonable requirement of the landlord to get the possession of the block. It is further held by that Court that the conduct of the landlord is also not bona fide. In paragraph 8 of the judgment the learned District Judge has observed that the conduct of the landlord, to lease out the suit premises to the defendant after the same were restored by the original tenant in execution of the decree in Regular Civil Suit No. 209 of 1961. In paragraph 8 of the judgment the learned District Judge has observed that the conduct of the landlord, to lease out the suit premises to the defendant after the same were restored by the original tenant in execution of the decree in Regular Civil Suit No. 209 of 1961. In the trial Court, the respondent has examined the previous tenant Shaikh Akbar at Exhibit 71. He was occupying the area of 14 x 65 on a monthly tenancy of Rs. 10/- per month and the decree in Regular Civil Suit No. 209 of 1961 was obtained against him. The decree was drawn on a compromise. After the compromise decree, the temporary shed belonging to the tenant Akbar was sold by him to the present respondent for Rs. 2,500/- and out of the consideration of Rs. 2,500/-, he paid Rs. 400/- by way of arrears of rent to the appellant, and then the present respondent was inducted as a tenant on a monthly tenancy of Rs. 21/-. From this conduct of the landlord it is clear that he does not desire to construct or erect a new building. If it was really a bona fide desire on the part of the landlord to erect a new building, he would have constructed the new building on the said plot immediately after obtaining possession from the previous tenant. Having obtained the vacant possession, he again let out to the present respondent and thereafter he had filed the present application under section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act after 3-4 years. Now, these are questions of facts. The Appellate Court after appreciation of evidence has come to the conclusion that the landlord has failed to prove the reasonable requirement and also bona fide requirement. There is no error apparent on the face of the record, and therefore, it is not possible for me to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Court, and therefore, the landlords application will have to be dismissed. 10. So far as the tenants applications are concerned, being Special Civil Application Nos. 1798 of 1975 and 1799 of 1975, the learned Assistant Judge, Dhulia committed an obvious error in recording a finding that the landlord has proved satisfactorily his financial condition. It is ignored by the learned Assistant Judge that the best evidence has not been produced by the landlord, viz., bankbook and his account-book. 1798 of 1975 and 1799 of 1975, the learned Assistant Judge, Dhulia committed an obvious error in recording a finding that the landlord has proved satisfactorily his financial condition. It is ignored by the learned Assistant Judge that the best evidence has not been produced by the landlord, viz., bankbook and his account-book. The extracts of the account-book although produced it is not proved in accordance with law. The tenant has denied in his written-statement that the financial condition of the landlord is satisfactory. The burden was on the landlord to prove that he was in a position to undertake the construction. He could not give an estimate of the cost of construction. He should have also shown his resources to raise those funds. Nothing of the kind has been done by the landlord. He has merely stated in his evidence that he has got Rs. 30,000/- at this disposal. 11. In paragraph 16 of the judgment, the learned Assistant Judge has stated that he had held that the plaintiff has got necessary funds to erect a building consisting of eight shops/rooms. He has made the necessary preparations. The plan is got prepared and got sanctioned from the municipal council. All these facts indicate bona fides of the plaintiff. That fact strengthened because of the fact that the plaintiff has already constructed one shop room, part of the proposed building. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the fact that the plaintiffs requirement is bona fide. Much emphasis is put by the learned Assistant Judge on the fact that the landlord-plaintiff has obtained necessary sanction from the Municipal Council and he has got prepared the plans of the eight shops/rooms. In my view, the Municipal Council is not called upon to decide as to whether the applicant who sought the permission has sufficient funds and as to whether he wants to bona fide construct the new building. These two requirements, as mentioned above, have got to be proved by persons who come to the Court for seeking relief under section 13(1)(i). The learned Assistant Judge lost sight of these two important tests viz. reasonable requirement and a bona fide requirement. The judgment is based only on a fact that the landlord has got necessary funds to erect a building and that he has prepared plans for the construction of the building. 12. The learned Assistant Judge lost sight of these two important tests viz. reasonable requirement and a bona fide requirement. The judgment is based only on a fact that the landlord has got necessary funds to erect a building and that he has prepared plans for the construction of the building. 12. Now, having held in Special Civil Application No. 2566 of 1973, that the landlord has failed to prove that he has sufficient funds and that there is no bona fide claim of the landlord to construct a new building consisting of eight shops/rooms on the plots, including the plots of the petitioners in Special Civil Application Nos. 1798 of 1975 and 1799 of 1975, and once it is held that he has no capacity or sufficient funds and that his claim is not bona fide and his requirement is not reasonable, then these two applications of the tenants will have to be allowed. 13. In the result, Special Civil Application Nos. 2566 of 1973 is dismissed with costs, and Civil Application Nos. 1798 and 1799 of 1975 are allowed with cost, while quashing the orders passed by the learned Assistant Judge, Dhulia, dated May 3, 1975, and that of the trial Court restored. -----