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1978 DIGILAW 794 (ALL)

Nihal Singh v. Sixth Addl. District Judge, Saharanpur

1978-08-18

K.C.AGRAWAL

body1978
JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. Five applications under Section 21 (1) (a) and (b) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 were filed by the Jat Dharamshala, Hardwar, through Surja Ram Turad, Mukhtariam of the trustees of the said Jat Dharamshala (hereinafter referred to as 'the Dharamshala'). Apart from the Dharamshala, four others who claimed themselves to be the trustees also joined the filing of the applications. The Dharamshala claimed that respondents nos. 4, 5 and 6 established the Dharamshala at Upper Road Hardwar, for the purpose of being used by the members of the public as a Dharamshala, and that since then it was managed by Surja Ram Turad as the Mukhtariam of the trustees. The Dharamshala claimed that the building in question was more than hundred years old, and that it was in a bad condition. It was claimed that the reconstruction of the Dharamshala had become a necessity and in the present form the building could not be used for a long period. The Dharamshala also asserted that the trustees intended to provide modern amenities and, therefore, they got a plan for the construction of the Dharamshala sanctioned by the Nagar Palika, Hardwar, and also prepared an estimate of cost which would have been needed in the reconstruction. The Dharamshala alleged that for reconstructing the building it was necessary to get possession of the shops in the occupation of Nihal Singh, Vishnu Datt, Brahm Datt, Dharam Chand Rajpal and Harish Chand. As there were five tenants, the Dharamshala filed five applications under Section 21 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act. These five applications were contested by the tenants, mentioned above. All the tenants asserted that the need of the Dharamshala was not genuine and bona fide, and further that the Dharamshala was not a public charitable trust, and hence the applications filed by it were not maintainable. Each one of the five tenants pleaded his personal hardship in defence of the application. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. The Prescribed Authority found that the need of the Dharamshala was bona fide, and hence allowed the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The Prescribed Authority did not grant the prayer made under Clause (b) of Subsection (1) of Section 21. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, five appeals were preferred before the District Judge. The Prescribed Authority found that the need of the Dharamshala was bona fide, and hence allowed the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The Prescribed Authority did not grant the prayer made under Clause (b) of Subsection (1) of Section 21. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, five appeals were preferred before the District Judge. The Additional District Judge disposed of these five appeals by the impugned judgment. Hence five writ petitions. The first contention raised on behalf of the tenants was that the Dharamshala was not a public charitable trust, hence the applications filed by it were not maintainable. This plea had been raised on behalf of the petitioners in the appeals as well. The plea was repelled, and the learned Additional District Judge found that the building of the Dharamshala was being used for public purposes, viz. for staying of the pilgrims without any distinction of castes and creed. To support its case that the Dharamshala filed a number of documents. Some of these documents may be mentioned to show that the argument advanced on behalf of the tenants has no substance. One of these was a copy of the sale deed Ext. Although which the building of the Dharamshala was purchased. The recitals of the sale deed would show that the building was purchased for establishing a public Dharamshala, Hardwar. The scheme of administration of the Dharamshala was also filed, which was Exhibit A14. It was subsequently got registered under the Registration Act. The registration certificate filed was Ext. A15. Apart from these documentary evidence, the, Dharamshala filed the affidavits of Phusa Ram, Khet Pal, Surja Ram and Dr. Dharampal to show that the building of the Dharamshala was being used for public purposes and for staying of pilgrims without any distinction. The register maintained by the Dharamshala was also produced to show that the pilgrims used to come and stay in it. The evidence thus filed on behalf of the Dharamshala fully established that the Jat Dharamshala was a public charitable trust. There are three codes in which a voluntary transfer of property in favour of a trust can be validly and effectively made. The first is by dedication of the property. This mode is sanctioned or recognised by the Hindu Law and needs no compliance of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. There are three codes in which a voluntary transfer of property in favour of a trust can be validly and effectively made. The first is by dedication of the property. This mode is sanctioned or recognised by the Hindu Law and needs no compliance of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The second is by way of gift to the trustee or trustees. Such a transfer must comply with the requirements of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act in case of an immovable property by delivery of possession. The third method is by the creation of a valid trust. In the present case, the requirement of dedication have been fully established. For effecting a dedication under the Hindu Law no document in writing or registered is necessary. What is necessary is to establish a clear manifestation of the intention on the part of the person creating the trust. To decide the question of dedication, the conduct and the user of the property is very material. Dealing with this question, the Supreme Court in Dasaratha Rani Reddi v. Subba Rao(A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 797), observed as under: "dedication to charity need not necessarily be by instrument or grant. It can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity." In the instant case, the evidence was available in abundance to establish that the Dharamshala was a public charitable trust. In fact, the sale deed, through which the property of the Dharamshala was purchased, itself mentioned that the property purchased would be converted into a Dharamshala. This was also an evidence of the fact which was in issue between the parties. The expression "public charitable trust" has not been defined in the Act. The word "charity" however, does not have a rigid meaning and is incapable of being given a precise definition. Although the word "charity" is not capable of being precisely defined, but the most comprehensively drawn definition is: "It is a gift, to be applied consistently with the existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from suffering, disease or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of the government. The charity is active goodness the doing good to our fellow men, fostering those institutions that are established to relieve pain, to prevent suffering, and to do good to mankind in general or to any class or portion of mankind." Rama Swami v. Ayya Swami(A.I.R. 1960 Mad. 467). It was held by our High Court in Patan Sen v.Suraj(3) that establishing a Dharamshala is a charitable purpose. Thus, it is clear that the establishment of a Dharamshala is a charitable purpose. The only question is whether it is of public character. It appears to be the settled position in law that the law recognises no purpose as charitable unless it is of public character It is, however, not necessary to dwell on this point any further as in the instant case evidence was brought on record to prove and which was accepted by the courts below that the Dharamshala was meant for the general public without there being any distinction of caste and creed. Hence, the first submission that the Dharamshala was not a charitable trust so as to be entitled to file an application under Section 21 (1) (a) must fail. The second argument was that the trust had failed to establish its requirement, and in this connection the counsel appearing for the tenants also contended that the building in dispute was not in a dilapidated condition. For obtaining the relief under Clause (a) of Subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act, it is necessary for a trust to establish that the building is bona fide required by it for the objects of the trust. It is not necessary in order to succeed in an application filed under Clause (a) of Section 21 (1) to show and prove that the building if in a dilapidated or ruinous condition requiring reconstruction after demolition. The equivalent of the phrase 'bona fide" is 'honestly'. It refers to the state of the landlord's mind. A trust should, therefore, be entitled to get the release under this provision of the premises is honestly required by it for its objects, subject to the condition that the likely hardship which would be suffered by it would be greater than that which might be suffered by the tenant. It refers to the state of the landlord's mind. A trust should, therefore, be entitled to get the release under this provision of the premises is honestly required by it for its objects, subject to the condition that the likely hardship which would be suffered by it would be greater than that which might be suffered by the tenant. The condition of the building may also be a relevant consideration for deciding whether the requirement of a landlord is bona fide under Clause (a) of Subsection (1) of Section 21. That being so, the Court would be justified in looking into the scheme, the plan and the resources of the landlord to find whether his intention is bona fide. In the instant case, evidence was brought on record by the Dharamshala to show that the building was more than 100 years old and it had outlived its utility. The learned Additional District Judge found as a fact that the premises was required by the Dharamshala for the purposes of reconstruction after demolition. This will enable the Dharamshala to make arrangements for the stay of a larger number of pilgrims in better condition. Sri H. S. Nigam, counsel appearing for the tenants, however, invited my attention to the report of the local inspection made by the appellate court and submitted that the said report showed that the building was strong and stout, and that it did not require demolition. The learned Additional District Judge deciding the appeal was the same who made the inspection. In the judgment he considered every pros and cons of the matter and found that the building was in a dilapidated condition. That apart, as already stated above, for succeeding under Clause (a) of Subsection (.) of Section 21, the building need not necessarily be in a dilapi dated condition. The proof required is that the premises is bonafide required for the objects of the trust in its existing form or after demolition aid reconstruction. The view taken by me is supporte. by a decision reported in Champa Kuar Trust v. District Judge(4). In that case reference was made to a number of authorities for coming to the said conclusion. I need not refer to those authorities in this judgment. The only other question that remains to be considered is that of the comparative hardship. The view taken by me is supporte. by a decision reported in Champa Kuar Trust v. District Judge(4). In that case reference was made to a number of authorities for coming to the said conclusion. I need not refer to those authorities in this judgment. The only other question that remains to be considered is that of the comparative hardship. The courts below concurrently found that all the four tenants, excepting Dharam Chand Rajpal had alternative accommodations available to them. This was not challenged before me by the counsel appearing for the tenants. There remains the question of Dharam Chand alone. His interest was also secured by the Additional District Judge by directing the Dharamshala to let out a new shop on the ground floor to him after the new building had been constructed. This would mean only a temporary discomfort and inconvenience to Dharam Chand. So far as other tenants are concerned, they have got shops available to them and they would not be put to any loss if their shops are taken possession of by the Dharamshala and the building is reconstructed. This would be in the interest of the public. Moreover, the questions of bonafide requirement of the premises as well as that of comparative hardship are those of fact. The Supreme Court also took the same view in Munni Lal v. Prescribed Authority. For these reasons, all the five writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Each one of the five petitioners is given four months' time to vacate the premises.