JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This writ petition is directed against an order of the Ninth Additional District Judge, Allahabad dated 3.4.1976. Prabhu Dayal Kapoor is the tenant of house No. 54, Akhara Man Khan, Allahabad. The house belongs to Sohan Lal Mehrotra, respondent No. 3. It is an admitted fact that Sohan Lal Mehrotra's sister was married to Prabhu Dayal Kapoor. 2. An application was field by Sohan Lal Mehrotra under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for release of the house in the tenancy of Prabhu Dayal Kapoor. The application was contended by Prabhu Dayal Kapoor. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application. It held that the need of respondent No. 3 was bona fide and that he was likely to suffer greater hardship incase the application filed by him was rejected. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority the petitioner took up the matter to the District Judge by means of an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed by the Learned Additional District Judge by an order dated 3.4.1996. Against the said order, the present writ petition was filed by Prabhu Dayal Kapoor. 3. Sri R.N. Bhalla, Counsel for the petitioners, contended that after the amendment made in Section 21, by Amending Act No. 28 of 1976 it was incumbent upon learned Additional District Judge to; have decided the question of comparative hardship. According to his submission, the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in not going into the said controversy on an erroneous view that as Rule 16 of the Rules had been declared ultra vires, in the case of Chandra Kumar Shah v. District Judge, Varanasi, 1976 AIR 95 the said question did not arise for decision. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner appears to be well founded. It cannot be denied that after the amendment made by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976, by the Learned Additional District Judge should gone into the said question. 4. There are two alternatives open to me. One is to set aside the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge and to direct him to decide the question of; comparative hardship or to look into the evidence of the parties and to record my own finding on the said controversy. 4. There are two alternatives open to me. One is to set aside the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge and to direct him to decide the question of; comparative hardship or to look into the evidence of the parties and to record my own finding on the said controversy. The Prescribed Authority had gone into this question and recorded a finding in favour of the respondent No. 3 that he was likely to suffer greater hardship by the rejection by the rejection of the application. I have gone through the judgment of the Prescribed Authority and find myself in complete agreement with the finding given by him. The Prescribed Authority gave various reasons for taking the view that the need of respondent No. 3 was greater. 5. That apart, the parties are closely related to each other. On that account, the Prescribed Authority granted him one year's time to vacate the premises in 1975. By now the petitioner should have made arrangement for another house. In the background of what I have said above, I find no merit in this petition. But, considering the close relationship of the petitioner with respondent No. 3, and also the fact that the parties have agreed, I grant one years' time to the petitioner to vacate the premises. 6. For these reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. The petitioner is granted one year's to vacate the premises. There shall be no order as to costs.