JUDGMENT A.B. Srivastava, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has sought quashing of an order dated 7.5.1977 of the Prescribed Authority under U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), directing eviction of the petitioner from a piece of land, measuring 794 sq ft., claimed by the respondent No. 3 Nagar Palika, Aligarh to be public premises, and appellate order dated 18.11.1978 of the Additional District Judge, Aligarh confirming tie same in appeal. 2. The proceedings before the Prescribed Authority were initiated on an application moved by the Nagar Palika, Apgarh with the allegation that the State Government is the owner of the public land described as plot No. 98 in the survey sheet in Mohalla Katra Shahid.Khan, Aligarh, which is under the management of the respondent Nagar Palika. The petitioner (opposite party before the Prescribed Authority), it was alleged, has in December, 1955 entered into unauthorised occupation of 794 sq. ft. area in the said plot measuring 31' 9' x 24' plus 26'/2 as shown in the survey map attached to the application. The, petitioner, it was alleged, has without the permission or sanction of the Nagar Palika constructed his house over the land in question. A notice dt. 24.6.1969 u/S. 186 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 was served on the petitioner on 26.6.1969 but the same was not complied. Besides eviction damages @ Rs. 90/ per annum was also sought. 3. The petitioner in his written statement before the Prescribed Authority pleaded that the proceeding is barred by limitation because he is in possession over the land in question since more than 80 years. It is also barred by res judicata as an earlier suit filed by Nagar Palika against the petitioner's brother in respect of the same land was dismissed by a Magistrate on 30.11.1951 and the revision filed by the Nagar Palika before the District Judge was also dismissed, the disputed construction on the land in question was alleged to have been made with sanction of a plan by the Nagar Palika on 6.3.1956. The proceedings were also stated to be incompetent because it was earlier instituted before the S.D.M. in the year 1970 but Act 13 of 1959 under which the same was initiated and the Amending Act of 1970 was declared illegal and unconstitutional, and the proceedings could not be revived under 'the Act.' 4. The Prescribed Authority before whom the parties entered into evidence, came to the conclusion that in 1948 a prosecution had been launched against the brother of the petitioner for constructing without getting plan sanctioned, but the same failed for lack of evidence and defective notice. Thereafter the petitioner submitted a plan for construction on 16.9.1955 and got it sanctioned on 16.3.1996. The construction had been completed in December, 1955 and seeking sanction was an attempt to get the construction activity started in 1948 regularised. The Prescribed Authority further held that sanction of plan did not change the nature of the land which was 'nazul' land, and thus public premises. The petitioner was liable to be evicted. He accordingly directed the petitioner to remove his possession over the disputed land within 60 days, failing which the same was to be done by execution of the order. 5. The learned Additional District Judge in appeal held that the proceeding under the Act was maintainable and jurisdiction of any other court or authority was barred under Section 15 of the Act. There was no question of bar of res judicata on account of failure of the criminal prosecution initiated against the petitioner's brother Ram Prasad, sanction of plan under Section 186 of the U.P. Municipalities Act is no bar to the present proceeding, there was no reason to doubt the location of the disputed construction visavis the plot claimed as public premises by the Nagar Palika. Affirming the finding of the Prescribed Authority regarding the construction in question being an encroachment on the public premises, he dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, this petition. 6. Shri V.K. Gupta learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri R.P. Goel for the contesting respondent No. 3 have been heard. 7. Affirming the finding of the Prescribed Authority regarding the construction in question being an encroachment on the public premises, he dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, this petition. 6. Shri V.K. Gupta learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri R.P. Goel for the contesting respondent No. 3 have been heard. 7. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the present proceedings are barred by the principles of stare decisis, in view of the fact that prior to the present proceedings, the Nagar Palika, Aligarh had initiated proceeding against petitioner's brother Ram Prasad for demolition of the construction raised on the land in question and the same having been dismissed by the Magistrate and the dismissal affirmed by the revisional court, the present proceeding is not competent. The answer to this plea however is to be found in the own submissions of the petitioner that the said earlier proceeding was on account of construction having been made without getting a plan as mandated in the Nagar Palika Adhiniyam, sanctioned, it was not a proceeding for eviction. Annexure 7', the copy of order dated 30.11.1951 of the Magistrate would also go to show that the ground upon which the prosecution failed was the defect in notice under Section 186/307 of the Adhiniyam which was the basis of the said prosecution. The questions in issue in this case are not the same, in so far as the prayer herein is to evict the petitioner from 'nazul' land, which is public property. Secondly it is a cardinal principle of law that the judgment of criminal proceedings do not constitute res judicata in civil or quasi civil proceedings, the same being relevant only on two points, that there was a prosecution, and the same ended in acquittal. 8. The next contention of the petitioner that the present proceedings are in competent and unmaintainable, because of the sanction of plan having been made while the process of construction was still on, is also untenable. The sanction of a plan is by no means a proof of title over the land, its purpose being adherence to the construction regulations and bylaws. Sanction of the plan could not amount to divesting the State Government in its 'nazul' department, or the respondents, of its power to manage the same on behalf of the Government. 9. The sanction of a plan is by no means a proof of title over the land, its purpose being adherence to the construction regulations and bylaws. Sanction of the plan could not amount to divesting the State Government in its 'nazul' department, or the respondents, of its power to manage the same on behalf of the Government. 9. The third submission which has been vehemently put forth on behalf of the petitioner is that the construction being a big house and being in existence since 80 years or more, the claim of the respondents is barred by limitation, and in any case eviction could not be ordered by a summary proceeding under the Act, rather a civil suit should have been filed. It is also contended that the construction on the spot being in the nature of a big residential building, demolition will cause great prejudice to the petitioner. In reply it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the plea of the petitioner that he is sought to be evicted from his entire land, or house, is misconceived, because his main house is towards east of the disputed land, and only a portion of his house has been extended by raising encroachment on the land in question. 10. A perusal of Annexure T to the copy of the application for initiating proceedings moved by the respondents would itself go to show that the house of the defendant is situated towards east of this land and in west a public road is situated, and in between lies the strip of about 32' long and 24' to 26' wide, which is subject of encroachment. The plea that this encroached portion is a part of 80 years or more old house, thus is untenable. 11. His plea that the construction should be allowed to exist being an old one could also not be entertained for the reason that it is against the conforming uses of the land in question, which appears to be a part of the public road, or at least land abutting the said road. The courts could not be oblivious of the fact that in a developing society, roads or the adjoining areas, which are the nerve centre of all activities, could not be allowed to be narrowed down, and encroachments protected on hypertechnical pleas. 12. The courts could not be oblivious of the fact that in a developing society, roads or the adjoining areas, which are the nerve centre of all activities, could not be allowed to be narrowed down, and encroachments protected on hypertechnical pleas. 12. On facts also the plea of bar of limitation does not stand scrutiny. The Prescribed Authority who had the jurisdiction to decide the questions of fact arising has on the basis of evidence led, come to a conclusion that the disputed construction was an encroachment made on the 'nazul' land, around the year 195556 or earliest having begun in the year 1948, completed around 195556. The appellate court has also affirmed the same. The Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction could not reassess the evidence to come to a different conclusion, more so when no perversity in the approach of the courts below is shown. In fact the own statements, of the petitioner Har Prasad and his brother Ram Prasad before the Prescribed Authority, Annexures 5' and 6' would go to show that the disputed construction is recent addition to their house, and is not a 80 year old construction as contended. They have also not filed any earlier sanctioned plan or any document of title, to show that this land all along belonged to them or their predecessors and they had their authorised construction on the same in the past also. 13. Yet another contention that a civil suit, and not proceedings under the Act, was the remedy of the respondent is also without substance. No such complicated questions arose in the proceedings which could not be decided in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act by Prescribed and the Appellate Authority, nor is the construction proved to be of olden times. Consequently no benefit can be derived by the petitioner of the observations in the union of India v.Babu Lal Gupta; 1975 A.L.J. 375; Sain Das v. District Judge, Nainital and others, 1985 (1) A.R.C. 326, M/s. Bharat Cooking Coal Limited v. Estate Officer and others, A.I.R. 1991 N.O.C. 3 (Pat). 14. For all these above stated reasons, therefore, the petitioner has not made out any case for interference with the two impugned orders and the writ petition is devoid of merit. 15. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated 10.4.1979 is recalled 16. No order as to costs.