ORDER K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a tenants writ petition filed against the judgment of the 1st Additional District Judge, Nainital dated Nov. 21, 1977 allowing an appeal filed by respondent No. 3. 2. An application under Section 21 (1) (a) was filed by Jai Kumar, respondent No. 3 for release of the shop in occupation of the petitioner on the ground that on a mutual partition held amongst the members of the family, the shop in question fell to the share of Jai Kumar and as he was unemployed, after obtaining technical education in 1966 he wanted to start business of generating sets and electric goods in the premises in dispute. On the objection raised by the petitioners Jai Kumar impleaded M/s. Sudama Lal Ram Ashrey and S/Sri Onkar Saran and Raj Narain as applicants. Jai Kumar alleged that the petitioners had their own shop in Durga Mandi and that they could carry on their business in the same. 3. The application was contested by the petitioners. As already observed above, the shop had been let out to a firm M/s. Kesho Saran Laxmi Narain which was constituted of Laxmi Narain, Manohar Lal and Dinanath as partners. The tenants claimed that Jai Kumar did not bona fide require the shop for his own use as he did not want to start the business himself. It was claimed by the petitioners that Jai Kumar was a partner of the firm M/s. Sudamalal Ram Ashrey and that the earnings made from the said firm in which Jai Kumar had also a share was sufficient to meet the need of Jai Kumar. It was claimed that the application was filed by Jai Kumar with an ulterior motive to get the tenants thrown out of the possession of the premises in dispute so that the respondents may be able to let out the same at higher rent. 4. Apart from filing affidavits the two sides produced witnesses also in support of their respective cases. 4. Apart from filing affidavits the two sides produced witnesses also in support of their respective cases. The Prescribed Authority held that Jai Kumar did not bona fide require the shop for his own need, firstly, because he did not make the application for the release of the shop soon after obtaining diploma in 1966, secondly, he did not make any application for release for two years after he vacated the shops in Radhey Shyam building, thirdly, because Jai Kumar did not know the business of generating sets and fourthly, because he was a partner in the firm M/s. Sudamalal Ram Ashrey and that he earned thousands of rupees as his share. 5. The application was rejected by the prescribed authority but the appeal preferred by respondent No. 3 was allowed and the order of the Prescribed Authority was set aside. Consequently, the application of respondent No. 3 stood granted. Aggrieved, the tenants have filed the present writ petition. 6. Two points arise for consideration in this writ petition. The first was whether the respondent No. 3 bona fide required the shop for Jai Kumar to start the business in generating sets and electrical goods and the second was whether likely hardship which would be suffered by the landlord would be greater than that which might be suffered by the tenant. 7. Apparently, these two questions are those of facts. The findings arrived at by the appellate authority on these two issues cannot be reversed or set aside, unless they suffered from a manifest error of law. 8. Coming to the question of the bona fide requirement, the main emphasis laid on behalf of the petitioners was that Jai Kumar belonged to a rich family and he really did not intend to start a business in the premises in dispute. It was pointed out that Jai Kumar had taken a shop from one Radhey Shyam on rent but the fact that he vacated the said shop showed that he did not require the disputed shop for starting a business in the said premises. It is true that Jai Kumar had taken a shop some time back on rent but the court below believed Jai Kumars version that the said shop was to be vacated by him because of the exorbitant rent. It is true that Jai Kumar had taken a shop some time back on rent but the court below believed Jai Kumars version that the said shop was to be vacated by him because of the exorbitant rent. As the explanation offered by Jai Kumar was believed by the appellate authority, it is not open to me to reverse the finding recorded thereon in this writ petition. Sri V. N. Khare, counsel appearing for the petitioner stressed that the aforesaid controversy was decided in favour of Jai Kumar by the appellate authority under a wrong impression that since Jai Kumar had no sufficient opportunity to explain the aforesaid adverse circumstance against him, the same did not weigh against Jai Kumar. It is not correct that the explanation offered by Jai Kumar was not accepted on this basis. Dealing with this aspect of the matter the Additional District Judge observed "on behalf of the applicants it has been deposed that the shops were vacated because of the rent being rather high." 9. The next question that was urged in this connection was that as Jai Kumar belonged to a rich family and was having huge income from the profits of the firm of which he was a partner, his need for this shop was not genuine. It is not possible to accept the submission of the learned counsel. This may be true that Jai Kumar was a member of the family which was affluent, but that by itself is not determinative of the controversy that his need was not genuine. The question of the genuineness of the need is to be decided on the basis whether a claim of a landlord is in reality a genuine one. This requirement can be satisfied by looking into the surrounding circumstances. Investigation, however, is only to be confined to the existence of an intention in the mind of the landlord but intention must be honestly held. In the present case, the court below found that the requirement of Jai Kumar of the premises was genuine and honest. He had no other shop to start a business and the shop in dispute was the only one which could suit his purpose. 10. Next comes, the question of the hardship. It is here that the need of a landlord is to be compared with that of the tenant. He had no other shop to start a business and the shop in dispute was the only one which could suit his purpose. 10. Next comes, the question of the hardship. It is here that the need of a landlord is to be compared with that of the tenant. The relevant provision of Section 21 itself provides that the prescribed authority shall, except in cases, provided for in the Explanation, take-into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have-regard to such factors as may be prescribed. A reading of the aforesaid pro-, vision shows that the onus of proving of hardship lies both on the tenaru and the landlord, with regard to their respective hardships. Both sides have to bring evidence on record to show the hardship which would happen to him, in case his case is not accepted. In this regard, the most important thing to be inquired into is whether another accommodation is available to the tenant. Whether the accommodation is available depends on the circumstances and the evidence of each case. The requirement of availability of alternative accommodation does not mean equally luxurious or comfortable. 11. In the instant case, the appellate authority found that the petitioner had another shop in his possession which was situated in Durga Mandi. It, however, found that as the petitioner was carrying on the business of sale of foodgrains in retail in the disputed shop for the last several years it could be possible to direct the petitioners to retain the disputed shop and to give the shop situated in Durga Mandi to the landlords. The petitioners learned counsel contended that the direction given by the appellate authority was illegal. It was strongly contended that under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the appellate authority could not issue a direction to the above effect. Be that as it may, since the direction was issued for the benefit of the petitioners, it was up to them to avail it or to refuse it. Having found that the need of the respondent No. 3 was genuine, the court below could allow the application without giving any direction. Be that as it may, since the direction was issued for the benefit of the petitioners, it was up to them to avail it or to refuse it. Having found that the need of the respondent No. 3 was genuine, the court below could allow the application without giving any direction. If the petitioners felt aggrieved by the direction and intended to retain the shop situated in Durga Mandi, the petitioner may refuse to exchange the shop in dispute with the shop situated in Durga Mandi. 12. The next submission made was that as the court below did not find that the landlords were likely to suffer greater hardship and the finding only was that the likely hardship to the parties would be equal, the application should have been rejected. It was submitted that an application under Section 21 can be allowed only if hardship of the landlord is greater and not where it is evenly balanced. It is true that the observations, made by the court below at one place, are to the effect that the hardship of (he parties was evenly balanced but the court below did not dispose of the question of hardship simply by making those observations. He concluded by observing "therefore, if they give that shop to the applicants they would not suffer and Jai Kumar would also get employment. This shows that the likely hardship of the landlord would have been greater if the application was rejected. Moreover, in a case where the hardship is evenly balanced it is possible for a court to make an order of release in favour of the landlord. This has been so found in two decisions of this Court reported in Jagat Narain Srivastava v. Sitaran: Sharma (1977 Ren CJ 634) (All) and Mst. Rashid Jahan v. Shrimati Shirajan (1977 (UP) RCC 593) (All). A similar argument was advanced before the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Vishwanath v. Bhaskar Digamber, (1977) 4 SCC 374 : ( AIR 1977 SC 2183 ). In that case also the joint Judge disposing of an application filed under Section 13 (2) of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1946 observed that the hardship of the landlord for whose requirement the premises were required and the tenants were placed in almost identical circumstances." This judgment of the Joint Judge was reversed by the High Court. The Supreme Court disagreed with the judgment of the High Court and observed "it may be mentioned that the learned joint Judge did not deal with the question of hardship by merely resorting to the tilting of the scales that though even that course may in conceivable cases be permissible." These observations show that where the hardship is evenly balanced, it is permissible in some cases to-hold that the need of the landlord is greater, if facts justified it. In the present case whereas the tenants had an alternative accommodation Jai Kumar was lying idle without any work and employment. Hence, this justified the release in his favour. The emphasis laid on the fact that Jai Kumar was a rich man does; not impress me. In the present case, the tenants are also similarly situated and that being so, it is a neutral circumstance. 13. The learned counsel also stressed that the petitioner could not carry on the selling foodgrains in retail in the shop situated in Durga Mandi, the court below should not have taken that shop into consideration at all. fail to understand the logic behind this argument. According to the petitioners, they were carrying on the wholesale business in the said shop and as wholesale business was a seasonal one, the shop of Durga Mandi used to be closed mostly. Since, the learned Judge found that the shop of Durga Mandi, on the own assertion of the petitioners, was not of much use to them, he gave the option to the petitioners to give that shop to the respondents, if they so desired. In this way, the petitioners would be able to retain the shop in question and would be also able to do sale of foodgrains in retail as well as in wholesale. 14. Apart from the shop situated in Durga Mandi, the averments made in counter-affidavit show that the petitioner have another shop in the locality in which the shop in question was situated. The petitioners were doing retail foodgrains business in the said shop. These averments were made in paras 15 and 18 of the counter-affidavit. No effective reply to these paragraphs has been given by the petitioners. Accordingly if the petitioners leave the shop in dispute they would not be put to any inconvenience. 15. The petitioners were doing retail foodgrains business in the said shop. These averments were made in paras 15 and 18 of the counter-affidavit. No effective reply to these paragraphs has been given by the petitioners. Accordingly if the petitioners leave the shop in dispute they would not be put to any inconvenience. 15. The last argument stressed was that as Jai Kumar was a member of the rich family, the application ought to have been rejected. The present is a dispute between two rich families. The petitioners, therefore, cannot rely on the richness of the respondents for the rejection of the application, inasmuch as this criterion, if applied, can go against them as well. 16. For these reasons the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The petitioner As granted three months time to vacate the premises.