JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. This writ petition is directed against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Bareilly, dated 31st of October, 1977. Rameshwar Dayal, respondent no. 1, who is the owner of premises No. 35B, Civil Lines, Bareilly, filed an application under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 against the petitioners for release on the ground of personal need. The said application was contested by the petitioners, The application was dismissed on 26th of June, 1976. Meanwhile, U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was amended. By this amendment, a new subsection (8) "was inserted to Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. This subsection (8) confers a right on a landlord to get the rent enhanced on the basis of the market value of the property let out to a tenant. Respondent no. 1, thereafter, filed an application purporting to be under subsection (8) to Section 21 for enhancement of rent from Rs. 550/ to Rs. 208333 paise. The application was contested by the petitioners. The respondent no. 1 filed evidence in support of its claim that the correct value of the property was Rs. 2,50,000/ and that the respondent no. 2 was entitled to get Ks. 209333 paise on the basis of the said valuation. The Prescribed Authority upheld the contention raised on behalf of the respondent no. 1 and allowed the application. As a result of the allowing of the application, the rent was enhanced from Rs. 550/ to Rs. 208333 passed per month. Against the aforesaid order, the present writ petition was filed. The first question that arises for decision is whether the impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority could be challenged by means of an appeal under Section 22 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. If that be so, the present writ petition would not be maintainable and would be liable to be dismissed on that ground. The first question that arises for decision is whether the impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority could be challenged by means of an appeal under Section 22 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. If that be so, the present writ petition would not be maintainable and would be liable to be dismissed on that ground. Section 22 lays down that: "Any person aggrieved by an order under Section 21 or 24 may, within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal against it to the District Judge, and in other respects, the provisions of (Section 10) shall mututis mutand is apply in relation to such appeal." It would be seen that the scope of Section 22 takes within its ambit, an order which may be passed under Section 21 of the Act, and an order will include the order contemplated by subsection (1) to Sec. 21. Accordingly, any order which may be passed under subsection (8) to Section 21 can be challenged by means of an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. Hence the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground. That being so I need not go into the merits of the case. It may be true that subsection (8) to Sec. 21 was inserted by the amending Act No, 28 of 1976 which came into force on 5th of July, 1976 but that would not make any difference on the interpretation of Section 22 of the Act. The language of Section 22 of the Act is wide enough to include an order which is required to be passed in subsection (8) to Sec. 21. Merely because the original act did not make any provision providing for the eventuality contemplated by subsection (8) to Section 21 of the Act, that would not be sufficient to hold that the appeal could not be filed under it. The language employed in section 22 includes an order contemplated by subsection (8) to Sec. 21 as well. It was not necessary for the legislature to make any amendment in Section 22 for the purpose of making an order covered by, subsection (8) to section 21 appealable. For these reasons, the writ petition fails, and is dismissed with costs to respondent no. 1.