JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This is defendant's revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge Moradabad, setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissing the plaintiff-opposite parties' suit for ejectment of the defendant-applicants. 2. Anwar and Shabir were owners and landlords of the disputed house which was in the tenancy of Nasiruddin, Predecessor-in-interest of the defendant- applicants. The plaintiff-opposite parties purchased the house in dispute from Anwar and Shabir under a sale deed on 2-3-1972. The plaintiff-opposite parties, wish the help of previous owners, made an attempt to demolish the house in question. Nasiruddin filed a suit for injunction against them before the Civil Court and obtained an injunction order restraining the plaintiff- opposite parties and the previous owners from interfering with his possession or demolishing the house in question. On 4th May, 1972, Nasiruddin tendered a sum of Rs. 97.50 to Shabir and Anwar, previous owners, as rent for the period from 15-4-1971 to 14-5-1972 but they refused to accept the money order and returned the same back to Nasiruddin. On 5-5-1972, Anwar and Shabir executed another sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-opposite parties transferring their right to recover arrears of rent due from Nasiruddin for the period 5-4-1971 to 1-3-1972. On 10th June, 1972, Nasiruddin tendered three months rent to the plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 by money order but he refused to accept the same. On 11th July, 1972, plaintiff-opposite party no. I filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment against Nasiruddin on the pleading that a composite notice dated 18th May, 1975 demanding rent amounting to Rs. 97.50 and terminating the tenancy of Nasiruddin was served on him but he failed to comply with the terms of the notice. 3. Nasiruddin contested the suit. He asserted that notice dated 18th May, 1972 was neither tendered to him nor he refused to accept the same. He further asserted that since he had tendered the rent to the plaintiff-opposite party, he was not a defaulter. As a precautionary measure, Nasiruddin deposited the entire rent in the court. During the pendency of the suit, Nasiruddin died on 30-9.1972 and thereafter the defendant-applicants were brought on record as his legal heirs and successors. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on two grounds. As a precautionary measure, Nasiruddin deposited the entire rent in the court. During the pendency of the suit, Nasiruddin died on 30-9.1972 and thereafter the defendant-applicants were brought on record as his legal heirs and successors. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on two grounds. Firstly, it held that Nasiruddin was not a defaulter and, secondly, the tenancy of Nasiruddin was not determined before the filing of the suit as the alleged notice dated 18th May, 1976, was not served on Nasiruddin and he had never refused to accept the same. On revision by the plaintiff-opposite party, the Additional District Judge upheld - the trial court's finding that Nasiruddin was not a defaulter but on the second question, the Additional District Judge held that since the notice dated 18th May, 1972 was returned back with the endorsement of refusal, there was presumption of service of notice on Nasiruddin and since that presumption stood unrebutted, the notice must be deemed to have been served on Nasiruddin. As the contractual tenancy of Nasiruddin had been determined, his heirs were liable to ejectment and they were not entitled to the protection of the Rent Control Legislation. 4. Learned counsel for the defendant-applicant urged that after the death of Nasiruddin, the defendant-applicants who are his sons inherited the tenancy and as they were not defaulters, no decree of ejectment could be passed against them. Reference was made to section 3(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 which defines 'tenant'. In the said definition, 'tenant' in relation to a residential building, includes legal heirs who may normally have been residing with the tenant at the time of his death. Thus, tenancy rights are heritable under the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 although under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, tenancy rights could not be inherited. Under the 1947 Act, tenancy of person terminated on his death and the heirs of the deceased tenant did not acquire any right of tenancy. See: Chaudharain Smt. Bhartoo v. Mst. Asa Devi, 1966 A.W.R. 55 (F.B.) There is no dispute that-the old Act (1947 Act) applied to the building when the plaintiff filed the suit. Under the 1947 Act, tenancy of person terminated on his death and the heirs of the deceased tenant did not acquire any right of tenancy. See: Chaudharain Smt. Bhartoo v. Mst. Asa Devi, 1966 A.W.R. 55 (F.B.) There is no dispute that-the old Act (1947 Act) applied to the building when the plaintiff filed the suit. The U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was enforced on 15th July, 1972 whereas the plaintiff had filed suit for ejectment against Nasiruddin, the original tenant, on 11th July, 1972 on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the 1947 Act. Under section 43(2)(s) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, a suit for eviction of a tenant instituted on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 3 of 1947 Act pending immediately before the commencement of the Act is to continue and conclude as if the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 has not been passed. In view of this provision, the rights of the parties continue to be determined in accordance with the provisions contained in 1947 Act and the defendant-applicants are not entitled to claim benefit of section 3 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The defendant-applicants could not, therefore, inherit the right of tenancy on the death of their Nasiruddin, as the old Act applied to the suit. 5. Learned counsel for the applicants contended that the Additional. District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the trial court on the question of rebuttal of evidence of service of notice. I find considerable force in this contention. As already noted, Nasiruddin had taken stand in his written statement that the notice determining the tenancy was never tendered nor he ever refused to accept the same. He further asserted that the previous landlords had taken proceedings against him for his ejectment but on their failure they adopted various other tactics to eject him and in that process they executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-opposite parties and tried to demolish the house in question forcibly. Before Nasiruddin could be examined in the witness box he died. Thereafter, his widow Smt. Sarwari Begum appeared in the witness box acid denied the service of notice. She asserted that Nasiruddin was an old man of 80 years. Before Nasiruddin could be examined in the witness box he died. Thereafter, his widow Smt. Sarwari Begum appeared in the witness box acid denied the service of notice. She asserted that Nasiruddin was an old man of 80 years. He generally remained at his house and the notice was never tendered to him nor he refused to accept the same. The trial court recorded a finding that the presumption of service of notice stood rebutted. The trial court drew inference on the basis of six different circumstances : (1) Nasiruddin was an old man of 80 years and due to illness he remained in his house as he was unable to move, (2) the previous owners in collusion with the plaintiff- opposite parties had taken law in their own hands to demolish the house, (3) the statement of Smt. Sarwari Begum, widow of Nasiruddin relating to denial of service of notice was true, (4) Nasiruddin had not corroborated the assertion as contained in paragraph 5 of the plaint to the effect that the previous landlord started litigating against him but failed and therefore adopted tactics to create ground of ejectment in their favour with the object of obtaining possession of the disputed house. (5) the statement of Smt. Sarwari Begum and the report of the Amin, Ex. A-11 which indicated that the plaintiff-opposite parties had tried to demolish the disputed house, and (6) Nasiruddin's complaint (Ex. A-8) to the Post Master against the postman for having submitted a false report of refusal of acceptance of notice. The trial court considered these circumstances and recorded a finding that the evidence of service of notice stood rebutted and since the plaintiff-opposite parties failed to produce any evidence that the notice was actually tendered to Nasiruddin, the notice was never served on Nasiruddin. The Additional District Judge on re-appraisal of the evidence recorded contrary findings. The Additional District Judge was exercising jurisdiction under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act he could not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial court unless those finding were found perverse and contrary to law. The Additional District Judge has however, recorded no such finding. It is well settled that inferences drawn by the trial court on the basis of the proved facts cannot be interfered with the revisional court merely because different view may be possible. The Additional District Judge has however, recorded no such finding. It is well settled that inferences drawn by the trial court on the basis of the proved facts cannot be interfered with the revisional court merely because different view may be possible. The learned Additional District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in interfering with the findings of the trial court. In this view of the matter Nasiruddin's tenancy was never determined in accordance with law. Consequently the suit for ejectment of Nasiruddin was not maintainable. 6. Since the plaintiff-opposite parties suit was not maintainable on account of non-service of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act no decree for ejectment could be passed against the defendant applicants. 7. The revision succeeds and is accordingly allowed and the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge is set aside and the decree of the trial court is restored. Parties shall bear their own costs.