A. M. AHMADI, J. ( 1 ) THE above discussion of the prosecution evidence leads us to the conclusion that the fatal blow was inflicted by the accused and none else. Undoubtedly only one blow was given and that raises the question whether the offence committed by the appellant-accused is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Whether the fact that the appellant gave only one blow with the knife on the chest of the deceased would mitigate his offence and reader him liable for capable homicide not amounting to murder must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Dr. Dhanraj who performed the post mortem noticed a transverse penetrating stab wound 3 1/2 cms. long and 3/4 cm. in breadth on the left chest above the breast at the third inter-costal space 3 inches away from mid-line and 2 1 inches from medial end of left clavicle. On internal examination a haemetoma 11 cms. x 4 cm. on the third and fourth inter costal space of the left side of chest just above the cartilage of the third rib was found with the pleura torn. On the right ventricle 2 cms. above the apex there was a perforation wound with clear cut margins. The diaphragm was also damaged and the chest cavity was full of 700 c c. of clotted blood. The deceased was pregnant by about 12 weeks. The accused came duly armed with a Rampuri knife to the house of the deceased and gave the fatal blow on the chest of the deceased who was in sitting position. There was absolutely no exchange of words or struggle with the accused before he gave the fatal blow. This is not a case of the crime having been committed without premeditation and in a sudden quarrel in the heat of passion. The accused came determined to strike chose the seat of injury and while the victim was still sitting he thrust the knife deep into her chest. Dr. Dhanraj says that the injury was so serious that the victim must have succumbed immediately without uttering a word. The accused came determined to strike chose the seat of injury and while the victim was still sitting he thrust the knife deep into her chest. Dr. Dhanraj says that the injury was so serious that the victim must have succumbed immediately without uttering a word. Where a person stabs another in a vital part with a dangerous weapon like a big Rampuri knife the inference is that he intended to cause death or bodily injury as is likely to cause death and if death ensues as a result thereof he would be guilty of murder. In any event his act would betray an intention to cause bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death in which event also he would be guilty of murder. We are therefore of the opinion that the case of the accused squarely comes within the purview of sec. 300 I. P. C. ( 2 ) REFERENCE was made by Mr. Panchal to the case of Chamru Budhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 652. In that case a severe exchange of words preceded the incident. Tempers rose high and both the sides came out from their respective houses in anger. In the course of the incident a fatal lathi blow was inflicted on the head of the deceased causing instantaneous death. It was found that the crime was committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion. In the aforesaid circumstances it was held that the fatal injury was not caused with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury as was likely to result in death. This case is not an authority for the proposition that even if a deliberate blow is given on the head of the victim with a lathi causing an injury sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death and actually results in death the case would not fall within the mischief of sec. 300 I. P. C. The facts of the present case bear no anology to the facts of the case on which Mr. Panchal relies. In this case the accused acted in cold blood chose his weapon and the seat of injury and caused a deep penetrating wound on a vital part of the human anatomy. Hence the case relied upon by Mr. Panchal is clearly distinguishable on facts. Panchal relies. In this case the accused acted in cold blood chose his weapon and the seat of injury and caused a deep penetrating wound on a vital part of the human anatomy. Hence the case relied upon by Mr. Panchal is clearly distinguishable on facts. ( 3 ) WE may recall the observations of the Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1958 S C. 465 to repel the contention of Mr. Panchal. It transpires from para 3 of the judgment that the victim Khem Singh was injured by a single blow of a spear thrust in the abdomen which caused the following injury :"a punctured would 2x 1/2 transverse in direction on the left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal". Three coils of the intestines were found coming out of that wound. The incident had occurred at 8. 0 P. M. On the question whether the accused was guilty of murder the Supreme Court observed as under in para 12 of the judgment; "to put it shortly the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under sec. 300 thirdly; First it must establish quite objectively that a bodily injury is present; secondly the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations thirdly it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury that is to say that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present the enquiry proceeds further that fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. It was further observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 13 of the judgment as under:"once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and of course the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under sec. 3c0 thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It was further observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 13 of the judgment as under:"once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and of course the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under sec. 3c0 thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two ). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether as a matter of purely objective inference the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder". In the instant case we find that all the aforesaid elements pointed out by the Supreme Court have been established and proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. We also find that having regard to the past history the accused intended the injury which he caused after selecting the seat of injury when the deceased Bai Sharda was in sitting position She was in her own house and the accused intending to cause the injury which he ultimately caused entered the house with a knife and inflicted the fatal blow in the presence of two eye witnesses. The injury was so serious that it resulted in almost instantaneous death of the victim. We are therefore of the opinion that all the four elements pointed out by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision are satisfied in the instant case and hence the offence is clearly one of murder. We are therefore in agreement with the view taken by the learned trial Judge that the accused has committed the offence punishable under sec. 302 I. P. C. The learned trial Judge has rightly awarded the sentence of imprisonment for life. We are therefore in agreement with the view taken by the learned trial Judge that the accused has committed the offence punishable under sec. 302 I. P. C. The learned trial Judge has rightly awarded the sentence of imprisonment for life. ( 4 ) IN view of the above discussion we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same. Appeal dismissed. .