ORDER George Vadakkel, J. 1. This is a revision by the landlord who sought eviction of the respondent under S.11(2)(b), 11(4)(iii), 11(4)(iv), 11(7) and 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. It (the revision petitioner is an institution) succeeded before the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority. On revision by the tenant the application for eviction was dismissed by the revisional court. Hence this revision by the landlord institution. 2. I may at the outset say that the grounds founded on S.11(4)(iii) and 11(8) were not pressed before me by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner. The ground mentioned in S.11(2)(b) also need not be examined herein in so far as the tenant has admittedly deposited arrears of rent. There remain for consideration only the grounds founded on S.11(4)(iv) and 11(7) of the Act. It would be advantageous to consider the said grounds in the reverse order. 3. S.11(7) of the Act enables a religious, charitable, educational or other public institution, to seek eviction of a tenant occupying a building belonging to such institution "if the building is needed for the purposes of the institution." There is no dispute before me that the revision petitioner is an institution coming within the purview of the aforesaid provision. The only question that arises so far as the case on hand is concerned with reference to the aforesaid provision is as to whether the institution needs the building in question for the purposes of the said institution. 4. Relying on Exts. A-4, A-5 and A-6 the revisional court held that the said "letters leave no room for doubt and they are clear that it is the society which is going to construct the building and the Book Shop is also to be run by it". The society made mention of therein is the Christian Literature Society on whose behalf its General Secretary has sent the said letters to the Treasurer of the revision petitioner institution. The revisional court has considered the said letters elaborately in Para.10 and 11 of its judgment and has discussed the effect of the said letters in the succeeding paragraphs. It cannot be said that the finding entered by the revisional court as aforesaid is unsustainable on the basis of the said letters. The revisional court has considered the said letters elaborately in Para.10 and 11 of its judgment and has discussed the effect of the said letters in the succeeding paragraphs. It cannot be said that the finding entered by the revisional court as aforesaid is unsustainable on the basis of the said letters. The said letters would suggest that the Christian Literature Society is to construct a huge building complex consisting of two, or three societies in stages on the site on which the building in question stands after the same is made available to that society by the revision petitioner institution. No doubt Pw. 1 who has given evidence on behalf of the revision petitioner institution deposed that the arrangement between the Christian Literature Society and the petitioner institution is only some sort of financial arrangement and that the book depot and other activities are to be conducted by the revision petitioner institution. But as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent it appears to me that the letters aforesaid which were put in evidence by the petitioner institution itself are at any rate suggestive of the fact that the petitioner institution is seeking eviction not for its purpose but for the purpose of Christian Literature Society. Suffice to say that the view taken as aforesaid by the revisional court cannot be said to be. in view of the said letters and the language employed therein, unsustainable. 5. Faced with this difficulty the learned counsel for the revision petitioner attempted to get out of the aforesaid obstacle by referring me to a decision of the Madras High Court in I. V. Chetty v. P. A. Chetty AIR 1971 Mad. 354 . In that decision Kailasam, J., of that court, as he then was, construing a similar provision contained in the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 said that so far as the landlord respondent before that court which was a religious trust was concerned "putting up a Kalyana Mandapam to increase its income" after evicting the tenants from the buildings belonging to that trust would be "for the purpose of the institution". The learned Judge in that decision noticed the decisions in Bhakthavatsalu Chetty v. Natesa Achari 1968 (81) Mad. Law Weekly 13 and CRP. The learned Judge in that decision noticed the decisions in Bhakthavatsalu Chetty v. Natesa Achari 1968 (81) Mad. Law Weekly 13 and CRP. No. 113 of 1961 (Madras) a short note report whereof is to be found in Official Trustee of Madras v. M/s Gopalji Champshi & Co. 1967 (1) MLJ. Short Notes 45. These decisions were dissented from by Kailasam, J., in the decision mentioned above. 6. In Bhakthavatsalu Chetty v. Natesa Achari (1968) 81 Mad. Law Weekly 13 Anantanarayanan, C. J., adverting to the same provision of the Madras Act repelled a similar contention advanced before the learned Chief Justice by pointing out that: "Simply stated, this is a case in which the landlord trust is seeking to evict the tenants, so that the building can be used as a Kalyanamandapam, in which contingency, the trust expects that a much higher income will be derived. It seems to me that the argument is clearly fallacious, that the eviction of a tenant from a residential building belonging to the trust, in order to get more money by releasing the property to some other person for a limited purpose, can be one of the valid purposes of the trust, on the logic that the trust has to subsist on its revenues. If that argument is accepted, every trust will be automatically entitled to evict all or any of its tenants, at pleasure, wholly disregarding the protection offered to tenants under the various provisions of Madras Act XVIII of 1960." I am in full agreement with what has been laid down in the aforesaid decision. To the same effect is the decision of Veeraswami, J., in Official Trustee of Madras v. M/s Gopalji Champshi and Co. 1967 (1) MLJ. Short Notes 45 where the learned Judge pointed out that to attract S.10(3)(b) of the Madras Act similar to S.11(7) of the Kerala Act, "the landlord itself must be a religious, charitable, educational or other public institution" and that "it is also necessary that the institution required the building for its own purpose". 1967 (1) MLJ. Short Notes 45 where the learned Judge pointed out that to attract S.10(3)(b) of the Madras Act similar to S.11(7) of the Kerala Act, "the landlord itself must be a religious, charitable, educational or other public institution" and that "it is also necessary that the institution required the building for its own purpose". In that case the Official Trustee acting under the terms of the deed in administering the properties purchased a property with the sanction of the High Court and sought eviction of the respondents before that court who were occupying the house invoking S.10(3)(b) of the Madras Act on the ground that the same was required for using the same as a choultry as per the wishes of the settler. It was this ground that was repelled by the court in the aforesaid case. The learned counsel for the respondent brought to my notice the latest decision on that point by the Madras High Court which is reported in LIC. of India v. Government of Tamil Nadu 1977 (11) MLJ. 283, where the two decisions of that court referred to above were approvingly cited and followed. The question that arose in that case was as to whether the Life Insurance Corporation of India is entitled to get exemption from certain provisions of the Act for the purpose of evicting tenants from a building belonging to them for the purpose of housing their employees. Exemption was sought for under S.29 of the Madras Act. The Accommodation Controller took the view that in so far as the Corporation can evict its tenants under S.10(3)(b) of the Madras Act similar to S.11 (7) of the Kerala Act, no exemption was called for. The Corporation in these circumstances invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. The court in that connection examined the question as to whether S.10(3)(b) of the Madras Act is available to the Corporation to evict tenants from the building belonging to the Corporation for the purpose of housing its employees and said that the section would not be available since the purpose for which eviction is sought for is not that of the Corporation but for housing its employees. The court said: "In this case, as already stated, the Life Insurance Corporation is not requiring the ' the building for its own use or for its own purpose, i. e., for carrying on the life insurance business. The building is required by the Corporation to provide housing accommodation for its own employees. Provision of housing accommodation for its employees has nothing to do with its business or the purposes for which the Corporation may be morally obliged to provide its staff housing accommodation it cannot be taken to be the purpose of the Corporation. In these circumstances, therefore, the Corporation cannot file an application under S.10(3) for eviction of the tenants for the purpose of providing house accommodation to its staff." 7. In view of what is stated above, with respect, I am not in a position to follow the decision in I. F. Chetty v. P. A. Chetty AIR 1971 Mad. 354 . With respect, I am in full agreement 'with what has been ruled in the other three cases of that court. The result is the decision of the revisional court that the civil revision petitioner is not entitled to rely on S.11(7) of the Act for evicting the respondent from the building in question has to be sustained and I do so. 8. This takes me to the ground relied on by the civil revision petitioner that the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction. Under S.11(4)(iv) of the Act, if the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the building, that is to say, if the landlord has a genuine intention to reconstruct the building and if he satisfies the court that he has the plan and licence, if any required, and the ability to rebuild, the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant provided "the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction". There is no controversy about the intention of the landlord to reconstruct nor about the plan and licence, nor about the landlord's ability to rebuild the building in question. The only question, therefore, that remains to be considered under this head is as to whether the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction. 9. According to the Commissioner's report and the evidence in the case the building is at least 70 years old and has been constructed in the pattern obtained at that time. The only question, therefore, that remains to be considered under this head is as to whether the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction. 9. According to the Commissioner's report and the evidence in the case the building is at least 70 years old and has been constructed in the pattern obtained at that time. The Commissioner's report also shows that the building shows the effect of its age by such damages as cracks in the walls etc. The building is situate on the Mahatma Gandhi Road in the capital city which is the main road in that city and is near the public offices and other buildings. The Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority taking into consideration all these aspects came to the conclusion that the building needs reconstruction. The revisional court took the opposite view. 10. It has to be noticed here that stating that "one has, therefore, to concentrate one's attention on sub-s.(4)(iv)" the revisional court, after discussing that aspect in two or three paragraphs came to the conclusion that that ground is not made out by the revision petitioner. The revisional court criticised the Rent Controller for taking note of the fact that all along that road new buildings in new pattern have come up and that the building is situate in the city, by observing that, that court was at a loss to understand as to "how the erection of a huge building would contribute to the beauty of a city". That court also observed that according to the Rent Control Court old fashioned buildings have to be demolished and buildings of modern type have to spring up and remarked that that is also an irrelevant consideration. Supporting these reasonings the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that unless and until the physical condition of the building is such that it needs reconstruction, S.11(4)(iv) is not attracted. This contention appears to me is against the trend of the decisions of this court beginning from Narayanan Nair v. First Additional District Judge, Trivandrum ILR. 1964 (1) Ker. 254. In successive decisions such as Ahammad Kanna v. Muhammed Haneef 1967 KLT 841 . Kalliani v. Madhavi 1970 KLT 257 , Saramma Varghese v. George 1971 KLT. This contention appears to me is against the trend of the decisions of this court beginning from Narayanan Nair v. First Additional District Judge, Trivandrum ILR. 1964 (1) Ker. 254. In successive decisions such as Ahammad Kanna v. Muhammed Haneef 1967 KLT 841 . Kalliani v. Madhavi 1970 KLT 257 , Saramma Varghese v. George 1971 KLT. 282 and Porinchu v. Ouseph 1971 KLT 571 it had been pointed out that the physical condition of the building alone is not the criterion to apply S.11(4)(iv) and seek eviction on the ground of reconstruction. In Kalliani v. Madhavi 1970 KLT 257 Krishna Iyer, J., of this court, as he then was, pointed out in Para.3 of that decision that he does not agree with the argument "that the stress is upon the physical condition of the building". Categorically stating so the learned Judge said that "a wider and more realistic meaning must be given to the expression 'condition of the building' ". So stating it was said: "The social purpose of this provision is to remove the road blocks in the way of progress in building programmes. Old structures in newly developing areas may be like pimples on fair faces. Replacement and renewal of obsolescent and unsightly buildings to make room for larger, modern constructions is a social necessity, provided existing tenants are not thrown into the streets. The 'condition of the building' is a larger concept which includes considerations of social surroundings and allied factors. Where the building is very old and incongruous with the social setting and the surroundings of the place the court has got to take a more liberal view in applying the provision of law. However, the primary purpose of the statute viz., prevention of unreasonable eviction must also inform the court when applying this provision. That is precisely why the statute itself provides that the tenant, if evicted on the ground of need to reconstruct, should be put back in the building, when reconstructed. A blend of the social needs of replacement and renewal and the avoidance of unreasonable eviction is achieved by S.11(4)(iv), in that it provides for eviction when the building is in a physically or socially bad condition. At the same time, the tenant is armed with a right to get back into possession of the premises when rebuilt." (emphasis by me). At the same time, the tenant is armed with a right to get back into possession of the premises when rebuilt." (emphasis by me). This construction placed on S.11(4)(iv) is not dissented from in any of the decisions that followed including the latest decision referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent in Arunachalam v. Sreenivasa Reddiar 1977 KLT 974 where the whole case law bearing on the point has been referred to by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Menon, J. The decision aforesaid in Kalliani v. Madhavi 1970 KLT 257 has been approvingly referred to in this decision as well. 11. In view of what is stated above it appears to me that the revisional court erred in holding that S.11(4)(iv) is not available for evicting the respondent. In that view that portion of the order under revision has to be set aside and I do so. I allow the application for eviction filed by the civil revision petitioner in the Rent Control Court under S.11(4)(iv) and only under that provision. 12. Under the first proviso to S.11(iv) the Rent Control Court has to fix the time within reconstruction of the building is to be completed. This the Rent Control Court will do on receipt of the records back by that court. It also goes without saying that that court will have power to issue directions as contemplated by the second proviso to S.11(4)(iv) of the Act. It cannot also be disputed that the respondent, if evicted shall have the first option to have the reconstructed building or such portion thereof allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent. 13. Dealing with the question whether S.11(4)(iii) is available to the revision petitioner institution, the revisional court directed the appellate authority to deal with that aspect afresh. In view of the fact that the learned counsel for the revision petitioner institution is not pressing that ground as already stated at the beginning of this order, it is not necessary to uphold that portion of the order remitting the case back to the appellate authority. I set aside that portion of the order as well. 14. The civil revision petition is allowed to the above extent. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Allowed.