JUDGMENT K. C Agrawal, J. :- This writ petition has been filed by Kalloo Miyan, a tenant of a portion of House no. 701/820, Purana Katra, Allahabad. 2. The aforesaid premises belongs to Smt. Champa Devi, respondent no. 1 she filed an application under section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of the premises on the ground that the accommodation in her possession was insufficient to meet the requirement of herself and her family members. She also claimed the benefit of Explanation (iv) to sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Act. 3. The application was contested by the petitioner. He denied that the need of respondent no. 1 for the Additional Accommodation was justified. He claimed that the application was filed with an ulterior motive to evict him from the premises. He alleged that respondent no. 1 had filed a suit for his eviction and after having failed in the said suit, the present application was filed to evict him. 4. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. The application was allowed by the prescribed authority, and in appeal, the judgment of the prescribed authority was upheld. Aggrieved the tenant has filed the present writ petition. 5. After hearing the counsel for the parties, I am satisfied that the judgment of the appellate court is liable to be set aside. In the appeal, the petitioner had not only challenged the finding about the bona fide requirement of the premises by respondent no. 1, but he has also claimed that he was likely to suffer greater hardship. The appellate court neither decided the question of bona fide requirement of the premises nor dealt with the question of hardship. He contended himself by observing ; "It is thus obvious that a tenant can shift to an accommodation according to the income of his family." 6. The application filed by a landlord under clause (a) sub-section (1) of section 21 could be allowed provided he established his bona fide requirement of the premises. The appellate court ought to have examined the said question and recorded a finding thereon. It is true that the application was allowed by the prescribed authority and a finding about the bona fide requirement of the premises was recorded by him, but that did not absolve the appellate court of its duly to go into the said question himself. The appellate court ought to have examined the said question and recorded a finding thereon. It is true that the application was allowed by the prescribed authority and a finding about the bona fide requirement of the premises was recorded by him, but that did not absolve the appellate court of its duly to go into the said question himself. Had I found that the appellate court had expressed its agreement with the necessary of evidence made by the prescribed authority, I would have not interfered in the present proceedings, but a perusal of the judgment of the appellate court does not show even the agreement of the learned 1st Additional District Judge with the finding of the Prescribed Authority. Whatever he had done in the case is only to consider the question of hardship and that too was done in a most cursory and summary manner. The protection given by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act of 1972 is a valuable one and that a tenant can be deprived of the protection only when an order is passed by an authority in accordance with the provisions made in the same. 7. For these reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the lower appellate court is set aside and the case is sent back to him for deciding the appeal afresh. The stay order granted by this court stands vacated. It will be open to the petitioner to file a fresh application for stay before the appellate court. The appeal will be decided by the District Judge expeditiously.