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1978 DIGILAW 828 (ALL)

Sunil Kumar v. District Judge, Nanital

1978-08-24

K.C.AGRAWAL

body1978
ORDER K. C. Agrawal, J. :- These two writ petitions raise common questions of fact and law, hence can be decided by a single judgment. 2. The premises in dispute, which was situated in Mohalla Ganj, Kashipur, District Nanital, originally belonged to Gopal Krishna respondent no. 3. The house had been let out to Kishori Lal, the alleged adoptive father of the petitioner Sunil Kumar. Kishori Lal died in December, 1974. After the death of Kishori Lal, Gopal Krishan Mehrotra, respondent no. 3 moved an application for the release of the disputed premises on 6-1-1975 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under section 16 read with section 12 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, Gopal Krishna Mehrotra alleged that since after the death of Kishori Lal, the accommodation in dispute had been lying vacant. He claimed that he wanted to get the repairs done and so he wanted release of the premises in this favour. 3. The application was contested by Sunil Kumar the present petitioner in both the writ petitions, on the allegation that he was the adopted son of Kishori Lal and after the death of Kishori Lal he had been in possession of the premises in dispute. Sunil Kumar claimed that as the house was not vacant, the provisions of sections 16 and 12 did not apply. His case was that the house was not in dilapidated condition which required demolition and reconstructions. 4. As the fact that Sunil Kumar was the adopted son of Kishori Lal as disputed by Gopal Krishna Mehrotra, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was called upon to decide two questions (1) whether Sunil Kumar was the adopted son of Kishori Lal and (2) whether the house was vacant. Both the parties led evidence in support of their respective cases. By an order dated 15-9-1976 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer held that Sunil Kumar might have been adopted by Kishori Lal but the house was vacant in as much as Sunil Kumar was not in possession of the house and that be was living with his natural father and not in this house. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer also observed that as Sunil Kumar was about 17 years of age at the time of alleged adoption, the same was invalid, under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer also observed that as Sunil Kumar was about 17 years of age at the time of alleged adoption, the same was invalid, under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was satisfied that Gopal Krishna Mehrotra, respondent no. 3, had made out a case for the release and therefore, he granted the prayer made by him for release of the premises. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the petitioner filed a revision before the District Judge. The revision filed by Sunil Kumar was dismissed. The District Judge held that the claim of release made by Gopal Krishna Mehrotra was not bona fide and therefore he set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and gave a direction to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for taking the proceedings for allotment under section 16 of the Act. 6. After the order was passed by the District Judge on 22-12-1976, a number of applications were filed for allotment. Sunil Kumar, the petitioner, filed an objection claiming that as he was in possession of the premises, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no power under the law to make any order of allotment. One of the applicants for allotment was Om Prakash. It, however appears that after the remand, since the premises had been sold by Gopal Krishna Mehrotra to Mahesh Kumar, respondent No. 4, the latter applied for the release of the premises in this favour. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the applications for allotment as well as the objection filed by Sunil Kumar and released the premises in favour of Mahesh Kumar. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction were preferred before the District Judge (1) by Om Prakash, an applicant for allotment and (2) by Sunil Kumar, the petitioner. Both of these revisions were dismissed. Against the dismissal of his revision writ petition no. 1572 was preferred by Sunil Kumar while against the previous order of the District Judge dated 22-12-1976 writ petition No. 348 of 1977 was filed by him. 7. The main question that arise for decision in these petitions is whether Sunil Kumar was a tenant of the premises in dispute and in possession of the same. 1572 was preferred by Sunil Kumar while against the previous order of the District Judge dated 22-12-1976 writ petition No. 348 of 1977 was filed by him. 7. The main question that arise for decision in these petitions is whether Sunil Kumar was a tenant of the premises in dispute and in possession of the same. The two courts below held that Sunil Kumar's adoption was invalid and he was not in possession of the premises. The two courts below found that Sunil Kumar was living with his natural father and not in the premises in dispute. That being so, the objection filed by Sunil Kumar was not sustainable and was rightly dismissed. 8. Sri A. K. Misra, counsel appearing for the petitioner, made an attempt to challenge the finding about possession on the ground that the same was perverse. He also urged that neither the Rent Control and Eviction Officer nor the Additional District Judge in writ petition no. 1572 of 1977 discussed the evidence filed by the petitioner, and therefore, the judgments rendered by them must be held to be illegal. I am not impressed by this argument. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer discussed the entire evidence and found thereafter that the petitioner was not in possession of the disputed premises So far as the learned District Judge is concerned, he also addressed himself to the said controversy and having found that the relevant material had not been filed by Sunil Kumar the finding of the Control and Eviction Officer about possession was affirmed. 9. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the learned Additional District Judge was exercising the power under section 18 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Section 18 is analogous to section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code gives a very restricted power of interference to the High Court. Similar power was possessed by the District Judge while deciding the revision under section 18. He could not interfere with a finding given on a question of fact. Section 18 is analogous to section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code gives a very restricted power of interference to the High Court. Similar power was possessed by the District Judge while deciding the revision under section 18. He could not interfere with a finding given on a question of fact. The Supreme Court dealing with section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, which is in pari materia with section 18 of the Present Act, observed : "It is now well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to cases of illegal or irregular exercise or non-exercise or illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the subordinate courts. If subordinate courts is found to possess the jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or with material irregularity even if it decides the matter wrongly. In other words, it is not open to the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself." 10. Moreover, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not satisfy me that the judgments of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer holding that Sunil Kumar was not in possession was erroneous. This court also has a limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to seeing that no mistake of law apparent of the face of the record was committed. 11. Apart from the above, it is the admitted case of the parties that the building, which had been let out to Klshori Lal, has been demolished. Accordingly, it no longer exists. For this reason as well, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 12. For these reasons, writ petition no. 348 of 1977 is dismissed with costs As I have found that the petitioner Sunil Kumar was rightly held not to be in possession of the premises in dispute, the other writ petition no. 1572 of 1977 must also meet the same fate. The same is so dismissed with costs.