ORDER K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition challenges a judgment of the District Judge, Farukhabad dated 21.1.1978 dismissing an appeal filed by the petitioners under section 22 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 2. The dispute in his case is with respect to a portion of house No. 214 Mohalla Kazim Khan, Kaimganj district Farukhabad. On March 2, 1976 an application was filed by the landlords of the said house against the petitioners for release on the ground floor that the same was needed by them to settle one of them, namely, Ashfaq Husain. Ashfaq Husain was an Advocate practising at Farukhabad. The landlords claimed that Ashfaq Husain wanted to shift to Kaimganj to establish a practice there. According to the landlords, there was no other house at Kaimganj, where Ashfaq Husain could live and set up his chamber. The application was contested by the petitioners. They claimed that the need of the landlords was not genuine and bonafide. The petitioners claimed that Ashfaq Husain was practising at Fatehgarh, where he was living with his family and that he had no intention to shift to Kaimganj. 3. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application against which the appeal filed by the tenants was also dismissed. Feeling aggrieved the tenants have filed the present writ petition. 4. The first point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that in view of clause (ii) of the Third proviso to section 21(1) of the Act, the application filed by the landlords was not maintainable. It was urged that the legal profession, for which the premises was required by the landlords, was a business purpose, Hence the application was liable to be rejected. The learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment reported in Dr. Bashir uddin v. District Judge, Bulandshahar, 1978(1) R.C.J. 199. in support of his contention. 5. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties I am not prepared to accept the contention of the petitioners. As observed above, it would be seen that the portion in occupation of the petitioners was required by the landlords for residence as well as for an office for Ashfaq Husain. The need set up in the application was not wholly for the office of Ashfaq Husain. As observed above, it would be seen that the portion in occupation of the petitioners was required by the landlords for residence as well as for an office for Ashfaq Husain. The need set up in the application was not wholly for the office of Ashfaq Husain. The Prescribed Authority found that Ashfaq Husain wanted to shift to Kaimganj with his family and that he intended to reside in that building as well as to carry on the profession. This was affirmed in appeal by inc District Judge. 6. In this back ground, the question that arises for decision is whether the need of Ashfaq Husain was for one to which clause (ii) of the third proviso to section 21(1) applied ? 7. Clause (ii) lays down that an application under sub-section (1) of Section 21 would not be entertainable in respect of a residential building where it was required for "business purpose." It was suggested by the learned counsel for the landlords that the profession of law is not a business purpose, hence the aforesaid proviso would not be attracted. In view of the decision given by the Division Bench in Dr. Bashir uddin (supra) it is not possible for me to hold that the word "business" did not include the practice of a profession. I am bound by the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for me to go into the difference between a profession and business. 8. Roscoe Pound in his book "jurisprudence" Vol. V. page 676 (1959 Edition) dealing with the nature and definition of a profession says : "Historically, the practice of law is a profession. It must remain a profession if the purposes of representation in litigation as part of the machinery of justice are to be achieved. A profession is a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service-no less a public service because Incidentally it may be a means of livelihood. The exigencies of the economic order require most persons to gain a livelihood and the gaining of a livelihood is a purpose to which they were constrained to devote their activities. But while in all walks of life men must bear this in mind, in business and trade it is the primary purpose. The exigencies of the economic order require most persons to gain a livelihood and the gaining of a livelihood is a purpose to which they were constrained to devote their activities. But while in all walks of life men must bear this in mind, in business and trade it is the primary purpose. In a profession, on the other hand, it is an incidental purpose pursuit of which it is held down. A profession, such as the ministry, medicine law, teaching is much more than a calling which has a certain traditional dignity." It is also doubtful as to how far subordinate legislation can be looked into or the purposes of construction of the enabling Act (See : J. K. Steel and Iron Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1173. 2 at page 1174. 9. But as pointed out above, the decision of the Division bench on the aforesaid question viz., that the word "business" includes within its ambit the practice of a profession is binding on me. This decision, is however, distinguishable. Dr. Bashiruddin was a landlord of an accommodation situated in the town of Bulandshahar of which respondent No. 3 of that case was a tenant. The petitioners' case was that he was a resident of Khurja and was registered by the U.P. Dental council at Lucknow as a medical practitioner and that he had been practising as a Dental Surgeon since 1958. The alleged that in order to meet his professional need, he required the premises in question which had been let out to the tenant of that case. The tenant alleged that as the premises was used by him for residence as well as for washing clothes, the application filed by the landlord for business purpose was barred by clause (ii) of the Third provision to section 21(1). Dealing with this question the Bench found that as the dominant use of the house, which consisted of a single room and a Varandah in which the tenant resided, was clearly residential, the application was barred by clause (ii) to Third proviso to sub-section 21(l) of section 21 of the Act. The Bench was not called upon to consider the controversy like the one, which is whether the premises was required for residence as well as for an office by a lawyer. 10. The Bench was not called upon to consider the controversy like the one, which is whether the premises was required for residence as well as for an office by a lawyer. 10. The question now to be considered is whether where a person requires a house for residence as well as for his office, would that purpose be considered to be "business purpose" and that the said proviso be attracted ? In my opinion, the answer to this question must be in the negative. In all these cases, a court is required to find the dominant purpose for which the premises is required. In a case, where a lawyer requires a house for residence as well as for his office, the dominant or the main purpose is the residence and not of business. In fact, in Dr. Bashir Uddin's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel, the Division Bench itself quoted with approval the following passage which would show that the dominant use of a house is the relevant consideration for finding the purpose for which a premises is required. The passage quoted was from the decision in Krishna Nair v. Valliammal, 1949(1) M.L.J. 74 . : "A lawyer may advise his client in a room of his house; a doctor may give a consultation to his clients in a room of his house; an astrologer may give his predictions to his clients in a room of his house; a barber may have his select and urgent clients in a room of his house, a pandaom-maker can make pandaom in a room of his house; provided the portion so used form only a fraction of the entire premises and does not alter the nature of the premises from residential to non-residential purpose." The Supreme Court also observed in Ramlal v. Piarelal, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2124, that the social conditions of this country are such that it cannot justify the conclusion that where a part of a residential house is used in connection with the business or profession of the owner of that house ; that portion ceases to be a part of the residential house. Dealing with this the Supreme Court further observed : "As is well known, very often a lawyer might have his office room in his house, a doctor might have a consulting room in his house: an Advocate's library might occupy one of the rooms of his house. The room where the lawyer works of his library is located cannot be said to cease to be part of his residential house." These observations were although made by the Supreme Court in connection with protection claimed by a judgment-debtor under section 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, but, to my mind, these observations throw light on the controversy involved before me as well. 11. It was held by the Mysore High Court in Mrs. C. Colaco v. Urban D. Silva, 1970 R.C.J. 886. that : "Even though a house is taken for residential purpose, it does not prevent the person from carrying on his profession in the said premises during his spare time as has been pointed out by Madras High Court. Simply because a lawyer meets his clients in his house ; and transacts some legal work, or a doctor sees some patients in his house, residential house is not converted into a non- residential one. It is also to be borne in mind that it is not disputed that the respondent and his family members were residing in the said premises'. The fact that they were incidentally carrying on tailoring work in the house does not amount to conversion of a residential premises into a non- residential one." It therefore, appears to me that as the essential purpose for which the premises was required by the landlords of the present case was residential, the bar contained in the clause (ii) proviso third to section 21(1) did not apply. The intention of the legislature in enacting the aforesaid proviso was that a residential house be not permitted to be converted into a business premises. In a case where a premises is required by a lawyer for residence as well as for an office, the purpose cannot be said to be business. The essential nature of the premises does not change. Hence the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 12. In a case where a premises is required by a lawyer for residence as well as for an office, the purpose cannot be said to be business. The essential nature of the premises does not change. Hence the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 12. It may further he pointed out that both the courts below concurrently held that the tenants had alternative accommodation available to them and they would not face any inconvenience or trouble if they were required to vacate the premises in their occupation. That being so, the view taken that the petitioners were not likely to suffer any hardship, cannot be said to be erroneous. 13. For these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The petitioners are granted two months time to vacate the premises.