JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C. J. This Special Appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that it is belated; that the impugned order of reversion did not amount to reduction in rank within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution and that the impugned order of reversion did not violate Art. 16 of the Constitution. When this appeal came up for hearing, learned counsel for the appellant informed us that the appellant has an alternative remedy by way of approaching the Services Tribunal constituted under the U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act (U.P. Act no. 17 of 1976) and, therefore, the appeal as well as the writ petition are liable to be abated under Section 58 of the FortySecond Constitution Amendment Act. Section 58 aforesaid is headed as under: 58. "Special provision as to pending petitions under Article 226.,' In substance, it provides that pending petitions under Article 226 of the constitution shall abate in case an alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party. By the FortySecond Constitution Amendment Act, Article 226 was amended. One of the statutory limits imposed on Article 226 was that jurisdiction under Article 226 would not be exercised in cases where there is an alternative remedy. The well settled principle that Article 226 conferred a discretionary jurisdiction and was not liable to be exercised in cases where an alternative remedy is available has been made by the FortySecond Constitution Amendment Act as a statutory restriction or limit on the jurisdiction itself. In order to further the legislative intent behind this limitation, Section 58 of the FortySecond Constitution Amendment Act specifically provided for abatement of such petitions pending under Article 226. The question is whether the provisions of Section 58 are applicable to Special Appeals also which are pending under the letters patent read with the U.P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order 1948, against decisions rendered in petitions under Article 226 of Constitution. For the appellant, reliance was placed on certain decisions which say that Article 226 confers jurisdiction on the High Courts. It does not ordain whether the jurisdiction shall be exercised by the Judges sitting alone or in Division Benches. For the appellant, reliance was placed on certain decisions which say that Article 226 confers jurisdiction on the High Courts. It does not ordain whether the jurisdiction shall be exercised by the Judges sitting alone or in Division Benches. If according to the Rules of the Court the jurisdiction under Article 226 is exercised by a Judge sitting alone and if under the law and Rules of the Court an appeal from the j judgment of a learned Single Judge lies, the High Court exercises the same jurisdiction as is conferred under Article 226 while hearing and disposing of an appeal. See Chairman Budge Budge Municipality v. Mongru Mia and others (A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 433). It was further emphasized that as recognised by the Supreme Court in Carikapati Veerava v. N. Subbiat Choudhary and others (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540), the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. This suggests that the proceedings, whether pending in the court of first instance or of appeal are some in nature and character. In other words, the petition under Article 226 remains pending in the High Court, either before a Single Judge or a Division Bench. Section 58 of the FortySecond Constitution Amendment Act makes special provision for "pending petitions under Article 226". It, in our opinion, refers to and includes pendency at either of the stages. In other words, section 58 on its plain construction covers petitions under Art. 226 pending trial or pending in appeal. Since an appeal is a rehearing of the same matter, it is the same proceeding which becomes pending as and when an appeal is filed. The nature of the proceedings as well as the extent of jurisdiction that is exereisable is identical whether it be before the trial court or an appellate court. In a Special Appeal the Division Bench of this Court exercises the same jurisdiction, asunder Art. 226 of the Constitution is exereisable by a learned single Judge. In view of the settled principle that a legal proceeding included an appeal, it was not necessary for Parliament to specifically refer to appeals, while making provision in respect of pending petition's under Art. 226. In view of the settled principle that a legal proceeding included an appeal, it was not necessary for Parliament to specifically refer to appeals, while making provision in respect of pending petition's under Art. 226. In view of the settled rule of law, one would have expected Parliament to make an exception in respect of Special Appeals, if it was intended to save them. Absence of such a provision indicates that parliament did not intend to upset or modify the well settled principle of law that legal proceedings at trial or appeal stage, are series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regulated as one legal proceeding. It was stressed that in a special appeal the judgment of a single Judge is under attack; relief contrary to the judgment cannot be granted without setting it aside. That may be so, but in law the Division Bench hearing the appeal makes up its own mind on the submissions of the parties and on the question whether the case deserves relief. The judgment of the learned single Judge enters into the decisionmaking process of the appellate Bench just as the submissions and arguments of the parties do. It is not the judgment which is truly and correctly speaking under scrutiny. The appellate Bench is not confined to it. It considers the matter on its own and afresh. Under the law special appeal jurisdiction is as wide as that of a learned single Judge who decides the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel for the respondent invited our attention to the decision of a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the Government of India and others v. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd, (A.I.R. 1977 A.P. 250). We have carefully gone through that decision, but we are unable to subscri be to the contrary view expressed in that case. In Special Appeal No. 42 of 1975, decided on 1721977, a Division Bench of this Court held that the Special Appeal was liable to be abated under section 58. of India Ltd, (A.I.R. 1977 A.P. 250). We have carefully gone through that decision, but we are unable to subscri be to the contrary view expressed in that case. In Special Appeal No. 42 of 1975, decided on 1721977, a Division Bench of this Court held that the Special Appeal was liable to be abated under section 58. The Division Bench held that "............The writ petition in the form of appeal would be deemed to be pending and inasmuch as there is another remedy provided under the U.P. Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976, for the redress for the alleged injury, the writ petition and the appeal abate." This decision is binding on us. In the result, the appeal as well as the writ petition out of which it arises are declared abated under section 58 of the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act. The parties will bear their own costs.