JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE defendant tenant has preferred this Letters Patent appeal against the decree for eviction passed against him by a single Bench of this Court by reversing the decrees of the Courts below under section 12 (1) (c) and (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, on the grounds of disclaimer of title of the landlord and bona fide need of the landlord of the suit accommodation for residence. ( 2. ) IT is not in dispute that one Maryambai owned the suit house and she was the landlady of the defendant Meerkhan. The defendant is occupying the ground floor of the suit house on a monthly rent of Rs. 8, the tenancy commencing on the 20th of each English calendar month. She filed Civil suit No. 110 /60 for eviction of the defendant but the suit was dismissed on 20-9- 61. Appeal No. 84-A/61 preferred against that decree was also dismissed. She subsequently filed another Civil Suit No. 107-A/64 for eviction of the defendant which was also dismissed on 6-1-65. The plaintiff Kutub Ali is nephew of Mariyambai and he is living with her and also looking after the business of her husband Fakhruddin, who is dead. The plaintiff is legal heir of Mariyambai. By registered sale-deed 12-4-68 Mariyambai purported to sell the suit house for a consideration of Rs. 1500 Even thereafter she received rents of April, May and June 1968 sent by the defendant by money order, but she did not receive rents of July and August 1968. On 30-7-68 the plaintiff and Mariyambai gave a joint notice to the defendant directing him to pay rent to the plaintiff in view of the sale deed in his favour. The plaintiff then by his notice dated 14-5-69 terminated the tenancy and demanded arrears of rent. The defendant in his reply dated 20-5-69 denied the title of the plaintiff and refused to pay any rent to him saying that the sale-deed is not genuine and brought into existence for the purpose of evicting him from the suit house. The plaintiff thereafter filed the present suit on 2-9-69 claiming eviction of the defendant on the grounds of disclaimer of his title and bona fide need for his residence. ( 3. The plaintiff thereafter filed the present suit on 2-9-69 claiming eviction of the defendant on the grounds of disclaimer of his title and bona fide need for his residence. ( 3. ) THE plaintiffs case is that in view of the sale-deed executed in his favour by Mariyambai on 12-4-69 he is the owner and landlord of the defendant. He purchased the suit house for his residence as at present he is living as a tenant of Mariyambai and he has no other house of his own in the town. Mariyambai had sent notice to the defendant to attorn tenancy in favour of the plaintiff but the defendant has. been refusing to recognise him as his landlord. Therefore, his tenancy has been terminated and eviction is sought under section 12 (1) (c) and (e) of the Act. The defendant in his written statement admitted that he is a tenant of Mariyambai. However, he submitted that the sale-deed in question is not a genuine one and has been brought into existence mala fide only for the purpose of evicting him. The defendant never recognised the plaintiffs title and he is not disentitled to challenge derivative title of the plaintiff. Mariyambai since the year 1960 has been trying to evict the defendant from the suit house and she filed 2 suits which were dismissed. Therefore, she has deviced a novel procedure to eject the defendant by bringing into existence a sham and bogus sale deed in favour of her nephew. The plaintiff has been living with mariyambai and he is managing her property and business. The plaintiff has no need of the suit house for his residence. The suit is liable to be dismissed with costs. ( 4. ) THE learned trial Judge found the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff to be genuine but it was brought about with the mala fide intention only for the purpose of this suit for evicting the defendant and so no effect can be given to it. As such, the plaintiff is not entitled to evict the defendant on the grounds of disclaimer of title under section 12 (c) of the Act. As such, the plaintiff is not entitled to evict the defendant on the grounds of disclaimer of title under section 12 (c) of the Act. The plaintiff has failed to prove that he is living as a tenant of Mariyambai, on the other hand he is living with her as a member of her family and, as such, he has no need of the suit house for his residence. The learned Additional district Judge in appeal affirmed the decree of the trial Judge though he reversed the finding that the sale-deed is genuine. The appellate Judge came to the conclusion that the sale-deed was bogus and sham and brought about to evict the tenant and no title passed to the plaintiff under the sale deed, enumerating the circumstances for coming to that conclusion. He, therefore, held that the defendant is not liable to eviction on the ground of disclaimer of derivative title of the plaintiff and the plaintiffs need of the suit house for residence is also not bona fide. The first floor was lying vacant all these years and the plaintiff has simply expressed his desire to occupy the suit house but he has not proved that his need is genuine. In Second appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the decree of the Courts below have been reversed by the learned single Judge holding that the question of motive for execution of the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff is wholly immaterial. By virtue of the sale-deed the defendant became a tenant of the plaintiff under section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. Disclaimer of title of the plaintiff by the defendant makes him liable for eviction under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. The plaintiff has fully established that he needs the ground floor of the suit house for his residence under section 12 (1) (e ). There is no evidence that the plaintiff has any other house of his own in the town and merely because he was residing with Mariyambai would not disentitle him to claim eviction on the ground of bona fide need. Accordingly, the plaintiffs suit for eviction has been decreed. ( 5. ) THE main question to be considered in this appeal is whether the learned single Judge was justified in reversing the decrees of the Courts below by interfering with the findings of fact. Accordingly, the plaintiffs suit for eviction has been decreed. ( 5. ) THE main question to be considered in this appeal is whether the learned single Judge was justified in reversing the decrees of the Courts below by interfering with the findings of fact. It is contended that the learned single Judge ignored the several circumstances enumerated by the Additional district Judge in coming to the conclusion that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was bogus and sham and brought about only to evict the defendant. This was a finding of fact and binding on the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge proceeded on the assumption that the sale-deed was genuine because Mariyambai entered the witness box and vouchsafed about the genuineness of sale-deed. Because of this assumption, the learned single Judge held that the tenancy of the defendant stood attorned in favour, of the plaintiff and, as such, the plaintiff is entitled to evict the defendant on the grounds of disclaimer of title and bona fide need for residence. These are again findings of fact and could not have been disturbed in second appeal. Therefore, the decree passed in second appeal is liable to be set aside and those of the Courts below restored. The respondent on the other hand contended that the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below were vitiated as they were led away by the irrelevant consideration of motive for executing the sale-deed and, as such, the findings have been rightly interfered with in second appeal. ( 6. ) UNDER section 100 of Civil Procedure Code a second appeal can lie on the following grounds, namely, (a) the decision is contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, or (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law, or (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Code has resulted in error or defect in the decision of the case on merits. The Privy council in Durga v. Jawahir Singh, (17 M I A 122.) has held that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. The Privy council in Durga v. Jawahir Singh, (17 M I A 122.) has held that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. In another case of Wali Muhammad v. Muhammad Baksh, (AIR 1930 PC 91.), it has further been held nor does the fact that the finding of the first appellate Court is based upon some documentary evidence make it any the less a finding of fact. The Supreme Court while approving these decisions in D. Pattabhiramaswamy S. Hanymayya, (AIR 1959 S C 57.), has held as under: - "the provisions of section 100 are clear and unambiguous. There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. Nor does the fact that the finding of the first appellate Court is based upon some documentary evidence make it any the less a finding of fact. A Judge of the High Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. (The practice of some Judges of the High court disposing second appeals as if they were first appeals deprecated.)" In another case of Ramchandra v, Ramalingam, (AIR 1963 S C 302.) it has been observed "the error or defect in the procedure to which clause (c) of section 100 (1) refers is, as the clause clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. That is why, even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure. In a recent case of Jangbit v. Mahavir Prasad, (a i r 1977 S C. 27.), the Supreme Court has further observed "unless interpretation of a document involves the question of application of a principle of law mere inferences from or the evidentiary value of a document generally raises only a question of fact". In a recent case of Jangbit v. Mahavir Prasad, (a i r 1977 S C. 27.), the Supreme Court has further observed "unless interpretation of a document involves the question of application of a principle of law mere inferences from or the evidentiary value of a document generally raises only a question of fact". The fact finding Court i. e. the appellate Court came to the conclusion that the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff was bogus, sham and colourable document and brought into being with the purpose of evicting the defendant from the suit house. The Supreme Court in Paras Nath v. Mohani Dasi, (AIR 1959 S C 1204.), has held that the question which the Courts below decided and which was the only question is controversy before the High Court whether the trust deed was a fictitious transaction, such question essentially is one of fact. Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act, 6th Edition at page 267 has opined that the transfers referred to in this section 53 are transfers binding between the parties, but voidable in the circumstances stated in the section. A document made to defeat or to delay his creditors is binding on the executant and those claiming under him. The transfer is valid until it is set aside, and must not be confused with benami or colourable transfers which are merely sham transfers and not meant to operate between the parties. In collusive or benami transactions there is no transfer, but the property is merely put in a false name and generally for the purpose of defrauding creditors. As observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Mina Kumari v. Bijoy Singh , (16 A P C 232.), the difference is distinct though it is often slurred. Such colourable or sham deeds do not require to be set aside, tor the real title is all along with the transferor. ( 7. ) IN the present case, the learned Additional District Judge has found that Mariyambai, who is the real owner of the suit house, was trying to evict the defendant by filing one suit after another. Having failed in her attempts, she executed a sham and bogus sale-deed of the suit house in favour of her nephew. ( 7. ) IN the present case, the learned Additional District Judge has found that Mariyambai, who is the real owner of the suit house, was trying to evict the defendant by filing one suit after another. Having failed in her attempts, she executed a sham and bogus sale-deed of the suit house in favour of her nephew. There is no reason why the plaintiff, who is the legal heir of Mariyambai, would purchase the suit house from her and what was the need for making the transfer. The plaintiff, who is nephew of Mariyambai, was living with her as her son and was looking after her property and business. There is no evidence about the negotiations prior to the sale. The consideration was not paid before sub Registrar and no date has been given in the sale-deed as to when the consideration was passed. Obviously, it was without any consideration. Mariyambai had a number of houses and no reason has been disclosed as to why it was necessary for her to sell this particular house. Even after sale of the suit house, Mariyambai accepted rents for 3 months. The suit house has not been mutated in the name of the plaintiff. No tax receipt has been produced to show payment of the tax by the plaintiff. On the other hand, the demand of tax has been in the name of Mariyambai which she has been paying without protest. In fact, the finding so reached regarding the sale-deed has not been considered or set aside but the learned single Judge proceeded with the assumption that the sale deed was genuine because Mariyambai came and deposed that she has sold the suit house to the plaintiff. In case of such bogus and sham transaction, the vendor is bound to come forward and support the transfer in order to achieve the ulterior purpose. In the present case, the ulterior purpose was to evict the defendant at any cost and so a sham, bogus and nominal sale deed was brought into existence. The reason for evicting the defendant from the suit house is perhaps to get more rent. The learned single Judge committed an error in holding that under section 109 of the transfer of Property Act the defendants tenancy stood attorned in favour of the plaintiff by virtue of the sale-deed in his favour. The reason for evicting the defendant from the suit house is perhaps to get more rent. The learned single Judge committed an error in holding that under section 109 of the transfer of Property Act the defendants tenancy stood attorned in favour of the plaintiff by virtue of the sale-deed in his favour. But section 109 can only be attracted if there is genuine transfer though there could be no such automatic attornment of tenancy in respect of a sham and nominal sale-deed. The learned single Judge was led away by the fact that motive for execution of this document was irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the question regarding eviction of the defendant under section 12 of the m. P. Accommodation Control Act. He relied on Amar Bahadur Singh v. S. K. Bose, (1963 MPLJ Note 5.), that- "motive of executing a document creating title is irrelevant while determining the need of person becoming landlord on the strength of the document. " This decision is based on the earlier Division Bench decision in Sheoshankar v. A. D. C. Nagpur, (1951 N L J Note 27.), that when the family house has been partitioned, the applicant getting the portion becomes the landlord, whatever the motive of partition may be. In both these cases, transfers were held to be genuine and, therefore, motive for the transfers was irrelevant in determining the question regarding eviction of the tenant under Rent Control Act. While in the present case the fact finding Court has found that the transfer in favour of the plaintiff was not genuine and the sale deed was a bogus, sham and colourable one brought about to evict the defendant. Since no title passed under such a sale-deed, the facts of the present case are distinguishable from the facts of those 3 cases. In the present case, motive for execution of such a bogus and sham document is very much relevant in order to find out as to why such a document was executed. If no title passed, there could be no attornment of tenancy in favour of the plaintiff under section 109 of the transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff not being the owner, he has no right to bring a suit for eviction of the defendant from the suit house. If no title passed, there could be no attornment of tenancy in favour of the plaintiff under section 109 of the transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff not being the owner, he has no right to bring a suit for eviction of the defendant from the suit house. When the finding being of fact, the fact that it is itself an inference from other facts will not alter its character as one of fact Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. I. T. Comtnr. , (AIR 1957 S C 49. ). As such, the finding that the sale-deed was bogus and sham being based on inference of other facts, was binding on this Court in second appeal. ( 8. ) IT is now settled law that the doctrine of estoppel under section 116 of the Evidence Act applies where the tenant has been let into possession by the landlord. But where the landlord himself did not induct the tenant into property but claims his position under a derivative title, such as assignee, donee, lessee, heir etc. , there is no estoppel against tenant. So a tenant already in possession is entitled to show that the plaintiff does not possess the derivative title he claims, but it is in some other person. The Privy Council in Krishna Prasad v. B. C. Concern , (A I R 1937 P C 251.), has held: "the principle does not apply to disentitle a tenant to dispute the derivative title of one who claims to have since become entitled to the reversion, though in such cases there may be other grounds of estoppel, e. g. , by attornment, acceptance of rent etc. " In the present case, it has been found that the transfer in favour of the plaintiff was bogus and sham and no title passed, the defendant neither attorned the tenancy nor paid any rent. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to challenge the derivative title of the plaintiff. For challenging plaintiff derivative title the defendant does not come within the mischief of section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to challenge the derivative title of the plaintiff. For challenging plaintiff derivative title the defendant does not come within the mischief of section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in pandit Ramjilal v. Vijai Kumar12, that finally the contention that the defendant No. 1 denies the title of his landlord is a principle which applies only to a suit brought by the landlord against his tenant whom he had inducted in possession of the demised premises. It is of no avail to the tenant when the real owner of those premises brings a suit for possession against the landlord as well as his tenant. Therefore, the Additional District Judge was justified in holding that the plaintiff cannot be evicted under section 12 (1) (c) for denying the derivative title of the plaintiff. ( 9. ) THE last question to be considered is whether the plaintiff has proved that he bona fide needs the suit house for his residence. The learned additional District Judge found the need to be not genuine, firstly because the sale deed was sham and bogus and secondly because the first floor of the suit house was lying vacant all these years and if his need was genuine, he would have occupied the same. The plaintiff came with a case that he was living as tenant in the house of Mariyambai. This has been found to be false. In fact, in the application for issue of ration card Ex. D-9, the plaintiff has described himself as head of the family consisting of Mariyambai and other members of the family. The plaintiff only expressed his desire to occupy the suit accommodation but he has not proved that he genuinely needs it. The Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal13, has held that the finding reached by the Additional District Judge, and first appellate Court, on an appreciation of evidence that the landlord does not bona fide require the suit premises in question for the purpose of starting business is a finding of fact and it cannot be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal. This finding being binding, the same could not have been interfered by the learned single Judge. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to evict the defendant on this ground also. ( 10. This finding being binding, the same could not have been interfered by the learned single Judge. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to evict the defendant on this ground also. ( 10. ) AS a result, this appeal is allowed with costs throughout, the judgment and decree passed in Second Appeal No. 768 /7i are set aside and those of the Courts below are restored. Counsels fee as per schedule, if certified. Appeal allowed.