Judgment :- 1. These revisions, heard together, are being disposed of by this common order. The petitioner in CRP. No. 1865 of 1977, hereinafter referred to as the 'kudikidappukaran' is the first respondent in CRP. No. 746 of 1977. The first respondent in CRP. No. 1865 of 1977, hereinafter referred to as the 'landowner', is the revision petitioner in CRP. No. 746 of 1977. The State of Kerala, the second respondent in the revision petitions, is only a formal party. 2. The relevant facts, briefly stated, are as follows: The 'kudikidappukaran' filed OA. No. 1508 of 1970 on the file of the Land Tribunal, Vaikom for purchase of this kudikidappu, under S.80-B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 164 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, for short the Act. The'landower' besides filing a written statement, had also filed an application under S.80-A (9) of the Act, therein, for an order for the shifting of the kudikidappu to another portion of the same land. The Land Tribunal passed orders simultaneously dismissing the application under S.80-A (9), and allowing the main application under S.80-B of the Act. The 'landowner' took up the matter in appeal as per L.R.A.S. No. 345 of 1971 on the file of the Appellate Authority, Ernakulam. The appeal having been dismissed as per the judgment dated 11 111976, CRP. No. 746 of 1977 has been preferred by the 'landowner'. In the meanwhile, on 2121971, nearly three months after the passing of the order on O.A. No 1508 of 1970, the 'landowner' filed O. A. No. 932 of 1971 for shifting the kudikidappukaran to an alternate site offered by him. The application was allowed on 28 21975. The writ petition, O. P. No. 1952 of 1975, filed under Art.226 of the Constitution by the 'kudikidappukaran' for quashing the order on O. A. No. 932 of 1971 was dismissed by this Court on 6 111975. Though writ appeal No. 5 of 1976 was filed, that also was dismissed on 611976. 3. After the coming into force of Ordinance 20 of 1975, on 11-12-1975 the 'kudikidappukaran' on 28-2-1976 filed an appeal, LRAS. No. 230 of 1976, on the file of the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Ernakulam, with a petition to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 3. After the coming into force of Ordinance 20 of 1975, on 11-12-1975 the 'kudikidappukaran' on 28-2-1976 filed an appeal, LRAS. No. 230 of 1976, on the file of the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Ernakulam, with a petition to condone the delay in filing the appeal. By the judgment dated 1I-11-1976 the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal, and the application for condoning the delay, holding that the 'kudikidappukaran' had no right of appeal in regard to the order appealed against, passed before the amendment of S.102 of the Act by Ordinance XX of 1975 to provide for the right of appeal against an order under S.77 (2) of the Act. It is aggrieved by this decision of the Appellate Authority that CRP. No. 1865 of 1977 has been filed. 4. We will first deal with CRP. No. 1865 of 1977. It is an undisputed fact that till the amendment to S.102 of the Act introduced by Ordinance No. XX of 1975, which came into force on 1112 1975, there was no right of appeal against an order passed by the Land Tribunal under S.77 (2) of the Act. Act XV of 1976, which received the assent of the Governor on 25 31976, while repealing and replacing Ordinance XX of 1975, had, by S.14 of the Act, saved all things done and all actions taken under the principal Act as amended by the Ordinance, deeming them to have been done or taken under the principal Act as amended by the said Act, as if the amending Act had come into force on 1112 1975. We have already noticed that on 28 21975, on which date O. A. No. 932 of 1971 was allowed there was no provision for filing an appeal against an order under S.77 (2). The question, therefore, is whether the amended provisions of S.102 of the Act would enable the 'kudikidappukaran' to file an appeal on 28-2-1976 against that order, even with a petition to condone the delay. 5. It is the contention of Sri. S. Subramonia Iyer, the counsel for the 'kudikidappukaran', that though the provision for appeal against an order under S.77 (2) came into force only on 1112 1975, till which date no appeal could have been filed against such an order, it does not mean that no appeal would lie against orders under S.77 (2) passed antecedent to that date. S. Subramonia Iyer, the counsel for the 'kudikidappukaran', that though the provision for appeal against an order under S.77 (2) came into force only on 1112 1975, till which date no appeal could have been filed against such an order, it does not mean that no appeal would lie against orders under S.77 (2) passed antecedent to that date. It is his further submission that under R.94 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) rules, 1970, a period of 60 days has been allowed for filing the appeal, and if it is construed that right to file appeal is restricted to orders passed prior to 1112 1975, it would mean that right of appeal would be denied to the aggrieved party even in the case of orders passed on the very previous day. He also advanced a line of reasoning that in construing the beneficiary legislations like the Land Reforms Act, the Court has to interpret the provisions in such a way as to enable the class of persons for whose benefit the legislation has been enacted, to obtain the benefit thereof. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Federal Court reported in Rai Ram Tran v. Mrs. Hill (AIR.. (36) 1949 Federal Court 135) wherein Mahajan J., in Para.19, at page 139, observed as follows "The words of a remedial statute must be constructed so far as they reasonably admit so as to secure that the relief contemplated by the statute shall not be denied to the persons intended to be relieved." The right of appeal under S.102 of the Act is not one conferred exclusively on the class of tenants for whose benefit, no doubt, the Act has been primarily enacted, the right of appeal under that section is against orders enumerated therein, without any distinction as to whether the aggrieved party is a landowner or kudikidappukaran. So, if a construction is given that the right of appeal under S.102, as amended, is available in respect of orders passed under S.77 (2) anterior to the date of the coming into force of Ordinance XX of 1975, it would mean that it is a right available to the landowner as much as the kudikidappukaran,whoever being the aggrieved party. Therefore, the interpretation sought to be put by Sri. Therefore, the interpretation sought to be put by Sri. Subramonia Iyer, if accepted, would not be one which would be exclusively to the benefit of tenant class, and as such the passage relied on, strictly speaking, does not have much of relevance to the present case. That apart, on a careful consideration of the case, and the context in which the observation was made by the Federal Court, one would be satisfied that it does not go to the extent of laying down anything like a principle that the right of appeal operates retrospectively in the absence of any intention to that effect manifested in express words or by necessary implication in the statute which conferred the right of appeal. The passage immediately preceding the above quoted observation would reveal that the context in which it was made would not warrant the inference sought to be drawn by Sri. Subramonia Iyer. I would, therefore, quote that passage below: "...The legislature in its anxiety to give relief to debtors provided facilities to obtain it in all possible ways, and the power to review was also enlarged with this object. It seems to me that any other interpretation of the section would produce strange results and would result in anomalies. The words of the section 'which were not fully satisfied by 1st January 1939,' if interpreted in the manner suggested by the appellants' learned counsel would exclude all decrees passed in suits pending on 1st January 1)39 or instituted after that date from the scope of the exception to the proviso, because decrees which can be satisfied by 1st January 1939 can only be those passed antecedent to that date. This construction would produce a repugnancy between the two parts of the same section, the latter part providing that only decrees that came into existence before 1st January 1939 are within it and the earlier part saying that decrees passed in suits filed after 1st January 1939 are also included in it. Such a construction has to be avoided and if it is not possible to avoid it, then these words have to be ignored because otherwise the enactment qua decrees passed in suits to which the Act applies becomes, to all intents and purposes useless. Such a construction has to be avoided and if it is not possible to avoid it, then these words have to be ignored because otherwise the enactment qua decrees passed in suits to which the Act applies becomes, to all intents and purposes useless. Any reference to decrees passed in suits to which the Act applies would have been unnecessary in the section The construction suggested by the appellants also creates anomaly in as much as the result of it is that older decrees can be reopened under S.36 if not satisfied, while more recent ones in which excess interest against the law is included become immune from attack. In a statute framed to relieve debtors form excessive interest, such a construction is unsustainable". 6. From the passage quoted above it is obvious that the anxiety of the Court was to give a harmonious construction, avoiding repugnance between the two parts of the same section, as also anomalies which otherwise could have resulted. The sentence relied on by Sri. Subramonia Iyer has to be read and understood in the context of what has been stated in the preceding passage quoted above 7. Stressing his point that the right of appeal is a vested, substantive right, Sri. K. V. Sadananda Prabhu, the counsel for the 'landowner', cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Garikapati v. Subbiah Choudhary (AIR. 1957 SC. 540) wherein, in Para.23, speaking for the majority, S. R. Das C. J. observed as follows: "From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge: (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by a legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties there to till the rest of the career of the suit. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties there to till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. 8. Sri. Subramonia Iyer sought to distinguish the observations made is Garikapati v. Subbiah Choudhary (AIR. 1957 SC. 540) on the ground that whereas that case dealt with a question as to whether a vested right of appeal could be taken away without subsequent enactment to that effect, in the present case the question is whether a right of appeal conferred by an amendment to the Act could be retrospectively given effect to where the appeal provision does not specifically exclude the orders passed antecedent to the date of the coming into force of that provision from its purview. id my view, the question of affecting the vested right is involved here also. As the law stood before amendment by Act XV of 1976 (or Ordinance XX of 1975) the position was that once an order was passed by the Land Tribunal under S.7(2) of the Act, finality was attached to it; and when it is subjected to an appeal at the instance of the aggrieved party, to that extent, the vested right of the opposite party gets affected. I do not, therefore, find any merit in this contention advanced by Sri. Subramonia Iyer. 9. One of the well-known rules of construction of the statutes is that we must not imply anything in them which is inconsistent with the words expressly used. I do not, therefore, find any merit in this contention advanced by Sri. Subramonia Iyer. 9. One of the well-known rules of construction of the statutes is that we must not imply anything in them which is inconsistent with the words expressly used. "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature". (Maxwell On Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, Page 2) "The rule of construction is 'to intend the legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed' The underlying principle is that the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expression used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just or expedient." (Maxwell On Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, Page 4). 10. It is well settled that all legislations must be presumed to be prospective in their operations in the absence of any intention contrary thereto expressed or implied; the vested right should be respected; and it could be divested only by legislative provisions; and no more retro activity than what is strictly necessary should be given to any provision in law. This position is made clear in the following passages in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, Pages 204 and 205. "It is a fundamental rule of English law thai no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. 'Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only' A statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary 11 11. A right of appeal is not a question of procedure but a substantive right. If the enactment is expressed in language is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only' A statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary 11 11. A right of appeal is not a question of procedure but a substantive right. Therefore, in the absence of any contrary intendment, the Legislature must be presumed to have intended the right to be exercised only prospectively, without affecting the vested rights of the parties, arising out of orders which were passed antecedent to the date of the coming into force of the Act which conferred the right of appeal. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that on 28 21976, on which date the appeal was filed, the kudikidappukaran had no right to appeal against an order passed on 28 21975 in spite of the amendment to S.102 introduced by Ordinance XX of 1975, replaced by Act XV of 1976. The kudikidappukaran having had no right of appeal, the judgment of the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal, and the petition for condoning the delay, on that score is perfectly valid, and I find no ground to interfere with it in this revision under S 103 of the Act. 12. Sri. Subramonia Iyer submitted that the order passed by the Land Tribunal without properly applying its mind as to whether the conditions laid down in S.75 (2) (ii) have been fulfilled, and in violation of the provisions contained in the second proviso to S.77 (1) of the Act, is one without jurisdiction. Now that the appeal is found to be not maintainable, being one filed out of time, lam not called upon to consider the merits of this contention. If it is the case of the 'kudikidappukaran' that the order passed under S.77 (2) of the Act is a nullity for jurisdictional reasons, that probably may be a matter which could be urged at the time of execution, but not in this revision when the appeal itself was found to be not maintainable. 13. We will now take up C. R. P. No. 746 of 1977. 13. We will now take up C. R. P. No. 746 of 1977. One of the grounds urged in the memorandum of civil revision petition is that the order allowing the purchase application was a composite order, one rejecting the shifting application under S.80-A (9), and the other allowing the application for purchase of kudikidappu under S.80-B. Presumably the object behind this ground was to lay foundation for the argument that in an appeal against that composite order the correctness of the order under S.80-A (9) as well as the order under S.80-B could be attacked. From the judgment of the Appellate Authority it could be seen that it was the only contention raised before it, and the main attack was directed against that part of the order which fell under S.80-A (9). In this Court, however, no attempt was made to stress this point, obviously for the reason that it would be in conflict with the contentions based on the order under S .71 (2) of the Act. All the emphasis, in the course of the argument in this Court, was concentrated by Sri. Prabhu on the point that in view of the order under S.77 (2) passed by the Land Tribunal subsequently, the Appellate Authority ought to have set aside the order under S.80-B of the Act. This was not, as far as I could see from the judgment, a point argued before the Appellate Authority. The appeal was filed against an order under S.80-B which was passed long before the filing of the application under S.77 (1), and legitimately be could not have attacked the order under S.80-B on the ground that it was hit by the proviso to S.80-B (3) of the Act. The only question before the Appellate Authority was whether the order passed under S.80-B (3) wag a valid one. It was undoubtedly a valid order. An appeal might be a continuation of the proceedings initiated before the Land Tribunal, but the valid order passed by the Tribunal will not become invalid because of something done by the 'landowner' after the passing of that order validly. It was undoubtedly a valid order. An appeal might be a continuation of the proceedings initiated before the Land Tribunal, but the valid order passed by the Tribunal will not become invalid because of something done by the 'landowner' after the passing of that order validly. There appears to be nothing on record to the effect that a copy of the order on the application under S.77 (1) was produced before the Appellate Authority or any argument with reference to that order was advanced before that Authority; and little importance could be attached to the averment in the memorandum of civil revision petition that the passing of the order under S.77 (2) was brought to the notice of the Appellate Authority. In any event there is nothing to warrant the setting aside of the order validly passed by the Land Tribunal under S.80B(3) of the Act. In that view I uphold the judgment of the Appellate Authority in L.R.AS. No. 345 of 1971. The result is that both the revisions fail, and are, therefore, dismissed, however, without any order as to costs. Dismissed.