Ram Autar Gupta v. Hoshiyar Singh — 1978 DIGILAW 840 (ALL)

JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. Ram Autar Gupta, the petitioner is the owner of house no. 1197 situated at E. L. Sharma Road, Meerut. He was himself in possession of a portion of this house. The remaining three portions had been let out to Gur Bux Singh, Lajja Ram and Hoshiyar Singh separately. The house originally belonged to one Chaman Lal Son of Ganga Ram. He executed a sale deed in respect of the said house in favour of Ram Autar Gupta in April, 1972. The sale deed was presented for registration before the SubRegistrar, Meerut on April 19, 1972. It was registered and subsequently entered in the register on July 21, 1972. The petitioner filed three applications under section 21 of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) for release of the portions in possession of the three abovementioned tenants. The applications were contested. By an order dated 28th May, 1974, the applications were allowed. Aggrieved the three tenants preferred three separate appeals before the District Judge, Meerut. These appeals were transferred to the First Additional District Judge, Meerut who allowed the same by the impugned judgment dated 431977. Feeling aggrieved, Ram Autar Gupta, the landlord has filed these three writ petitions. The appeals were allowed on a preliminary objection raised by the tenants that as the applications filed under section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 had been preferred within a year from the date of sale deed obtained by the landlord, the said applications were not maintainable and were liable to be dismissed on account of the prohibition contained in the first proviso to subsection (1) of section 21 of the Act. The relevant provision of the Act is extracted below: Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenants: "21 (1). The relevant provision of the Act is extracted below: Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenants: "21 (1). The prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following ground exist, namely: (a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling or where the landlord is the trustee of a public trust, for the object of the trust; (b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction; Provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, application shall be entertained on the grounds mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before "the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years." For appreciating the point urged, it may be useful to deal with the object behind the above proviso. The Act was passed in 1972, Interalia for the interest of general public, for regulation of letting, rent and eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas, and for matters connected therewith. Section 20 of the Act contains a bar laying down that no suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy can be filed except on grounds mentioned in subsection (2) to section 20 of the Act. Section 21 is an exception to section 20. Section 20 of the Act contains a bar laying down that no suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy can be filed except on grounds mentioned in subsection (2) to section 20 of the Act. Section 21 is an exception to section 20. It provides that the prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord filed in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building or any specified part thereof, if he is satisfied that any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (21) of the Act exists. This takes me to the proviso to subsection (1) of section 21. It provides that where a landlord has acquired any building may transfer, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such acquisitionand the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant. This clause will, however, apply to the purchase which is made after the commencement of this Act. Where a purchase of the property was made before the commencement of the Act, the proviso would not apply. In the instant case, the plea of the tenants was that as the transaction of sale was completed on 2141972, the landlord could not file the application for release of the premises against them for three years, whereas the case of the landlord was that as the sale deed was executed on 19472 and presented on that date before the subregistrar for registration, the proviso did not apply to the present case. The object underlying the proviso appears to prevent transfers by landlord as a device to enable the purchasers to evict the tenants from the premises let out to them. It appears that the legislature thought that if a landlord was unable to make out a case for evicting his tenant under clause (a) of subsection (1) to Section 21, it was not likely that he may think of transferring the property to the purchaser to make him able to make out such a case on his own behalf, hence the legislature thought that if such a course was allowed to be adopted, it was likely to defeat the object of preventing the eviction of tenants. Consequently, in order to put a check to such a course the legislature thought of making a provision which could disentitle a landlord to file an application for release after having purchased the property. This provision was, thus, made with a view to discourage the temptation of landlord to use the machinery of subsection (1) to section 21 after having purchased the property. In V. N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai and another (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 432), the Supreme Court was required to decide the object of a similar provision contained in Section 14 (6) of Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958). Section 14 (6) of the said Act provides that there a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer, no application for recovery of possession of such premises could lie unless a period of five years had elapsed from the date of the acquisition. The Supreme Court dealing with the object of such provision held, "In other words, where the right to evict a tenant could not be claimed by a landlord under section 14 (1)(c), the legislature thought that the landlord should not be permitted to create such a right by adopting the device of transferring the premises to a purchaser who may be able to prove his own individual case under section 14 (1) (c)." It is evident that the proviso to subsection (1) of section 21 was inserted by the legislature in the present Act as well to prevent the landlords from circumventing the provisions of clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 21. It takes me to the consideration of next question as to whether the purchase made in this case was after the commencement of this act or before the said date. The word "purchase" has not been defined in the present act or in the Transfer of Property Act. Generally speaking, the word "purchase" means the transmission or transfer of property from one person to another by voluntary agreement, founded on a valuable consideration. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that "in the case of a sale of immovable property of the value of Rs. Generally speaking, the word "purchase" means the transmission or transfer of property from one person to another by voluntary agreement, founded on a valuable consideration. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that "in the case of a sale of immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/ or over, as in the case before me, a transfer could be affected only by a registered instrument." The word "Registered" has been defined in the Transfer of Property Act as "Registered under the law for the time being in force regulating the registration of documents. The relevant provision in the Registration Act relating to registration of a document is contained in subpart (B) of Chapter XI. The relevant provisions are sections 58 to 61. Section 61 makes provision for the copying of a document in public registers from which the word "registration" is derived. Section 61 (1) provides that endorsements and certificates referred to and mentioned in sections 59 and 60 shall thereupon be copied into the margin of the Registerbook and the copy of the map or plan (if any) mentioned in Section 11 shall be filed in Book No. I. Then, subsection (2) lays down that "The registration of document shall thereupon b; deemed complete, and the document shall then be returned to the person who presented the same for registration, or to such other person (if any) who has nominated in writing in that behalf on the receipt mention in Section 52." Undisputedly, the sale deed was registered on 21772 and was returned to Ram Autar Gupta, the landlord on the same day. Shri S. S. Bhatnagar, counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that as the document was executed on 19472, the petitioner shall be deemed to have become the owner of the property on that date. That being so the submission was that since the purchase was made before the commencement of the Act, the proviso did not apply. Section 47 of the Registration Act reads: "A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration." I am unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner as correct. Section 47 of the Registration Act reads: "A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration." I am unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner as correct. Under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a sale of immovable property is not valid unless it is affected by a registered instrument. Subsection (2) of section 61 clearly provides that it is only after the endorsement of entry made in the Registerbook that the registration of the document shall be deemed complete. So long as the transfer is not registered, it does not come into force. Once a document is registered, the effect begins to commence. Section 47 of the Registration Act makes provision for the operation of the document on transaction. It does not provide for point of time at which the deed becomes legally effective. In the present case, the question is not as to what was the effect of registration, but when the fact of purchase would be deemed to have completed. In Ram Saran Lal and others v. Mst. Domini Kuer and others (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1747), the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the question as to when the registered instrument would become complete. In that connection, the Supreme Court also considered the scope of section 47 of the Registration Act and found that Section 47 of the Registration Act had nothing to do with the completion of the registrationand, therefore, nothing to do with the completion of the sale when the instrument is one of sale. In this connection the Supreme Court further observed: "A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed cannot b? said to have been competed earlier because by virtue of section 47 the instrument by which it is effected, after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date.' The law enunciated by the Supreme Court would show that a distinction his to be maintained between the dates on which document becomes operative and the date on which it becomes legally affected. Section 47 of the Registration Act gives retrospective effect to a document after it has been registered. Section 47 of the Registration Act gives retrospective effect to a document after it has been registered. But the title of the transferee is not completed till the registration. The view convassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner ignores that if the sale deed is not registered, the transferee will have no titleover the property. In Firm Mukuni Lal Veerkumar and another v. Purushottam Singh and others (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1182), the Supreme Court was required to consider the period of time from which the period of three months for filing an application under section 9 of Insolvency Act commences. In that connection, the Supreme Court repelled the argument raised on the basis of section 47 of the Registration Act and found that it is not a date of the execution of sale deed which was relevant for that purpose, but the date on which the same was registered. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner the decisions reported in District Board, Bijnaur v. Mohammad Abdul Salon (A.I.R. 1947 Alld. 173) and Chaturbhuj Sharma v. Durga Dayal (A.I.R. 1975 Alld. 471). I could not find anything in these two cases which could advance the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In District Board's case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that where the Act of Insolvency is alleged against the debtor because of a transfer made by him by a registered sale deed, the limitation should be computed from the date of registration of the deed and not from the date of its execution. In Chaturbhuj Sharma's case (supra) the controversy was altogether different. But the law laid down in that case does not appear to be different than the view which I am taking in the present case, Shri S. S, Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the petitioner also urged that as the sale deed was presented for registration on 19472 for registration and the endorsement was made by the SubRegistration the said date itself, the registration should be deemed to be complete on this date. This submission has no substance. This submission has no substance. It was rightly pointed out by Sri Bharatji Agrawal learned counsel appearing for the respondents that sections 58 to 61 lay down a scheme for registration and that these provisions are so connected with each other that it is not possible to hold that a deed would be deemed to have been registered merely by an endorsement made by the subRegistrar on the document. As already observed the sale is complete after the completion of sections 59 to 61 and not when the document has been executed or presented for registration. There is another line to reach the same conclusion. The same is that as the rights of a third person are to be governed by the proviso to subsection (1) of section 21, the proper interpretation is the date on which the document is actually registered and not when it was executed. A tenant who is going to be evicted by filing of an application under clause (a) to subsection (1) of section 21 can be imputed the knowledge of the transfer from the date on which the registration is done and not from before. Considering the object behind the proviso as well, it also appears that the interpretation put by the learned counsel for the respondents should be accepted and not that made by the petitioner. The object more effectively be achieved by holding that the period of three years laid down in the proviso will commence from the date of registration of the document. For these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.