JUDGMENT K.C. Aggarwal, J. :- Premises No. 11, Dilkusha, New Katra, Allahabad, belongs to Purshotam Das, the petitioner. This had been let out to Gaya Prasad Verma. Suit No. 37 of 1971 was filed by Purshotam Das against Gaya Prasad Verma for his ejectment. This suit was compromised, and in pursuance of the compromise arrived at between Purshotarn Das and Gaya Prasad Verma, the latter vacated the premises and delivered its vacant possession to Purshotam Das. Kripa Shanker Misra respondent no. 3 filed an application for allotment of the aforesaid premises on the ground of his requirement. Purshotam Das also filed an application for release under section 16 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. In this application the need disclosed was that of residence by the members of the family of Purshotam Das. Purshotam Das stated that the accommodation in his possession was insufficient to meet the requirements of/the family members and, therefore, he required the same for occupation by members of his family. Before this application could be decided, Purshotam Das filed another application on 22.5.1973 and an affidavit dated 12.7.1973 stating that the premises was required by him for starting a lodge in the building. This was necessitated to argument his income. 3. By an order passed on July 20, 1973, the premises was allotted by Yamuna Shanker Misra, the then rent Control and Eviction Officer to his own brother Kripa Shanker Misra, respondent no. 3. Aggrieved by the order of allotment, Purshotam Das preferred an appeal before the District Judge under section 18 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed. Against the said order, Purshotam Das filed a writ petition, subsequently numbered as Writ Petition No. 6123 of 1973. The Writ Petition was allowed on November, 20, 1975, and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was directed to decide the application for release made by the petitioner as well as the application filed by Kripa Shanker Misra, respondent no. 3, a fresh. 4. After remand, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer again allotted the premises to Kripa Spanker Misra by an order dated 24-10-1977. Purshottam Des again filed a revision against the said order before the District Judge. This was transferred to the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, who dismissed the same on 11-1-1978. Feeling aggrieved, Purshottam Das preferred writ petition no. 675 of 1978. 5. Purshottam Des again filed a revision against the said order before the District Judge. This was transferred to the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, who dismissed the same on 11-1-1978. Feeling aggrieved, Purshottam Das preferred writ petition no. 675 of 1978. 5. It however, appears that Raja Ram Jailwal, who is the petitioner in writ petition no 1545 of 1978, also preferred an application for allotment. The application filed by him was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, and the order passed on the said application was maintained in revision. He filed the aforesaid writ petition against the rejection of his application for allotment. 6. A number of grounds were given by the learned Additional District Judge for rejecting the application for release filed by Purshottam Das. We are, however, concerned with the following three grounds which weighed with him These grounds are: 1. That applications were filed by Purshottam Das for different needs and at different times. 2. the need of the landlord did not appear to be bona fide as he was doing business of sale of Chooni and Bhoosi in another premises. 3. there being a bar that a residential building could not be permitted to be converted into a non-residential one, the application filed by Purshottam Das was not maintainable. 7. Coming to the first ground it is true that in the application filed on 28-12-1972, Purshottam Dass stated that he required the premises for residence of his family members. He however, filed another application on 22-5-1973 taking altogether a new ground which had not been set up in the application died 28-12-1972. In this application the prayer made was that in order to provide employment to his son and himself he wanted the premises in dispute for the purposes of opening a lodge in the same. It may be true that there was inconsistency in the two applications filed by Purshottam Das. But there is nothing in U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 which prohibits a landlord from taking inconsistent pleas. In fact, there is nothing to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure which puts such a bar. The law permits a litigant to take inconsistent pleas so that the same may obviate the necessity of bringing another suit for another purpose. In fact, there is nothing to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure which puts such a bar. The law permits a litigant to take inconsistent pleas so that the same may obviate the necessity of bringing another suit for another purpose. Accordingly, if the landlord filed two applications for two different purposes, that could not be a ground in itself for holding that the requirement of the premises by Purshottam Das premises by Purshottam Das was not bona fide. 8. That apart, it also does not appear to be correct that the needs set up in the two applications by Purshottam Das were inconsistent. In the first application Purshottam Das stated that he required the premises for occupation by family members where as in the second application he mentioned that a part of the premises was required by him for the purpose of converting it into a lodge. Since only a part was required for converting it into a lodging house and the remaining part could still be used by him for his residence, the two pleas taken were not destructive to each. Hence, the application for release could not be rejected on this ground. 9. So far as the question of bona fide need of the petitioner is concerned, it would suffice to mention that every one has a right to augment his income, and if for that purpose the need set up in the earlier application was modified, the courts below should not have found that the petitioner was not entitled to the release being made in his favour. 10. The second question that was decided against Purshottam Das was that he was already doing business of sale of Khali, Chooni and Bhoosi in another premises belonging to him. Assuming that the said fact was correct, the learned Additional District Judge was required to find whether the application filed by the landlord was not bona fide. If he would have found that the landlord did not require the premises in question for opening a lodging house, the matter would have been different. But, since he did not record such a finding, he could not reject the application merely on the ground that the petitioner had a business of sale of Khali, Chooni and Bhoosi in another premises. It could not be forgotten that Purshottam Das and a large family consisting of five sons and four daughters. But, since he did not record such a finding, he could not reject the application merely on the ground that the petitioner had a business of sale of Khali, Chooni and Bhoosi in another premises. It could not be forgotten that Purshottam Das and a large family consisting of five sons and four daughters. It was but natural that any person placed in these circumstances would normally like to argument his income and if for that purpose he wanted the premises in dispute, the application could not be rejected. The Additional District Judge was wrong in not applying the correct principle while deciding the question of bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord. If the Court would have found that the application filed was merely a device invented by Purshottam Das for the purposes of getting the premises released, the landlord Additional District Judge would have been perfectly justified in rejecting the application. But, since no such finding was recorded, the rejection of the application cannot be upheld on this ground. 11. The only other ground that remains to be considered is whether there was a bar in applying for release under section 16 as a residential premises was required by the landlord for business purposes. Undisputably, Section 16 does not contain such a bar. One of the provisions to section 21(1), however, contains a bar providing that no residential building can be released to a landlord for occupation for business purposes. Such a provision is not to be found in section 16. Rather, sub-section (2) of section 16 permits release of the residential premises even for the purposes of any trade, profession or calling. Hence, the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in holding that the application filed by the landlord for the requirement of business was barred and was not maintainable. 12. Sri Ram Nand, counsel for the respondent 3, contended that although there was no bar specifically provided, but the basis for release under section 16 being the same as provided for in section 21 of the Act, the bar of user of a residential building for non-residential purposes should be read in section 16 as well. I am unable to find any merit in this submission. If the legislature intended to make a provision like the third proviso to subsection (1) of section 21, it would have done so. I am unable to find any merit in this submission. If the legislature intended to make a provision like the third proviso to subsection (1) of section 21, it would have done so. The fact that it did not provide for the same goes to show that the legislature did not intend that an application for release filed under section 16 be rejected on the basis of her contained in the third proviso to section 21(1). 13. There is a distinction between proceedings under section 16 and 21 of the Act. In the former, the building is either vacant or is likely to fall vacant where as in the latter case the building is still in occupation of a tenant when an application is filed by a landlord. As the legislature did not want that a tenant occupying a building should be made to vacate it on the basis of the business need of the landlord, it made a provision to that effect in section 21. But, in the case of section 16, as there is no tenant, the legislature purposely laid down that such a premises could be released in favour of a landlord for the business purposes as well. To accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent no, 3 would mean to take up the task of legislation. This is not possible to be done. 14. For these reasons, it appears appropriate to set aside the order of the Additional District Judge dated 1-1-1978, and that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 24-10-1977, and to direct the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to decide the application for release made by Purshottam Das afresh. 15. No arguments were addressed before me in writ petition no. 1545 of 1978. 16. In the result, writ petition no 675 of 1978 is allowed. The judgment and order of the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dated 11-1-1978 as well at the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 24-10-1977 are quashed. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to decide the release application of Purshottam Das aforesaid in the light of the observations made above. As a result of quashing of the aforesaid two orders, the allotment order made infavour of respondent no. 3 is also quashed. Writ Petition no. 1545 of 1978 is dismissed. I make no order as to costs in both the petitions.