JUDGMENT Prem Prakash, J. - This Special Appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 878 of 1972, quashing the order of the Director, Postal Services (dated the 12th May, 1972) reducing the respondent, Oudh Behari Singh, an erstwhile Sub-Post Master in the Singar Nagar, Post Office, Lucknow, in the time scale for a period of three, years. The impugned order was set aside on the ground that the Senior Superintendent, Post Offices (Lucknow Circle) was not competent (sic) as disciplinary proceedings or to get an inquiry done, to impose the penalty, under sub-cl. (v) of Rule 11 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules to be hereinafter referred as the Rules the disciplinary authority to inflict the penalty in the present case being the Director of Postal Services. 2. Briefly stated, the relevant facts are these: The respondent Oudh Behari Singh was working as Sub-Post Master, Singarnagar, Lucknow, on 19-9-1968, which was a day of general strike in the Post and Telegraph Department. He asserts that, in order to have a smooth working, he accepted the services of three outsiders to do odd jobs. The strike was subsequently called off and it is said the letters of thanks were issued to them, on 19-9-1968. According to the Department, no information about this arrangement was sent to the Divisional Officer by the petitioner, and when Sri R. P. Tripathi was deputed by the Department, he, on receipt of some information informed that no outsider had been employed at Singarnagar Sub-Post Office. Ved Prakash, Inspector of Post Offices, according to the petitioner, submitted a report to the effect that the aforesaid three persons had actually worked at the Sub-Post Office on 19-9-1968. Some concessions were announced by the Government of India on 13-10-1968; on receipt of the concessions the petitioner is said to have furnished the applications of the volunteers for favour of disposal, along with his letter dated 20-12-1968, intimating to the Department, at the same time, that their services had been utilised on 19-9-1968. No such letter was received in the Divisional Office. Upon a preliminary inquiry made by another Inspector R.N. Bhatnagar, it was found that the petitioner had unauthorisedly issued the letter of thanks to the volunteers. No such letter was received in the Divisional Office. Upon a preliminary inquiry made by another Inspector R.N. Bhatnagar, it was found that the petitioner had unauthorisedly issued the letter of thanks to the volunteers. Thereafter, a charge-sheet was served on the petitioner, and the Inquiry Officer was appointed by the Superintendent, Post Offices (Lucknow Circle). Ultimately, the disciplinary inquiry was done by Bhatnagar, who after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and recording the evidence of the witnesses submitted his finding on 28-5-1971, vide Annexure 2. On receipt of the findings a show-cause notice was issued' by the Superintendent, Post Offices, Lucknow Division, it was cancelled and another notice was issued by the Director of Postal Services, it being Annexure 4. The respondent submitted his reply to the second show-cause notice. The Director of Postal Services, passed the impugned order on 12-5-1972. 3. Being aggrieved against that order, the respondent invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending, in the main, that the Senior Superintendent, Post Offices, Lucknow Division, was not competent under the Rules to initiate the departmental inquiry and to appoint an Inquiry Officer, rendering the order made by the Director 'void and illegal, and secondly that in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings, the Inquiry Officer breached the principles of natural justice. 4. In the counter-affidavit sworn by the senior Superintendent, Post Offices, Lucknow, the grounds of attack have been seriously controverted. Learned single Judge, taking the view that the Senior Superintendent, Post Offices, was not competent under the Rules to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, to inflict the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has set aside the impugned order. After having done so, he did not consider it necessary to enter into the correctness or otherwise of the ancillary point that the disciplinary proceedings, contravened the principles of natural justice. 5. After having done so, he did not consider it necessary to enter into the correctness or otherwise of the ancillary point that the disciplinary proceedings, contravened the principles of natural justice. 5. At the very outset, counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants have invited our attention to R. 13 (2) of the Rules which reads as thus: "Authority to institute proceedings (2) A disciplinary authority competent under these rules to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 11 may institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant for the imposition of any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority is not competent under these rules to impose any of the latter penalties." 'Disciplinary authority' as defined by Section 2 (g) of the Rules, means the authority competent under these rules to impose on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in R. 11. 6. Rule 11 enumerates the various kinds of penalties which may be imposed on a Government servant: They are minor penalties falling within cls. (i) to (iv), and 'major penalties covered by cls. (v) to (ix), reduction to a lower time scale of pay grade or service being one of the major penalties. Under the Schedule appended to the Rules any of the 'minor' penalties could be imposed by the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices but the 'major' penalties could only be imposed by the Director of Postal Services. Counsel for the writ petitioner contended that since the Inquiry Officer was not, in the present case, appointed by the Director, to inquire into the truth of the allegations made against the charged servant, the proceedings were void from their very inception; whereas, the counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has brought to his use sub-rule (2) of Rule 13, that, since the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices was competent to impose any other penalties specified in cls. (i) to (v) he could, as disciplinary authority, institute disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner for the imposition of any of the major penalties, and this being so, the argument proceeds, the disciplinary proceedings initiated in the instant case do not suffer from the vice of lack of power in the authority initiating the proceedings. (i) to (v) he could, as disciplinary authority, institute disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner for the imposition of any of the major penalties, and this being so, the argument proceeds, the disciplinary proceedings initiated in the instant case do not suffer from the vice of lack of power in the authority initiating the proceedings. To reinforce the contention he has called in aid sub-rule (21) (a) of R. 14 which provides that where a disciplinary authority competent to impose any of the minor penalties but not competent to impose any of the major penalties has itself inquired into or caused to be inquired into the articles of any charge and that authority having regard to its own findings or having regard to his decision on any of the findings of any inquiring authority appointed by it, is of the opinion that any of the major penalties should be imposed on the Government servant, that authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to such authority as is competent to impose the last mentioned penalty. From sub-rule (21) (a) it is, therefore, clear that an authority competent to impose any of the minor penalties can himself inquire into the articles of charge or cause it to be inquired into by any other person appointed by him and in that case the order awarding any of the major penalties, made by the authority competent to impose such major penalty will not be deemed bad in law merely on the ground that the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated by an authority competent only to inflict any of the minor penalties. The construction which we have put on sub-rule (2) of Rule 13 is consistent with the scheme built in the Rules. 7. Counsel for the respondent has urged that sub-rule (2) of R. 13 envisages a preliminary inquiry being made into the conduct of the Government servant and not a disciplinary proceeding, the procedure for which is prescribed in Part VI of the Rules. We are unable to agree that sub-rule (2) contemplates a preliminary inquiry and not a disciplinary action. The distinction between a preliminary inquiry and a regular departmental inquiry was emphasised by the Supreme Court in Champaklal Chemanlal Shah v. Union of India ( AIR 1964 SC 1854 ). We are unable to agree that sub-rule (2) contemplates a preliminary inquiry and not a disciplinary action. The distinction between a preliminary inquiry and a regular departmental inquiry was emphasised by the Supreme Court in Champaklal Chemanlal Shah v. Union of India ( AIR 1964 SC 1854 ). At p. 1892, it was observed: "Generally therefore a preliminary inquiry is usually held to determine whether a prima facie case for a formal departmental inquiry is made out, and it is very necessary that the two should not be confused In short a preliminary inquiry is for the purpose of collection of facts in regard to the conduct and work of a Government servant in which he may or may not be associated so that the authority concerned may decide whether or not to subject the servant concerned to the enquiry necessary under Article 311 for inflicting one of the three major punishments mentioned therein. Such a preliminary enquiry may even be held ex parte for it is merely for the satisfaction of Government, though usually for the sake of fairness, explanation is taken from the servant concerned even at such an enquiry..... It is only when the Government proceeds to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the Government servant one of the three major punishments indicated in Article 311 that the Government servant is entitled to the protection of that Article. 7-A. The words used in sub-rule (2) are may institute disciplinary proceedings making it unmistakably clear that what the Rule envisages is a departmental inquiry and not a preliminary inquiry. In the consequence, the contention is overruled. 8. The second limb of the argument is that since sub-rule (2) of R. 14 provides, with respect to the procedure for imposition of major penalties, that the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into or appoint an authority to inquire into the truth of the imputations of misconduct against a Government servant, the Director, Postal Services, was the only authority competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings and in the present, saving not formed an opinion that there were grounds for making an inquiry, the whole proceedings were void in law. At first sight, the argument appears almost irresistible. But on a closer scrutiny we have come to the conclusion that it is not correct. At first sight, the argument appears almost irresistible. But on a closer scrutiny we have come to the conclusion that it is not correct. On the principle of harmonious construction the attempt should be to avoid such conflict rather than create it. Sub-rule (2) of R. 13 expresses in general terms that a disciplinary authority competent to impose any of the minor penalties may institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant for the imposition of any of the major penalties specified in R. 11. If the intention of the Rule making authority was to abrogate the plain effect of sub-rule (2), the provisions in sub-rule (2) would have been differently worded. If the intention was that the proceedings for the imposition of any of the major penalties were to be initiated only by the disciplinary authority competent to inflict such punishment, then. I the sub-rule would have used some such i words like notwithstanding. The very fact that sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 does not restrict the ambit of the operation of sub-rule (2) of Rule 13, which, in our opinion, is a general provision applicable to all kinds of disciplinary proceedings, should lead us to hold that a disciplinary authority, competent under the rules to impose any of the minor penalties, may initiate the disciplinary proceedings, against any Government servant for the imposition of any of the penalties specified in els. (v) to (ix) of Rule 11. In that view of the matter the second branch of the argument must also fail. 9. In the alternative, counsel for the writ petitioner has pointed out to us several infirmities which in his submission, vitiate the order itself. First, it has been urged that R.N. Bhatnagar having made the preliminary inquiry and it was upon his adverse report that the disciplinary action was initiated by the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, he should not have been appointed as the Inquiry Officer, on the principle that no man should be a Judge in his own cause. The principle is well settled that an accuser cannot be permitted to act as Judge. But it must be in all cases a question of substance and of fact whether the Judge has in truth also been an accuser. The bias must be shown at least to be real. The principle is well settled that an accuser cannot be permitted to act as Judge. But it must be in all cases a question of substance and of fact whether the Judge has in truth also been an accuser. The bias must be shown at least to be real. Blackburn, J. said in R. v. Rand ((1866) LR 1 QB 230) "wherever there is a real likelihood that the Judge would from kindred or any other case, have a bias in favour of one of the parties it Would be very wrong in him to act: and we are not to be understood to say that where there is a real bias of this sort, this court would not interfere". And in R. v. Meyer in 1875 (1) QBD 173, the same Judge said "......... though disqualifying interest is not confined to pecuniary interest, the interest if not pecuniary, must be substantial. In the case of R. v. Camborne Justices ((1955) 1 QB 41) Slade J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, reviewed the authorities and confirmed that the right test was that to disqualify a person a real likelihood of bias must be shown. Slade J., went on to add a new principle namely, that a real likelihood of bias must be made to appear not only from the materials in fact ascertained by the party complaining, but also from such further facts as he might readily have ascertained and easily verified in the course of his inquiries. Much to the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi ( AIR 1957 SC 425 ). The court made the observation that "the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; that test always is and must be whether a litigant would reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a Member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal." It would always, thus, be a question of fact to be decided in each case whether there is reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a real bias. There must be ground to produce a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. 10. There must be ground to produce a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. 10. Counsel for the writ petitioner referred us to a single Judge decision of this Court in C. S. Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1961 All 45 ), but the facts of that case are patently distinguishable, inasmuch as the officer appointed by the State Government to inquire into the charges against the appellant had expressed the opinion prior to the inquiry held by him that the appellant was undoubtedly corrupt. Moreover, the Inquiry Officer had refused to allow the petitioner to inspect documents before he submitted his explanation and also refused to allow him an opportunity to argue the case before the report was submitted. On these facts, the learned single Judge held that the officer selected to make the inquiry was not a person with an open mind, and he bore bias against the appellant inasmuch as he had prejudged the issue. The facts of the case reported in State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) are equally distinguishable. The case arose out of a departmental trial against a police constable before a Deputy Superintendent of Police. In order to contradict the testimony of a prosecution witness the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was conducting the inquiry stepped down from the inquiry; got his testimony recorded by another officer, and went to re-hold the reins of the inquiry. The Supreme Court remarked that the rules of natural justice were completely discarded and all canons of fair play were grievously violated. 11. In the present, on the material on record, the finding cannot be returned that there was a real likelihood of bias to disqualify Bhatnagar from holding the disciplinary enquiry. At no stage of the proceedings the petitioner preferred an objection in writing that the appointment of Bhatnagar was irregular. There is nothing to show that Bhatnagar exhibited any bias during the course of the enquiry, nor in the reply to the second show cause notice did he mention that Bhatnagar bore any bias against him. The findings recorded by Bhatnagar bear the impress of fair determination of issues before him. There is nothing to show that Bhatnagar exhibited any bias during the course of the enquiry, nor in the reply to the second show cause notice did he mention that Bhatnagar bore any bias against him. The findings recorded by Bhatnagar bear the impress of fair determination of issues before him. It is not said that he desired to dispose of the case 'with precipitancy and haste or that the disposal of the case seemed to smack of an unsavoury frame of mind. Viewed in these aspects, the plea must be repelled. 12. Then, it was argued that the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices turned down the request of the petitioner for the supply of the copies of the statements recorded by Deputy Superintendent, Post Offices, Lucknow, and withheld the copies of the statements of the witnesses by whom the articles of charges were proposed to be established. The counter-affidavit, in para 9, states that the petitioner was asked by the letter dated 5-3-1970 that he should specifically mention the statements required by him and that other statements could be examined by him after submission of his written defence. The petitioner could not have insisted on the furnishing of the entire evidence which Bhatnagar had collected in the course of the preliminary inquiry. At that stage, the petitioner had had no right to be heard. He would get the protection of Article 311 and all the rights that that protection implies only when the Government decided to hold a regular departmental inquiry. The charge-sheet, served upon the petitioner, specified the names of the witnesses who were to be examined at the inquiry. Tripathi was cross-examined by the petitioner at length, and, so were Nawal Kishore and Radhey Shyam. The inquiry officer discarded the evidence of the latter two, and relying upon what' was said by Tripathi and other circumstances in the case, which have been detailed by him in his report, Annexure 2, he found the petitioner guilty of misconduct. Tripathi was cross-examined by the petitioner at length, and, so were Nawal Kishore and Radhey Shyam. The inquiry officer discarded the evidence of the latter two, and relying upon what' was said by Tripathi and other circumstances in the case, which have been detailed by him in his report, Annexure 2, he found the petitioner guilty of misconduct. The Note to Rule 14 (11) states that if the Government servant applies orally or in writing for the supply of copies of the statements of witnesses, mentioned in the list referred to in sub-rule (3), the inquiring authority shall furnish him with such copies as early as possible and in any case not later than three days before the commencement of the examination of the witnesses on behalf of the disciplinary authority. We may note that the writ petition does not aver that the petitioner made such application orally or in writing for the supply of copies, at the commencement of the inquiry. In that state of affairs, it is not possible to accept the plea of prejudice which the learned counsel has canvassed in the course of the hearing of the appeal. 13. Finally, it was urged that Sri Ved Prakash, the Inspector, who had earlier held a preliminary inquiry and exonerated the petitioner from the blame, was appointed the Presenting Officer, which deprived the petitioner from using his evidence to his benefit. The answer to this contention is that the petitioner did not give any indication to summon the report of Sri Ved Prakash, or to summon him as a witness for the defence. From the early stages of the inquiry Sri Ved Prakash had worked as the Presenting Officer, but the petitioner did not make any sort of complaint in that behalf. The ground must fail. 14. For the discussion in the above, we arrive at the view that the enquiry proceedings do not suffer from any legal infirmity, and that the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, was competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for the imposition of any of the major penalties, notwithstanding that he was not competent under the rules to impose any such penalty. Rule 13 (2) expressly confers such an authority upon the Senior Superintenden of Post Offices. 15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside. Rule 13 (2) expressly confers such an authority upon the Senior Superintenden of Post Offices. 15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside. Accordingly, the Rule fails, and the petition is dismissed. In the circumstances, costs shall be borne by the parties throughout. The interim order, if any, is vacated.