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1978 DIGILAW 846 (MP)

Sampatial v. Layakchand

1978-11-10

H.G.MISHRA

body1978
Short Note : 1. This is a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed against Order dated 25-2-1977, passed by the first Additional District Judge Gwalior, in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.38 of 1976; arising out of Order dated 29-6-1976, passed by the Third Civil Judge Class II, Gwalior in Execution Case No. 91-a/67-76, ordering criminal prosecution of the decree holder appellant under section 195 (1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) for having committed offence punishable under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. Held: When the learned Judge passed order dated 29-6-1976, under section 195 (1)(i)(a) of the Code, he did not cease to be a Civil Court. The learned Additional District Judge, when approached by the decree holder applicant, acted as a Court subordinate to this Court, within the contemplation of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that the High Court may call for the record of any case, which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto and if Such subordinate Court appears to have either exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law or to have failed to have exercised the jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. Sub-section (2) of section 115 of the CPC provides that the High Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any decree or any order against which appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. No appeal lies in the matter to this Court or to any Court subordinate to this Court. As such, the present revision is competent. 2. Sub-section (2) of section 195 of the Code vests power of ordering withdrawal of complaint by any authority to which the public servant, ordering making of the complaint, under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 195 of the Code is administratively subordinate. The decree holder applicant in the instant case, has also prayed for grant of relief under sub-section (2) of section 195 of the Code. The decree holder applicant in the instant case, has also prayed for grant of relief under sub-section (2) of section 195 of the Code. The action of the applicant before the Additional District Judge, may be treated as appeal-cum-application as far as appeal is concerned it is incompetent, as there is no provision of appeal in the matter. As such, prayer for an order of withdrawal of the complaint only appears to be legally permissible. 3. Now, the question that remains to be considered is as to what is the appropriate forum for seeking relief under section 195 (2) of the Code. The Civil Judge acting as public servant under section 195 (1) (a) cannot be regarded as administratively subordinate to the Court of Additional District Judge. Chapter 4 of the M.P.Civil Courts Act, 1958 deals with administrative control. Section 14 of this Act, is placed in Chapter 4 and provides that subject to the general superintendence and control of the High Court, the District Judge shall superintend and control all other Civil Courts in the local area within his jurisdiction. Section 15 thereof clothes the District Judge with power of distribution of business among Courts under his control. Accordingly, the learned Judge who passed the order dated 29-6-1976, as a public servant, is an authority who is administratively subordinate to the District Judge and not to the Additional District Judge. 4. Thus, the learned Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to pass any order under section 195 (2) of the Code. The learned Additional District Judge is right in holding so. The order passed by the Additional District Judge is non-est, rejecting the application instead of ordering return thereof. 5. So far as the applicant had preferred appeal in the Court of III Additional Sessions Judge Gwalior being appeal No. 120/76. This appeal was dismissed by the order dated 25-2-1977 So far as this appeal is concerned that too was incompetent. No appeal lay against the order passed by the Executing Court on 29-6-1976 under section 340 of the Code. Accordingly, finality attached to it by section 341 of the Code, cannot be attached to the order passed therein. Order dated 25-2-1977 passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge is accordingly null and void. It is quoram non-judice and having been passed by a Court having no jurisdiction, it cannot be treated to be relevant. Accordingly, finality attached to it by section 341 of the Code, cannot be attached to the order passed therein. Order dated 25-2-1977 passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge is accordingly null and void. It is quoram non-judice and having been passed by a Court having no jurisdiction, it cannot be treated to be relevant. Accordingly, the passing of such order in an incompetent appeal cannot be regarded to be effective bar, to the consideration of the application under section 195 of the Code by the appropriate authority. This is the position of law which flows from section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, thus: "44. Fraud or collusion in obtaining judgment of incompetency of Court, may be proved.-Any party to suit or other proceedings may show that any judgment or order or decree which is relevant under sections 40, 41 or 42, and which has been delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it, or so obtained by fraud or collusion" 6. The words 'not competent in the aforesaid section refer to a Court acting without jurisdiction as held in Ketlilomma v. Kelappan (ILR 12 Mad. 228). It has been laid down in ILR 21 Bom 205 (212) (Sardarmal Jagannath v. A. S. Moodaliar) that the "competency". of a Court and its 'jurisdiction' are synonymous terms. In R.V. BP, of Chester (1747-48)WVI 25, Land Cl. held that : "Every species of judgment will be rendered inadmissible in evidence on proof being given that the Court which pronounced it has no jurisdiction.” 7. It is a fundamental principle well established that order passed by a Court without jurisdiction is nullity and that its invalidity could be relied upon. Applying these principles it has to be regarded that the order passed by the II Additional Sessions Judge in Cr.A. No. 120/76 was passed in an incompetent proceeding (appeal). As such, that order, too, was without jurisdiction and the same cannot be set up a bar to the consideration on merits of the matter by authority competent to determine the question of withdrawal of the complaint. The learned Additional District Judge has illegally considered himself to be bound by the same. 8. As such, that order, too, was without jurisdiction and the same cannot be set up a bar to the consideration on merits of the matter by authority competent to determine the question of withdrawal of the complaint. The learned Additional District Judge has illegally considered himself to be bound by the same. 8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, since the learned first Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain application under section 195 (2) of the Code for ordering withdrawal of the complaint and the impugned order is void the application filed by the applicant on 13-8-76 will be deemed to be pending in the eye of law, ILR 21 Bom.205 and ILR 12 Mad. 228 relied on. Revision partly allowed. Case remitted to District Judge.