JUDGMENT S. J. Hyder, J. The only question which I am required to determine In this second appeal is about the true scope and ambit of the first proviso to subsection (1) of section 9 of the U.P. Basic Education Act (U. P. Act No. 34 of 1972. It may be stated that the responsibility for primary education had rested with the Zila Parishad in rural areas and with the Municipal Boards and the Nagar Mahapalikas in the urban areas until the aforesaid enactment was passed. The Legislature was of the view that the administration of the primary education through the instrumentality of the said local bodies was not satisfactory. It was considered necessary to reorganise, reform and expand elementary education and with the aforesaid object, U.P. Act No. 34 of 1972 was enacted and it received the assent of the President on August 17, 1972 and was published in U. P. Gazette Extraordinary dated August 19, 1972. The Act provides for the constitution of a Board known as Uttar Pradesh Board of Basic Education. It defines the function of the Board which includes among others the exercise of supervision and control over basic schools and normal schools. Section 9 (1) of the Act insofar as it is relevant is reproduced below: "9. Transfer of employees.(1) On and from the appointed day every teacher, officer and other employees serving under a local body exclusively in connection with basic schools (including any supervisory or inspecting staff) immediately before the said day shall be transferred to and become a teacher, officer or other employee of the Board and shall hold office by the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same other terms and conditions of service as he would have held the same if the Board had not been constituted and shall continue to do so unless and until such tenure, remuneration and other terms and conditions are duly altered by the Board." Provided that any service rendered under local body by any such teacher, officer or other employee before the appointed day shall be deemed to be service rendered under the Board." 'Appointed day' has been defined to mean the day on which the Board is established. The facts giving rise to this second Appeal are not disputed and may be stated shortly. The facts giving rise to this second Appeal are not disputed and may be stated shortly. The plaintiff who is the appellant before me was an Assistant Teacher in the Junior High School, Konch in the district of Jalaun. The said junior School had been established and was under the control of the Municipal Board. On 2891967, the President of the Municipal Board suspended the plaintiff and thereafter dismissed him by an order dated July 7, 1970. The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Commissioner who set aside the order of the President and remanded the case for his reconsideration. After the order of demand, the President, by an order dated June 21, 1971, reinstated the plaintiff but directed that he shall forfeit his full pay and dearness allowance from the date of the order of suspension. The plaintiff again went in appeal before the Commissioner who allowed the said appeal by his order dated July 1,1972 and again remanded the case for the reconsideration be the President. After this order, the President of the Municipal Board passed an order dated August 8, 1972 by which he directed that the plaintiff shall be entitled to his full pay and dearness allowance. The order passed by the Commissioner, was approved by the Municipal Board in its meeting held on September 16, 1972. The order of the President dated August 8, 1972, and the resolution of the Municipal Board dated 16th September, 1972 was passed after the appointed day under the Basic Education Act. In spite of the said order and resolution of the Municipal Board, the plaintiff was not paid the arrears of his salary any dearness allowance and increment due to him from the date of suspension till the date of reinstatement. The plaintiff accordingly filed the suit for the recovery of the said amount. The suit was contested on behalf of the Municipal Board on various grounds which need not be mentioned here. Suffice it to say that the trial court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said Decree the Municipal Board preferred an appeal. The said appeal was allowed by the Second Additional District Judge, Jalaun who dismissed the plaintiff's suit. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiff has come up in appeal to this court. Suffice it to say that the trial court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said Decree the Municipal Board preferred an appeal. The said appeal was allowed by the Second Additional District Judge, Jalaun who dismissed the plaintiff's suit. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiff has come up in appeal to this court. The only ground which found favour with the court of appeal below was that under the first proviso to subsection (1) of section 9 of the Basic Education Act, the plaintiff was deemed to be in the service of the Board from the very inception of his appointment as Assistant Teacher by the Municipal Board. It was of the view that the arrears of salary and dearness allowance payable to the plaintiff, although they related to a period before the appointed day, was a liability which had to be met by the Board and the Municipal Board was no longer responsible to pay the said arrears of salary and dearness allowance etc. It is the correctness of this view taken by the court of appeal below which has been challenged before me. The main provision of subsection(1) of Section 9 inter alia lays down that on and from the appointed day, every teacher, officer and other employees serving under a local body in connection with basic schedules immediately before the said day shall be transferred to and shall become teacher, officer or other employee of the Board. In other words, the date from which the services of such teachers and other employees have been transferred to the Board is the appointed day as defined in the Act, The main provision of subsection (1) of section 9 does not speak of the transfer of service of such employees from the local bodies to the Board from an anterior date. The difficulty, however, is created by the first proviso which has been set out in extension. As already stated above, this proviso has been interpreted by the lower appellate court to mean that the appellants services shall be deemed to be transferred from an anterior date, namely, the date from which the appellant was appointed by the local body. In case the interpretation placed by the lower appellate court on the first proviso to subsection (1) of section 9 is correct, it would create an obvious anomaly. In case the interpretation placed by the lower appellate court on the first proviso to subsection (1) of section 9 is correct, it would create an obvious anomaly. I would go even to the extent of saying that such an interpretation would place the first proviso on a collision course with the main provision contained in subsection (1). It is well recognised cannon of interpetation of statutes that ordinarily a proviso is construed as an exception to the general rule enunciated in the main provision of the section. The territoy of a proviso generally speaking is to take out and exclude something which would have been otherwise within the section. To this general rule, however, an exception has been recognised and it has been laid down that in exceptional cases, if language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the proviso may, in a given case, enact a substantive provision independent of the main provision to which it has been appended. Be that as it may, there is one element which admits of no doubt. In no circumstance, any proviso can be construed in a manner so as to obliterate and swallow up the main provision to which it is a proviso. Maxwell in his book 'On the Interpretation of Statutes' 1968 Edn, has stated at page 189 as follows: "Difficulties sometimes arise in construing provisos. It will, however, generally be found that in consistencies can be avoided by applying the general rule that the words of a proviso are not to be taken "absolutely in their strict literal sense," but that a proviso is "of necessity...limited in its operation to the ambit of the section which it qualifies." The rule enunciated by Maxwell is in consonance with the principle of harmonious construction. Reason for this rule have been stated by Maxwell as based on the general principle that an author must be supposed not to have intended to contradict himself. It has been held in Sirajul Haq Khan and others v. The Sunni Central Board of Wagf, U.P. and others ( AIR 1959 SC 198 ): "It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a statute courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective; an attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. In such a case, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provisions and to make the whole of it effective and operative." In commissioner of Commercial Tax, Board of Revenue, Madras and another vs. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver etc ( AIR 1968 SC 59 ) the Supreme Court has quoted the following passage from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn. page 155 with approval; "The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need by, on the rest.' "The true principle undoubtedly is that the sound interpetation and meaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting clause, saving clause and proviso, taken and construed together is to prevail." Keeping in view the principles enunciated above, I feel loath to construe section 9(1) and the first proviso to it in a manner so as to make the said provisions repugnant to each other. The only course open is to harmonise the proviso with the main enacting part of subsection (1) of section 9. Now subsection (1) of section 9 also lays down that on a transfer of the service from the local bodies to the Board with effect from the appointed day, the teacher, officer or employee of the Board, as the case may be, shall hold the office by the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same other terms and conditions of service as he would have held if the Board had not been constituted. As I look at subsection (I) of section 9 and the first proviso, I have no hesitation that the said proviso is to b; called in aid only for the limited purpose of determining the nature of tenure, remuneration and conditions of service to which reference has been made in the opening part of sub section (1). It is only by correlating the proviso for the said purpose, and for no other purpose, that it can be saved from cotradicting the main provision of subsection (1) of section 9. It is only by correlating the proviso for the said purpose, and for no other purpose, that it can be saved from cotradicting the main provision of subsection (1) of section 9. In my opinion, the lower appellate court has gone too far and to an extent which cannot be cotenanced in law holding that the effect of the first proviso to subsection (1) of section 9 is to transfer the liability for arrears of salary and allowances to the Board although such liability may have been incurred by the local authority before the appointed day. As a result of the conclusion on which I have arrived, his appeal merits to succeed. This appeal is accordingly allowed. The decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the decree of the trial court is restored. The defendant respondent shall pay the costs of this appeal and also of the lower appellate court to the plaintiff appellant.