JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - Vidyawati, the petitioner was the owner of building comprising of four shops numbers 295, 296, 297 and 420 and some other constructions situated at Majra Road, Shamli District Muzaffarnagar. These shops had been let out to four different tenants. The rest of the building was in occupation of the petitioner and she was running her own partnership business in the same. An application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by the petitioner on 10th March, 1974 against the respondent No. 2 on the ground that as she wanted to start a Karkhana in the back portion of the premises in dispute and further wanted to construct a show room as well, hence for the product of the commodities which would be prepared in the Karkhana, the shop in possession of respondent No. 2 Indersen be released in her favour. She claimed that she intended to take proceedings against the other tenants as well. In this application the allegations further made were that her requirement for the premises was bonafide and pressing. In the application, the petitioner further alleged that respondent No. 2 was carrying on general merchandise business in the disputed shop at a petty scale and he could get an alternative accommodation for running the said business. 2. The application was contested by respondent No. 2. He alleged that the need set up by the petitioner was not bonafide and that she had filed application with an ulterior motive to evict the respondent No. 2 so that she could let out the premises at a higher rent. Respondent No. 2 further alleged that the family of the petitioner consisted of herself, her husband and her son, her son's wife and their children. These people were living jointly and they possessed a number of properties in various names. Apart from the properties, they were also doing several businesses at Shamli and that the premises in dispute was not required by the petitioner for the purpose indicated in the application. Respondent No. 2 also asserted that the alternative shop, which was offered by the petitioner to respondent No. 2 was not situated in the Abadi and that he would be deprived of his livelihood, if the business was shifted to that premises. 3. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. Respondent No. 2 also asserted that the alternative shop, which was offered by the petitioner to respondent No. 2 was not situated in the Abadi and that he would be deprived of his livelihood, if the business was shifted to that premises. 3. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. Being satisfied that the need of the petitioner was bonafide, the Prescribed Authority allowed the application. Against the said order, an appeal was filed by respondent No. 2. The appellate court set aside the findings of the Prescribed Authority holding that the need of the petitioner was not bonafide. The appellate court also held that the respondent no. 2 would suffer greater hardship from the grant of the application than would be suffered by the petitioner from its refusal. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 3A. Shri B.D. Agrawal, counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that as the entire approach made by the appellate authority to the question- arising for decision were erroneous, the decision given by him was liable to be quashed. I do not find any merit in this submission. Two things, which were required to be decided in the present case, were whether the need of the petitioner was bonafide and secondly, whether the hardship which would be caused by the rejection of the application to the petitioner would have been greater. These two questions were those of facts. The appellate court discussed the evidence and found that the petitioner's family was doing a number of businesses at Shamli and that the premises was not required by her for the purpose indicated in the application. These two questions were those of facts. The appellate court discussed the evidence and found that the petitioner's family was doing a number of businesses at Shamli and that the premises was not required by her for the purpose indicated in the application. In this connection the findings given by the appellate court may be broadly mentioned as : (i) That the family of the petitioner was a small one consisting of herself, her husband and the only son Udai Pal ; (ii) That the small family had a large income from the established businesses of various types ; (iii) She was possessed of large properties yielding considerable ret it income ; (iv) The existing business was sufficiently big and that apart from partnership the petitioner had also agency of Hindustan Motors, bogy manufacturing business and timber and Ara Machine ; (v) The petitioner's family had a number of other plots where they could conveniently set up any type of business of factory ; (vi) They had means to acquire open land for factory purposes 4. Apart from the above factors, the others which were stated by the appellate authority in the judgment were about the fact that the application filed by the petitioner was not bonafide. The learned Judge demonstrated that the petitioner bad transferred a number of their properties in 1971 and if she proposed setting up the factory, these properties could be retained. Apart from the aforesaid properties, the petitioner had vacant shops in that building at Majri Road and showrooms could conveniently be set up. These findings recorded by the appellate authority are findings of fact. 5. Shri B.D. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner took me through the judgment of the Prescribed Authority and urged on the basis of the said judgment that the reasons given by the said authority are better than those of the learned Additional District Judge. I am not prepared to accept the submission. The appellate court discussed the entire evidence and after discussion of the same held that the need of the petitioner was not bonafide. It is the judgment of the appellate court which is binding on this court in this writ petition and not that of the Prescribed Authority. An effort was made to show from the evidence that the court below committed an error in recording that finding. It is the judgment of the appellate court which is binding on this court in this writ petition and not that of the Prescribed Authority. An effort was made to show from the evidence that the court below committed an error in recording that finding. It is not possible to reappraise the evidence and record a finding in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. The emphasis, next, laid by the learned counsel was that as the petitioner had a bonafide desire to establish a Karkhana the court below ought to have granted the prayer made in the application Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 speaks not of the bonafide of the landlord but it says that the claim of the landlord that he requires the premises for certain purpose should be bonafide i.e. honest in the circumstances. The investigation is not to be confined only to the extent of an intention in the mind of the landlord but the intention must be honestly held. In the present case, the court below found that the need of the petitioner was not bonafide. 7. The next aspect of the matter which is required to be considered is that after comparison, the court below held that the comparative hardship to the respondent no. 2 will be greater than that to the petitioner. A question of greater hardship is also one of fact as held by the Supreme Court in Munni Deri v. Prescribed Authority, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 28. It is not for the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to reappraise the evidence and to come to its own conclusion which may be different than that reached by the appellate court. It was, however, emphasised that since respondent No. 2 had an alternative shop available to him, the finding given by the court below to the contrary, is erroneous. The court below found that the shop talked of by the petitioner did not belong to respondent No. 2 it belonged to his brother. An attempt was made to challenge the transaction of the sale-deed obtained by the brother of respondent No. 2 on the ground that the same was Benami. It is not possible to accept this statement in the present case. An attempt was made to challenge the transaction of the sale-deed obtained by the brother of respondent No. 2 on the ground that the same was Benami. It is not possible to accept this statement in the present case. Admittedly, that building is in occupation of the brother of respondent No. 2 and no part of that building is lying vacant. Respondent No. 2 would not be able to shift his business to that building. 8. The next point urged was that respondent No. 2 should have accepted the offer made by the petitioner which was in respect of another shop, belonging to the petitioner, situated on the same road. It has come in evidence that the said shop is situated outside the Abadi. In this view of the natter, if the respondent No. 2 did not accept the offer, the court below was justified in holding that the offer made was not an alternative one. 9. For these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.