Judgment 1. POORAN Chand, the petitioner was a tenant of house No. 192, Beharipur Khatriyan, Bareilly. The said house belonged to a registered charitable trust known as Brijmohan Lal Ayurvedic Aushdhalaya Trust. Smt. Sharma Devi, who was the mother of respondent No. 4, was one of the trustees of the said trust. 2. ON an application filed by the trust, the petitioner was evicted from the said premises. Smt. Sharma Devi died in November 1972 leaving behind Smt. Savitri Devi respondent No. 4, her daughter, and Anil Gupta respondent No. 5, grandson, as her heirs and legal representatives. Smt. Savitri Devi was married to Amar Nath Gupta, arrayed as respondent No. 3 in the writ petition. In April 1974, an application for allotment of house No. 193, Mohalla Bebaripur Khatriyan, Bareilly, was filed by the petitioner. The petitioner, claimed that the said house was lying vacant and as the petitioner needed a house, the same be allotted to him. House No. 193 belonged to Smt. Sharma Devi and on her death the same was inherited by Smt. Savitri Devi, respondent No. 4,and Anil Gupta, respondent No. 5. After making an enquiry, the Senior Inspector (Rent Control) submitted a report dated 8-4-1974 stating that the premises was vacant. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer notified the vacancy. Against the notification of the vacancy, Amar Nath Gupta, respondent No. 3 filed an objection claiming that the premises was not vacant, and hence the report submitted by the Rent Control Inspector was liable to be rejected. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer held an enquiry about the vacancy of the premises. Having held that the house was vacant, he allotted the said house to the petitioner. Against the said order of allotment, an appeal was filed by Amar Nath Gupta before the District Judge. The appeal was allowed by the impugned order dated 1-3-1975. Against the said order, the present writ petition was filed. 3. THE first question that arises for decision is to find whether the house in dispute was vacant in respect of which an application under Section 16 of the Act could be filed. THE relevant provisions are to be found in Sections 12 and 16 of the Act. Section 12 deals with cases of deemed vacancy. 3. THE first question that arises for decision is to find whether the house in dispute was vacant in respect of which an application under Section 16 of the Act could be filed. THE relevant provisions are to be found in Sections 12 and 16 of the Act. Section 12 deals with cases of deemed vacancy. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 provide the circumstances in which a premises can be deemed to be vacant. THE other provisions about the deemed vacancy are to be found in sub-sections (2), (3), (3A) and (3B) of the aforesaid section. Under sub-section (4), any building or part which a landlord or tenant has ceased to occupy within the meaning of the aforesaid sub-sections shall be deemed to be vacant. Section 16 deals with the allotment and release of vacant building, and empowers the District Magistrate to pass orders in respect of such buildings. 4. IN the application filed for allotment the petitioner stated that as the owners of the house had permanently taken up residence at Delhi, the premises was vacant. The assertion made purported to be under clause (c) of Section 12 (1). The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was called upon to decide as to whether the said controversy existed or did not exist. He, however, did not record a categorical finding and allotted the premises to the petitioner without doing so. IN the appeal preferred by Amar Nath Gupta, respondent No. 3, this question was again not decided. The District Judge found that since clause (c) of Section 12 (1) was not applicable, the application made by the petitioner was not maintainable. IN doing so, the District Judge committed a manifest error. The averment made by the petitioner in the application for allotment was on the basis of clause (c) of Section 12(1) of the Act. The District Judge was, therefore, required to decide whether respondents 3 to 5 ha i taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere. As no finding was recorded by the District Judge on the said controversy, it is necessary that the judgment of the District Judge be set aside. The District Judge was, therefore, required to decide whether respondents 3 to 5 ha i taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere. As no finding was recorded by the District Judge on the said controversy, it is necessary that the judgment of the District Judge be set aside. Sri A. N. Verma, counsel appearing for the petitioner, is further right in his submission that as no application for release of the premises was filed by respondents 3 to 5, the District Judge committed an error in holding that even if it was considered to be a case of deemed vacancy, under Section 16 of U. P. Act XII of 1972, the Prescribed Authority had suo moto power to release a premises in favour of a landlord. An order under this provision can be passed only on an application by a tenant or a landlord. Moreover, a landlord cannot get a release of a house under Section 16 as of right. He is required to establish his bona fide requirement of the premises. Accordingly, the learned District Judge was in error in holding that even if it was legally considered to be a case of deemed vacancy, the premises could be released in favour of respondent No. 3. As on the facts and circumstances of the present case it was necessary for the District Judge to give a finding on the applicability of Section 12 (1) (c), the judgment of the District Judge is liable to be set aside. 5. SOME arguments were advanced on the applicability of Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act. The admitted case appears to be that before the coming into force of U. P. Act XIII of 1972, a portion of the premises in dispute had been let out first to Shyam Baran Lal and thereafter to U. S. Agrawal, These persons, admittedly handed over possession of the premises to Smt. Sharma Devi, the owner, much before the enforcement of the Act. Relying on these lettings, an argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the District Judge as well as before me that as clause (b) of Section 12 (1) was attracted, the allotment order should have been confined to the portion which had been let out to Shyam Baran Lal, it is not possible to accept the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner. It would be seen that the application for allotment was made by the petitioner in respect of whole of the premises and not with respect to the portion which had been let out to the persons mentioned above. Accordingly, the application for allotment had to be granted either for the whole of the premises or it had to be rejected. It could not be on the basis of Section 12 (1) (b). 6. FURTHER more, the provisions of Section 12 (1) (b) could not be applied to the facts of the present case. The language employed in Section 12 (1) (b) is that a landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if he is allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family. This shows that the words "has allowed" taken within themselves the field of cases where a premises had been let out unauthorisedly or any person had been sublet before the coming into force of the Act and the subletting continues even after the Act came into operation. It does not apply to a subletting which took place and ended before the coming into force of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The language of clause (b) requires that the act of letting or subletting must be found in presenti. That could happen only if the subletting took place before the coming into force of the Act and continued even after its enforcement. Sri A. N. Verma, counsel appearing for the petitioner, placed reliance on a case reported in Shambhu Nath Tandon v. IXth Additional District Judge, 1976 AWC 801 , and urged that the view taken by me in the said case supports his submission. I am unable to subscribe to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the said case it would be noticed that subletting had not only taken place before the coming into force of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 but also continued to be in operation even after the enforcement of the Act. Hence, the decision of that case is of no avail to the petitioner in the present case. In the said case it would be noticed that subletting had not only taken place before the coming into force of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 but also continued to be in operation even after the enforcement of the Act. Hence, the decision of that case is of no avail to the petitioner in the present case. In Gappu Lal v. Thakurji Shriji Dauji, AIR 1969 SC 1291 , the Supreme Court was required to consider a case where a premises had been sublet before the coming into force of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, and that the subletting continued even after its enforcement. In that connection, the Supreme Court observed that the relevant words "has sublet" being in present perfect tense, contemplated a completed event connected in some way with the present time. Had it been a case where subletting took place before the Act and continued to operate after the enforcement of the Act, the act of subletting would have been covered by Clause (b) of Section 12 (1). Accordingly the case of Shambhu Nath Tandon (supra) is clearly distinguishable. 7. FOR these reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the District Judge dated 1-3-1975 is quashed. He is directed to decide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made above. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.