B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) RESPONDENTS Nos. 1 and 2 herein are the parents of the unfortunate victim Ramesh a boy of 12 years in age who succumbed to the injuries which he received in course of an accident which occurred on April 7 1972 at the junction of four roads known as Asodar Chokdi on Vasad-Borsad road when appellant No. 1 who happened to be the driver of appellant No. 2-firm while coming in a car bearing registration No. GJM 7156 from Vasad side knocked down Ramesh with the result that he was thrown away to a distance of about 13 feet due to the impact. The car could stop only after going about 80 to 90 feet. The victim of the accident was rushed to Borsad Municipal General Hospital where he died of the in juries sustained by him. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 therefore filed claim petition being Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 47 of 1973 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Kaira at Nadiad claiming compensation for the fatal accident in sum of Rs. 9 900 comprising of different amounts that is Rs. 500. 00 on account of hospital expenses; Rs. 3 0 on account of expectation of life; Rs. 2 0 on account of damages for pain and agony and Rs. 4 400 by way of pecuniary loss. ( 2 ) THE appellants as well as the British India General Insurance Company Ltd. and one Jahangirji Rustamji Patel were arrayed as original opponents Nos. 1 to 4 respectively before the Tribunal. Original opponent No. 4 who is respondent No. 4 before me was joined as a party opponent since the registration of the vehicle stood in his name in the record of the Regional Transport Officer. Appellants Nos. 1 and 2 were joined as party-opponents because appellant No. 1 was the main tort feasor being driver of the vehicle which was agreed to be purchased by appellant No. 2-firm on has purchase basis from opponent No. 4. Opponent No. 3 was joined as it was the insurer of the vehicle since it had issued a comprehensive insurance policy covering the loss or damage to the motor car and also for covering the liability to third parties. ( 3 ) THE claim petition was raised by the said opponents. Original opponents Nos. 1 and 2 are in appellants before me. ( 3 ) THE claim petition was raised by the said opponents. Original opponents Nos. 1 and 2 are in appellants before me. They have denied their liability as the accident did not taken place on account of rash and negligent driving. They also denied that opponent No. 1 was driving the car and opponent No. 2 was the owner of it. Opponent No. 3 the Insurance Company entered the defence of bare denial of the averments in the petition. Opponent No. 3. Insurance Company further contended that since opponent No. 4 the owner had handed over the control of the car to opponents Nos. 1 and 2 the Insurance Company was not liable to indemnify the loss. Opponent No. 4 admitted that he was the owner of the vehicle in question at the time of the incident and the same was in possession of opponent No. 1 as hire-purchaster. He denied his liability for paying the compensation to the claimants. ( 4 ) THE Tribunal raised necessary issues on these pleadings. After hearing the evidence of the parties The Tribunal found that the victim Ramesh died on account of the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle in question by original opponent No. 1. It also held on the admission made by opponents Nos. 1 and 2 in their objections to the application of the claimants for condonation of delay in filing their claim petition that the vehicle involved in the accident was owned by opponent No. 4 and was in their possession as hire-purchaser and. therefore the opponent No. 2 was the owner of the vehicle in question and consequently vicariously liable for the tort committed by opponent No. 1. The Tribunal however for purposes of deemed in a the liability of the opponent or opponents to pay compensation could not persuade itself to hold original opponent No. 3 Insurance Company liable since in its opinion the insured opponent No. 4 was not liable at all because it was nobodys case before the Tribunal that opponent No. 1 was driver of the opponent No. 4 and opponents Nos. 1 and 2 had no insurable interest whatsoever in the vehicle. 1 and 2 had no insurable interest whatsoever in the vehicle. The Tribunal therefore held that when on the own showing of the claimants in their petition that at the relevant time the vehicle in question belonged to opponent No. 2 the partnership firm of which opponent No. 1 was a partner the liability can be of the said opponents Nos. 1 and 2 only and opponent No. 4 as well as the Insurance Company should be absolved from the liability. On the question of rash and negligent driving the Tribunal found that the speaking circumstances viz. (i) the fact that the victim was thrown away at a distance of 15 feet after he was knocked down by opponent No. 1 by his vehicle in question and (ii) the fact that the vehicle had gone to a distance of 80 to 90 feet after knocking down the victim would raise a presumption of res ipsa loquitar and since that presumption is not rebutted opponent No. 1 must be held guilty of rash and negligent driving as a result of which the victim suffered injuries to which he succumbed ultimately. On the question of quantum of damages the Tribunal accepted the evidence of the claimants and held that they were entitled to the amount claimed by them in their petition. He therefore by his order of April 15 1974 awarded Rs. 9 900 with interest at 6% from the date of the application till realisation with costs against opponents Nos. 1 and 2 and dismissed the petition against opponents Nos. 3 and 4. This award has been challenged by the original opponents Nos. 1 and 2 in this first appeal. ( 5 ) THE only contention pressed on behalf of the appellants at the time of hearing of this appeal is that the Tribunal was clearly in error in refusing to hold opponents Nos. 3 and 4. This award has been challenged by the original opponents Nos. 1 and 2 in this first appeal. ( 5 ) THE only contention pressed on behalf of the appellants at the time of hearing of this appeal is that the Tribunal was clearly in error in refusing to hold opponents Nos. 3 and 4 liable for the amount of compensation in spite of the admitted position as disclosed in the written statement of opponent No. 4 that he was the owner of the vehicle in question and opponent No I was in possession of the vehicle as a hire-purchaser and in spite of the clear admission in the written statement of the Insurance Company that opponent No. 4 Jahangirji Patel insured the car with the opponent Company and that he transferred the said vehicle to the second opponent who has not insurable interest and therefore the Insurance Company is not liable for the amount of compensation claimed in the petition. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the Tribunal refused to hold opponents No. 3 and 4 liable for the amount of compensation as the Tribunal larboard unwary misapprehension about the cases of the respective parties if original opponent No. 4 was the owner of the vehicle it was so urged he would be vicariously liable for the tortious act of the driver opponent No. 1 and the Tribunal is under obligation under sec. 119b of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 to specify the amount which would be paid by the insurer or the over of the vehicle involved in the accident In so far as the Tribunal his overlooked this obligation prescribed under sec. 110b the Tribunal has acted illegally and therefore the award should be modified to that extent. ( 6 ) ON the other hand it was urged on behalf of respondent-opponent No. 4 that since no appeal has been preferred by the original claimants who are respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in this appeal no award can be made in their favour against the co-respondents. ( 6 ) ON the other hand it was urged on behalf of respondent-opponent No. 4 that since no appeal has been preferred by the original claimants who are respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in this appeal no award can be made in their favour against the co-respondents. On behalf of the Insurance Company which is respondent No. 3 before me it was urged that the Tribunal has rightly exoncrated the Insurance Company since on the own showing of the claimants the appellant No. 2 was the owner of the vehicle which was driven by opponent No. 1 who happened to be its driver and who were in possession of the car as hire purchasers and therefore had no insurable interest which could make the Insurance Company liable to pay the amount of compensation. ( 7 ) I am of the opinion that the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is well founded. inasmuch as the Tribunal has overlooked the clear admissions made in the written statements of respondent No. 3- Insurance Company and respondent No. 4 the owner of the vehicle. It is no doubt true that the case as pleaded initially on behalf of the original claimants respondents Nos. 1 and 2 before me was that the vehicle in question belonged to appellant No. 9 firm and the appellant No. 1 was the driver at the relevant time when the accident occurred. However on objection being taken by appellants Nos. 1 and 2 that the vehicle in question belonged to Jahangirji Rustamji Patel in whose name the registration of the vehicle continued and that they were in possession of the vehicle as hire purchasers the original claimants moved the Tribunal of the vehicle as hire purchaser the original claimants moved the Tribunal by their application of August 9 1973 for joining the owner as well as the Insurance Company as opponents Nos. 3 and 4 to the petition. It is thereafter that these newly added opponents admitted in their written statements the plea advanced on behalf of appellants Nos. 1 and 2 that the vehicle in question really belonged to original opponent No. 4 herein. It is therefore surprising how the Tribunal overlooked this aspect of the question. 3 and 4 to the petition. It is thereafter that these newly added opponents admitted in their written statements the plea advanced on behalf of appellants Nos. 1 and 2 that the vehicle in question really belonged to original opponent No. 4 herein. It is therefore surprising how the Tribunal overlooked this aspect of the question. The fact which therefore emerges from the pleadings as well as from the evidence is that the vehicle in question was of the ownership of respondent No. 4 and was insured by him with respondent No. 3 the Insurance Company. It is established in evidence that respondent No. 3 has issued a comprehensive insurance policy agreeing and undertaking to indemnify the Insured against loss of or damage to the motor car and/or its accessories and also to indemnify hide in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the motor car against all sums including claimants costs and expenses which the Insured would become legally liable to pay in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person and damage to the property other than property belonging to the Insured or held in trust by or in the custody or control of the Insured The period of the insurance was from 30th September 1971 to 29th September 1972 The vehicle insured was the vehicle involved in this accident. Para 1 of sec. II of the Policy which has been produced at Ex. 46 indemnifies the insured. Paras 3 and 4 which are generally known as other drivers extension clause and Other vehicles extension clause respectively provided for the liability of the Insurance Company to indemnify the driver who is driving the motor car on the Insureds order or with his permission provided that such driver is not entitled to indemnity under any other policy and observes and fulfils the terms exceptions and conditions of the policy in so far as they can apply. The Schedule to the policy mentions limitations as to use and under the heading driver it is clarified that (a) any person and (b) the Insured may also drive a motor car not belonging to him and not hired to him under a Hire Purchase Agreement; provided that the person driving holds a licence to drive the motor car or has held and is not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence. At the end of the Schedule there is an important rider which reads"the insured is not indemnified if the Vehicles is used or driven otherwise than in accordance with this Schedule. Any payment made by the Company by reason of wider terms appearing in the certificate in order to comply with the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 is recoverable from the Insured. See the Clause headed AVOIDANCE OF CERTAIN TERMS AND RIGHT OF RECOVERY". LIMITATIONS as to use are that the vehicle should be used for social domestic and pleasure purposes and for the Insureds business and the policy did not cover use for hire or reward or for organised racing pacemaking reliability trial speed testing the carriage of goods (other than samples) in connection with any trade of business or use for any purpose in connection with the motor trade. The effect of the Policy is to provide for an obligation for the Insurance Company to indemnify the insured on the usual terms and condition which we find in such comprehensive policy issued in respect of the vehicles sought to be covered by such policy. ( 8 ) IN New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani and Others A. I. R. 1964 SC 1736 in the context of a policy which was pari materia with the Policy with which I am concerned in this appeal the Supreme Court was required to consider the obligation of the Insurance Company under such policies and it was held that the contract between the insured and the Company may not provide for all the liabilities which the Company has to undertake visa-vis the third parties in view of the provisions of the Act; and once the Company had undertaken liability to third parties incurred by the persons specified in the policy the third parties right to re over any amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Act is not affected by any condition in the policy. In my opinion therefore the Tribunal was clearly in error in overlooking this aspect of the question and various terms and conditions of the policy in question before me and therefore erred in holding that neither respondent No. 4 nor respondent No. 3 was liable for the payment of the amount of compensation and various terms and conditions of the policy in question appeal on the only contention urged on behalf of the appellants is whether this Court can now modify the award by holding respondents No. 3 and 4 liable who have been absolved by the Tribunal to pay compensation to the original claimants respondents Nos. 1 and 2 before me. In other words whether an award can be made in favour of the original claimants respondents Nos. 1 and 2 before me against respondents Nos. 3 and 4 herein thought the original claimants have not come in appeal against that part of the award by which respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have been absolved of their liability to pay compensation as awarded ? ( 9 ) IN Panna Lal v. State of Bombay and Others A. I. R. 1963 SC 1516 a question arose whether the High Court of Bombay was in error in refusing to exercise its power under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code while allowing the appeal and reversing the decree of the trial Court by granting a decree in favour of the plaintiff-respondent against the co-respondents who were absolved by the trial Court. Two contentions were urged before the Supreme Court that the High Court of Bombay was perfectly justified in refusing to exercise the power under Order 41 Rule 33 because in the first instance no appeal was preferred by the plaintiff-respondent who could not have in any case preferred cross objections against the co-respondents since Order 41 Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code permits filing of the cross-objections in an appeal against the appellant only. Rejecting both those contentions the Supreme Court held that having regard to the wide wording of Order 41 Rule 33 it was intended to empower the appellate Court to make whatever order it thinks fit not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between a respondent and a respondent and that the appellate Court is empowered not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as the case may require. The Supreme Court further held that if there was no impediment in law the High Court in appeal could therefore though allowing the appeal of the defendant appellant by dismissing the plaintiffs suit against him give the plaintiff respondent a decree against any or all the other defendants who were parties to the appeal as respondents The Court further held that if a party who could have filed a cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 has not done so it cannot be said that the Appeal Court can under no circumstances give him relief under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33. In the present case I am of the opinion that this Court should exercise its power under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code otherwise the original claimants would be left high and dry since in a given case the claimants may not be able to execute the decree and obtain the complete relief granted under the decree from the opponents who are made liable under the award. In the present case I am told the decree has not been fully satisfied by appellants Nos. 1 and 2. It should be recalled that on the facts admitted by the respondents the present owner of the vehicle is respondent No. 4 and appellants Nos. 1 and 2 were in possession of the vehicle as hire purchasers and the appellant No. 1 was the driver of the vehicle at the relevant time. In other words respondent No. 4 permitted or authorised appellant No. 1 being the hire purchaser to drive the on. None the less respondent No. 4 continued to be the owner and therefore remained vicariously liable for the acts of tort committed by appellant No. 1 in course of the existence of the hire purchase agreement. In other words respondent No. 4 permitted or authorised appellant No. 1 being the hire purchaser to drive the on. None the less respondent No. 4 continued to be the owner and therefore remained vicariously liable for the acts of tort committed by appellant No. 1 in course of the existence of the hire purchase agreement. The slate of affairs in the present case therefore is such that the reliefs claimed by the claimants against the different opponents are so intermixed that unless this Court exercises its power under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code the claimants may find themselves in a position where they might not be able to execute the decree fully. Therefore in the circumstances of this case though I do not find any justifying reasons to interfere with the order and award of the Tribunal so far as the appellants are concerned I propose to exercise the powers of the Appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 33 by holding that respondent No. 4 was also vicariously liable for the tortious ace of appellant No. 1 and therefore responsible for payment of the compensation to the original claimants as awarded by the Tribunal. Consequently respondent No. 3 being Insurance Company would also be liable to pay the said amount. In that view of the matter therefore the order of the Tribunal requires to be modified. ( 10 ) IN the result this appeal is dismissed but the order of the Tribunal is modified so as to read that the applicants do recover compensation of Rs. 9 93 with interest at 6% per amount from the date of the application till relation with fall cots form all the opponents Nos. 1 to 4 who are jointly on severally held liable for the same. Opponents Nos. 3 and 4 shall pay cost to the original claimants althroughout and shall pay costs of this appeal to the appellants. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 shall bear their own costs. ( 11 ) AWARD be modified accordingly. Appeal dismissed. .