Short Note : 1. In the judgment under appeal, it is clear that much reliance has been placed on the evidence given by Janakkumar (PW. 1) in the trial Court. Initially be was accused, who was put up with the appellants and the acquitted accused for being tried on the charges under section 395/397 IPC. If the application made by the State for grant of pardon to Janakkumar had not been allowed by this Court as per order passed in Criminal Revision No. 8 of 1975, he could not have been examined as a prosecution witness in the trial Court and would have been tried along with the other accused. 2. It is clear from the trial Court's record that after the order in revision was passed on 1-5-1976, Janakkumar, who was till then an accuted standing his trial along with the other accused, was not examined and here was no material before the trial Court to ascertain as to whether he has or has not made a true and honest disclosure about the commission of the offence by him and the other accused. He was straightaway examined as a prosecution witness on the assumption that his examination was necessary only as a prosecution witness. His examination was not necessary as contemplated by sub-section (4) of section 306 or the Criminal Procedure Code. Held : An examination as contempated by sub-section (4) of section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary because grant of pardon to an accused is always conditional on his making a true and honest disclosure about the commission of the offence by him and by the other accused. If no such disclosure is made, then the provisions of section 308 are attracted and he is liable to be tried as an accused In the instant case as already Stated above, no statement of Janakkumar was record either by any Magistrate or by the trial Court and there was, therefore, no material before the trial Court to ascertain as to whether Janakkumar has or has not made a true and honest disclosure of the circumstances in which he and the other accused had committed the said offences. 3. The procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge in this case was, in the light of what I have said above, contraty the provisions of sections 306 and 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 3. The procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge in this case was, in the light of what I have said above, contraty the provisions of sections 306 and 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A perusal of the statement as of Janak Kumar (PW 1) in the trial Court prima facie affords reasons to believe that he has as far as possible tried to keep himself away and implicate the other accused with the commission of the offences. The fact that the application made by the prosecution though, rejected by the trial Court was subsequently allowed by this Court did not mean that Janakkumar's statement as contemplated by sub-section (4) of section 306 was dispensed with. In my opinion, recording of a statement by way of examination was obligatory and could not be dispensed with. 4. The next question that arises for consideration is as to what is the effect of this omission on the validity of the trial. The answer to this question in my opinion is that the trial is vitiated and the case must go back for a retrial. 5. Ordinarily when anyone is examined as a prosecution witness the accused has an opportunity to cross-examine him on his previous statement recorded by the Police Officer. In a case where an accused is granted pardon, his statement under sub-section (4) of section 306 becomes a very important statement on which the other accused can cross-examine him. By making a statement under sub-section (4) of section 306 the person accepting pardon ordinarily implicates himself with the commission of the offence as much as he implicates the co-accused. In that event, the other accused who have to stand their trial have an opportunity to test the truth of the statement made by the person seeking pardon recorded under sub-section (4) or section 306 Criminal Procedure Code. In the instant case Janakkumar's statement was not available to the accused and as already indicated above, him statement prima facie appears to be self exculpatory and not inculpatory. The co-accused, therefore, were bound to be prejudiced because of this omission the part of the lower Court. AIR 1962 Guj. 283 (FB), AIR 1969 Orrisa 286, AIR 1967 Orrisa 82, & (1966) I Andh. WR 390 relied on. AIR 1963 SC 1850 referred to. Appeal allowed. Case remanded for retrial.