JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Hamirpur dated 14.2.1977 in Ceiling Appeal No. 624 of 1976, Vishwanath Singh v. U.P. State and others whereby 28.67 acres irrigated land of the petitioner has been declared as surplus. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the ceiling authorities have patently erred in treating the petitioner's land either Irrigated or Ekfasla without indicating the essential ingredients of section 4-A or Explanation added to section 4 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, hence their findings stand vitiated in law. Secondly he has contended that some of the petitioner's land was ancestral and his son Madan Gopal had share therein, but without separating the share of his son of determination of surplus are of the petitioner has been done. Thirdly he has contended that he had executed a lease in respect of 48.72 acres of the land in favour of his son Madam Gopal and the same has been wrongly treated as the land of the petitioner and the finding by the appellate authority that the aforesaid lease was not genuine is based on surmise. The appellate authority has failed to consider the oral evidence on the record regarding the possession of the lessee on the disputed land. 3. Learned counsel for the State has refuted the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and has submitted that the findings of fact recorded by the appellate authority in the present case are based on appraisal of evidence and the same should not be interfered with. 4. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. I find that the ceiling authorities have patently erred in deciding the petitioner's land cither irrigated or Ekfasla. 5. The appellate authority has dealt with the contentions of the appellant before it in the following words :- "The above classification of the holding of the appellant will show that he holds 3.56 acres of irrigated land there is no dispute on the point that no canal of schedule I passes through the villages in which the holding of the appellant are situate this area should have been classified as Ekfasli land and not irrigated land. The appellant, therefore, i.e. titled to the benefit of 1.90 acres of irrigated land on account." 6. The appellant, therefore, i.e. titled to the benefit of 1.90 acres of irrigated land on account." 6. Explanation to section 4 of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act reads thus :- "For the purposes of clause (ii), the expression 'single crop land' means any un-irrigated land capable of producing only one crop in an agricultural year in consequence of assured irrigation from any State Irrigation Work or private irrigation work." 7. The appellate authority has failed to indicate as to whether the irrigated land of the petitioner was capable of producing only one crop in an agricultural year in consequence of assured irrigation from any State irrigation work or private irrigation work. 8. Perusal of the impugned judgment indicates that the appellate authority has not considered the question whether the source of irrigation to the land of the petitioner was such which could be termed as State irrigation work or private irrigation work. Hence the finding of the appellate authority that the land of the petitioner should have been classified as Ekfasla appears to be patently erroneous. Unless there is an assured source of irrigation from State irrigation work or private irrigation work even if the land of the petitioner had either produced a single crop it a year or was capable of producing only one crop in an agricultural year, it would not be termed as Ekfasla land. 9. The Prescribed Authority has dealt with the grievance of the petitioner in the following words :- "The learned counsel has also submitted that his land cannot be treated as Ekal. But he has not produced the Khasras of all the relevant years. Hence no benefit may be given to him on this count also." 10. From the above observation of the Prescribed Authority it appears that the Prescribed Authority has treated the land of the petitioner as Ekal only on the ground that the petitioner had not produced the relevant Khasras. In the present case the petitioner is objector and the case before the Prescribed Authority started at the instance of the State. In order to justify that the land of the petitioner was single crop land, it was for the State to have produced evidence in support of the notice served upon the objector. When the notice served upon a tenure-holder is contested by the latter, a lis arises between the parties. In order to justify that the land of the petitioner was single crop land, it was for the State to have produced evidence in support of the notice served upon the objector. When the notice served upon a tenure-holder is contested by the latter, a lis arises between the parties. Since the State is an initiator of the proceedings the State should adduce relevant evidence to justify the notice that the land of the tenure-holder was either irrigated or Ekfasla. In the present case I find that the Prescribed Authority has repelled the contentions of the tenure-holder only on the ground that the tenture-holder had failed to file Khasras of the relevant years. In my opinion the approach of the Prescribed Authority to the claim of the tenure-holder is not correct and thus its finding stands vitiated in law due to wrong approach. 11. As regards the petitioner's contention that some of his plots are ancestral and his son Madan Gopal has got a right therein, the Prescribed Authority has dealt with the grievance as below :- "The learned counsel has also argued that the land was the Sir and Khudkasht land of the tenure-holder. As such his major sons are entitled for ⅓rd share therein. It is significant that no mutation have been done in their names and the tenure-holder is in possession of the entire land as stated by the Lekhpals. Hence there is no substance in this argument. Moreover, there is no provision in Ceiling Act to accept Khudkasht land, after abolition of Zamindari devolution is governed by Z.A. and L.R. Act." 12. In my opinion the Prescribed Authority has mis-appreciated the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner tenure-holder. The relevant thing to be determined in the case is as to whether the plots claimed by the petitioner was coming down in his family from the time of his ancestor and whether the petitioner's son Madan Gopal was born before 1st July, 1952. If the aforesaid two questions are answered in the affirmative the-petitioner's son Madan Gopal would get a right in Sir or Khudkasht land by virtue of his birth in the family. It is immaterial whether his name was entered over the disputed plot or not, or he was not in actual possession over his share in the plots. If the aforesaid two questions are answered in the affirmative the-petitioner's son Madan Gopal would get a right in Sir or Khudkasht land by virtue of his birth in the family. It is immaterial whether his name was entered over the disputed plot or not, or he was not in actual possession over his share in the plots. Even if the petitioner was in possession over the ancestral property, the right of the son Madan Gopal would not extinguish in the disputed plots if the disputed plots were coming down in the family from the time of grand-father or great grand-father or even from before them. It is true that the devolution would be governed by the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act after the enforcement of Act I of 1951, but on 30th June, 1952 the persons who could in law be sir-holder or khudkasht holder would not lose their rights due to enforcement of Act I of 1951. The Prescribed Authority appears to have failed to examine the claim of the petitioner from this angle. The appellate authority has not dealt with this aspect of the matter. Since the judgments of the ceiling authorities are patently erroneous on the question of the claim put forward by the petitioner that his plots were unirrigated, I think that the appellate authority should also examine the claim of the petitioner that his son Madan Gopal has share in the plots indicated by him (the petitioner) as ancestral property. 13. As regards the petitioner's contention that his lease dated 29.6.1949 in favour of his son Madan Gopal was wrongly ignored, I find that the appellate authority has treated the lease as paper transaction on the ground that the name of Madan Gopal was not entered in the revenue records. It is true that the revenue record is one of the guiding factors to determine the genuiness of transaction, but this is not conclusive. It is true that the revenue record is one of the guiding factors to determine the genuiness of transaction, but this is not conclusive. If it is established by oral evidence on the record that in pursuance of the lease relied upon by the petitioner his son Madan Gopal has come into separate possession over the property leased out to him, the transaction cannot be termed as paper transaction, if the fact of separate possession by the son of the petitioner is established by oral evidence on the record, the finding by the appellate authority that the alleged lease is a paper transaction would stand vitiated in law. Since the appellate authority has not examined the oral evidence on the aforesaid point, it is desirable that the appellate authority be asked to examine the claim of the petitioner based on registered lease afresh in the light of the oral evidence on the record. 14. I am not in agreement with the submissions of the learned counsel for the State that the findings of fact have been arrived by the appellate authority, hence no interference should be made with the findings recorded by the appellate authority in the present case. I have already indicated the errors committed by the appellate authority in holding the petitioner's land as Ekfasla. 15. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and the judgment of the appellate authority dated 14.2.1977 is hereby quashed and the appellate authority is directed to decide the claim of the petitioner in the light of the observations made above. No order as to costs.