JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - House No. 3/364-A situated in Mohalla Samad Road, Aligarh belonged to Dharamendra Singh, respondent No. 2. An application for the allotment of the said house was filed by Umesh Chand Sharma, the petitioner and a prayer for regularisation of his possession under section 14 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was also made in this application. The petitioner alleged that had been inducted into possession by the landlord in 1975 and as such he was entitled to the regularisation of his tenancy under section 14 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It, however, appears that before the application was filed, the respondent No. 2 had filed a suit in the Small Cause Court for ejectment and recovery of rent against the petitioner, treating him to be a tenant. On 20-4-1976, the District Supply Officer found that the petitioner was a tenant, having been inducted into possession of the house by the landlord and was as such entitled to the benefit of section 14. Against the said order, an appeal was filed by respondent no. 2. On 20th August, 1976 the appeal was allowed. While allowing the appeal, the appellate authority found that since a suit for eviction had been filed by the landlord and the same was pending on 5th July, 1976, when U.P. Act No. 29 of 1976 amending decision 14 was enforced, the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act. Since he held that the Prescribed Authority did not properly decide the application for release filed by the landlord, he observed that the Prescribed Authority would reconsider the application of the landlord for the release. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed writ petition No. 1624 of 1978. 2. After the order of the Appellate Authority dated 20th August, 1976, the Prescribed Authority considered the application for release, made by the respondent No. 2, and having found that the need of the said respondent was not bonafide rejected the application on 16-10-1976. Against the said order, a revision was preferred by the respondent No. 2. The revision was allowed by the Revising Authority the impugned order dated 9-7-1977. Against the said order writ petition No. 1610 of 1977 was filed. 3. Against the said order, a revision was preferred by the respondent No. 2. The revision was allowed by the Revising Authority the impugned order dated 9-7-1977. Against the said order writ petition No. 1610 of 1977 was filed. 3. Taking up writ petition No. 1624 of 1976 first, I find that the petitioner made two prayers in the application filed before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The first prayer was for the regularisation of the tenancy, and in the alternative, he claimed allotment. The prayer made for regularisation was rejected by the Appellate Authority on the ground that as a suit for eviction has been preferred by the landlord against the petitioner, the latter was not entitled to the benefit of section 14. 4. Section 14 applies to a case where the proceedings for dispossession against a tenant may not have been pending. In the instant case, since a suit for eviction of the petitioner was pending on 5th July, 1976, he could not get the benefit of his possession by virtue of section 14, as amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. For the applicability of the amended provision, it was mandatory that no suit for dispossession was pending against the tenant, on the date of the enforcement of U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 i.e. on 5-7-1976. 5. Now the only other thing, which remains to be considered in this writ petition, is whether the prayer for allotment made by the petitioner was liable to be considered. This question I will take up after I have disposed of writ petition No. 1610 of 1977. 6. So far as writ No. 1610 of 1977 is concerned, the grievance of the petitioner was that the impugned order of the Additional District Judge was liable to be set aside as the premises was released in favour of respondent No. 2 without finding that the need of the said respondent was bonafide. The grievance appears to be justified. Section 16(2) lays down, in clear terms, that a premises can he released in favour of the landlord, if he establishes that his need for such a house is genuine and bonafide. In the instant case, the Additional District Judge did not record any finding. The grievance appears to be justified. Section 16(2) lays down, in clear terms, that a premises can he released in favour of the landlord, if he establishes that his need for such a house is genuine and bonafide. In the instant case, the Additional District Judge did not record any finding. He did not go into this question on an erroneous consideration that since by a remand order made on 20th August, 1976, the appellate authority had given a direction for the release of the premises to the landlord, the question of bona fide requirement was not open for consideration. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the appellate authority would show that the application of release, filed by respondent No. 2 had to be decided afresh In giving that direction, no finding of the genuineness of the need of the landlord was recorded in his favour. The appellate authority was, therefore, obviously wrong in holding that the question of the bonafide requirement of the premises by the landlord was no longer a live issue and stood concluded by the order dated 20th August, 1976. As the question of bonafide was not examined by the learned Additional District Judge, the judgment, given in the appeal, is liable to be quashed. 7. Now the question that may arise is whether the case should be sent back to the appellate authority or to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for deciding the prayer made for release. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it appears to me that the proper course would be to quash the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 16-10-1977 as well, and to ask him to decide the application for release afresh, inasmuch as section 18 of the Act, under which the revision was filed, against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, does not give jurisdiction to Revising Authority to pass a release order itself. Accordingly, I set aside the order of the Additional District Judge dated 9-7-1977 and that of the Prescribed Authority dated 16-10-1976 and send back the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for deciding the release application of the landlord afresh. 8. As already observed in the beginning, two prayers were made in the application flied by the tenant. One was for regularisation of the tenancy and the other was for allotment. 8. As already observed in the beginning, two prayers were made in the application flied by the tenant. One was for regularisation of the tenancy and the other was for allotment. I have held that the order refusing to regularise The tenancy was correct. But so far as the prayer for allotment is concerned that has not been disposed of by those orders. As the case is being sent back for considering the application for release, it appears appropriate that the prayer for allotment of the petitioner may also be considered. It is true, as emphasised by Sri S. N. Agarwal, counsel for the respondent No. 2 that a release application is to be decided first on its own merit without being affected by the application for allotment of the tenant. If, however, the release application is rejected only then, an occasion to consider the allotment application shall arise. 9. Subject to the above, writ petition No. 1624 of 1976 fails and is dismissed. Writ petition No. 1610 of 1977 succeeds and is allowed. The order of the appellate authority dated 9-7-1977 and that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 16-10-1976 are quashed and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to decide the release application of the landlord afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. There shall be no order as to the costs.