N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS bunch of second appeals arises from the following civil appeals decided by the learned Assistant Judge of Bhavnagar which appeals in the Bhavnagar District Court in their turn had arisen respectively from the civil suits decided by the learned Civil Judge (J. D.) Palitana as mentioned below : s. A. No. District Court appeal civil Suit. 259 142 78 260 158 78 261 143 91 262 160 91 263 144 92 264 161 92 265 145 93 266 159 93 ( 2 ) ALL these appeals however are being disposed of by this common in judgment firstly because the questions of law involved are common and secondly because the learned counsels appearing for the contending parties are agreeable on this common treatment. ( 3 ) THE appellant in all these appeals is the Palitnana Nagarpalika a municipality deemed to be constituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 hereinafter referred to as the Municipal Act 1963 for brevitys sake. This municipality is the original defendant in all the above suits whereas there are different plaintiffs in all those suits. All these plaintiffs are the trustees or managers of different Dharmashalas or Sarais situated in the holy place of Palitnana which is the famous place of pilgrimage for persons following Jainism. All these sarais are put up by philanthropic people with a view to provide shelter to the visiting pilgrims and these properties are registered as Public Trust properties under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act. The municipality which is the appellant in all these appeals had first made attempts to levy the house tax on all these sarais managed by these trustees and other building3 situated within the municipal limits of Palitana. That attempt was made by framing some rules that were brought into effect from 1-7-57 but no taxes were actually levied. The said municipality however carne to be superseded by the Government and an administrator was appointed to run the municipal affairs. This administration went on from 16-12-60 till 25-9-67. During the period all the powers functions and duties of the municipality rested with the Administrator. The Administrator had passed a resolution on 4-3-64 ex. 78 under the provisions of sec. 60a of the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 which was then applied to the Saurashtra region with necessary modifications. This administration went on from 16-12-60 till 25-9-67. During the period all the powers functions and duties of the municipality rested with the Administrator. The Administrator had passed a resolution on 4-3-64 ex. 78 under the provisions of sec. 60a of the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 which was then applied to the Saurashtra region with necessary modifications. The procedure undergone by the Administrator is set out by the learned appellate Judge in paragraph 14 of his judgment and X do not propose to burden this judgment by reiterating those various stages undertaken by the Administrator. In short the Administrator had passed the resolution to make rules and levy house tax invited the objections considered them and then had approved the rules and submitted the same to the competent authority for their sanction. Ex. 83 are those rules as sanctioned by the Government with certain modifications. Then the Administrator passed the resolution Ex. 84 on 18-12-64 to apply those Rules to the Municipal limits with effect from 1-4-65. He also resolved under sec. 62 of the District Municipal Act that these Rules should be published along with details of the sanction as required under the said sec. 62. ( 4 ) IT so happened that before the Rules could be published the District Municipal Act 1901 came to be repealed by the Municipal Act 1963 which admittedly came into force on 1-1-1965. The administrator therefore issued the notice Ex. 85 on 12-2-65 under sec. 103 of the Municipal Act 1963 As much of the controversy raged in these appeals is veering round this Ex. 85 I propose to reproduce the same as duly translated by me:"public Notice (Under sec. 103 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963) hereby the citizens within the limits of the Palitana Municipality and ail concerned are informed that Palitana Municipalitys Taxes on Lands and Buildings Rules have been sanctioned by the Development commissioner of the Gujarat under his Order No DCG/mu/1264 dated 8-4-64 under Proviso A to sec. 46 of the District Municipal Act. The said sanctioned Rules are resolved to be brought into force within the municipal limits with effect from 1-4-65 as per the Municipalitys Resolution No. 54/64 dated 18-12-64. 46 of the District Municipal Act. The said sanctioned Rules are resolved to be brought into force within the municipal limits with effect from 1-4-65 as per the Municipalitys Resolution No. 54/64 dated 18-12-64. For the information of the public the said sanctioned Rules are hereby published and the Rules are available for inspection at the places of the publication of this notice as well as at the office of the Municipality on all days except holidays. All should take a notice of it. @@@ municipal Office sd/-Administrator palitana. Palitana Municipality 12-2-65 Palitana. @@@ ( 5 ) BECAUSE the citizens it appears had raised some protests or because of some other reason the fresh Rules had come to be framed in the year 1967 and a fresh notice similarly worded was published in the year 1967 on 9th May. It is Ex. 94 on the common record. ( 6 ) THE respective plaintiff challenged the levy of this house tax on a number of grounds but as far as the courts below are concerned they accepted the challenge on two grounds. The first ground that weighed with the courts below is that mandatory requirement of sec. 103 of the Municipal Act 1963 was not complied with in so far as no date was specified in the above-mentioned notice Ex. 85 or Ex. 94 the date from which the tax as prescribed by the Rules was to be imposed. The second ground that was pressed into service was that the sanction of the Rules by the Government and earlier procedural stages were under the District Municipal Act 1901 but on account of the repeal of the said Ace all those stages and steps had been rendered non-consequential with the result that the notices in question Exs. 85 and 94 could not publish the nonexisting Rules. On behalf of the respondents the original plaintiffs an additional ground was pressed into service before me in support of their plea under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was very vehemently contended on behalf of the respondents plaintiffs that the Rules in question framed on both the occasions namely in the year 1964-65 and then in the year 1967 were illegal in so far as they did not make any provision for remissions which were compulsory by virtue of the requirement of sec. It was very vehemently contended on behalf of the respondents plaintiffs that the Rules in question framed on both the occasions namely in the year 1964-65 and then in the year 1967 were illegal in so far as they did not make any provision for remissions which were compulsory by virtue of the requirement of sec. 114 of the Municipal Act 1963 I propose to examine these various grounds one by one. ( 7 ) THE first ground pertains to the interpretation of the notice in question namely the notice ex. 85 translated above and the similar notice Ex. 94 dated 9-5-67. Sec. 103 of the Municipal Act 1962 is quoted below :- 103 Rules sanctioned under sec. 102 with the modifications if any subject to which the sanction is given shall be published by the municipality in the municipal borough together with a notice reciting the sanction and the date and serial number thereof; and the tax as prescribed by the rules so published shall from a date which shall be specified in such notice and which shall not be less than one month from the date of publication of such notice be imposed accordingly It is obvious that sec. 103 deals with two requirements. Under the first part of above quoted sec. 103 Rules as sanctioned by the Govt. with the modifications if any are to be published by the municipality in the municipal Borough accompanied by a notice reciting the sanction and the date and the serial number thereof. The impugned notices Ex. 85 and Ex. 94 certainly comply with the requirement of this first part. The second part then deals with the specification of the date from which the tax as prescribed by the Rules so published are to be imposed and such specification is to be made in the notice under which the Rules are published under the first part of sec. 103. The plaintiffs contended that the mention of the date namely 1 in Ex. 85 and mention of 1-7-67 in Ex. 94 is the specification of the date only for the purpose of imforming the people that the Rules would come into force from those respective dates. As against this submission made on behalf of the various plaintiffs it was urged on behalf of the Municipality that under the first part Rules are not required to be brought into force. 94 is the specification of the date only for the purpose of imforming the people that the Rules would come into force from those respective dates. As against this submission made on behalf of the various plaintiffs it was urged on behalf of the Municipality that under the first part Rules are not required to be brought into force. They are only to be notified for the general public information and that the only occasion to specify the date is for the purpose of informing the people that the tax would be imposed according to the Rules from those dates. Had these notices been specific in stating that the tax will be imposed from those specified dates there would have been no difficulty. However the fact remains that the words as they are do not speak of the dates from which the tax shall be imposed but ex-facie the notice mention that the Rules will be coming into force from those respective dates. If what has been canvassed by the municipality is upheld it is obvious that the suits as far as that particular ground is concerned would fail. If what has been urged on behalf of the respondents is accepted it is obvious that the appeals will be liable to be dismissed. ( 8 ) BEFORE I go to the consideration of the two divergent views I propose to examine some authorities which were pressed on behalf of the plaintiffs and which were accepted by the learned appellate Judge in particular. The first is the case of the Supreme Court in the case of MUNICIPALITY OF ANAND V. STATE OF BOMBAY and ANR. A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 998. In that case the question was about the meaning of the word impose as occurring in sec. 59 (1) of the Bombay Municipal Act 1901 The Supreme Court stated that the word meant the actual levy of the tax after authority to levy it had been acquired by rules duly made and sanctioned. The point in controversy was regarding the Governments power even to direct the municipality not to levy tax despite the framing of the rules and compliance with other requirements. The point in controversy was regarding the Governments power even to direct the municipality not to levy tax despite the framing of the rules and compliance with other requirements. On behalf of the municipality the contention was that once the rules were sanctioned by the Government and they were duly published and pursuant thereto the taxes were decided to be imposed the Government would become functus of officio. This particular argument advanced on behalf of the municipality was negatived by the Supreme Court in very clear terms and it is in this context that the word impose as occurring in sec. 59 (1) of that Act was interpreted to mean actual levy of tax as distinct from the power to levy tax. This authority in my view does not directly lend any help to the plaintiffs. ( 9 ) THE second authority which obviously helps the plaintiffs as the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of MANAK CHAND V. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL JAIPUR and ANR. A. I. R. 1951 RAJ. 139. In that Division Bench judgment it has been specifically stated that the date of coming into force of the rules and the date of coming into operation of the liability to pay the tax are distinct dates but as it appears from the factual aspect the President himself had undertaken this job and fixed up the date which as a matter of fact was within the competence of the General Board. Nevertheless it has to be admitted that the point that is canvassed by Mr. Mehta for the respondents was considered by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court and the interpretation that has been sought to be placed before me by Mr. Mehta finds its approved place there. ( 10 ) THE municipal taxation being always a vexed question cases under the District Municipal Act and the Municipal Act 1963 are often occurring in courts of law and even in the Gujarat High Court the cases under the Municipal Act 1963 itself have come up. The first is the case of SAURASHTRA IRON FOUNDRY and STEEL WORKS PVT. LTD. and ANR. V. BHAVNAGAR NAGARPALIKA and ANR. 11 G. L. R. 351. It is a Division Bench judgment of this High Court and in paragraph 6 of this judgment various stages essential for the levy of the tax are set out. The first is the case of SAURASHTRA IRON FOUNDRY and STEEL WORKS PVT. LTD. and ANR. V. BHAVNAGAR NAGARPALIKA and ANR. 11 G. L. R. 351. It is a Division Bench judgment of this High Court and in paragraph 6 of this judgment various stages essential for the levy of the tax are set out. The eighth requirement is the publication of the sanctioned rules together with a notice reciting the sanction the date and serial number thereof and also specifying the date from which the tax shall be imposed. This authority however does not help the plaintiffs directly because it reiterates the text of sec. 103 of the Municipal Act 1963 ( 11 ) ANOTHER case pressed into service on behalf of the plaintiffs is the case of the MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF AHMEDABAD V. JAVERI KESHAVLAL LALLUBHAI 6 G. L. R. 228. It was a case that arose under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act and the rules made thereunder. The first question that arose for consideration was as to when would the liability of the rate-prayers in respect of tax would arise. The three questions were posed: (1) Does it arise on the commencement of the financial year by force of the Rule without anything having been done by the municipality ? (2) Does it arise on the preparation of the assessment list ? and (3) Does it arise on the authentication of the assessment list ?examining the scheme of imposition of taxes and considering the observations in the above-mentioned case of Municipality of Anand (Supra) the Division Bench of this High Court speaking through Shri P. N. Bhagwati J. as he then was; held that no liability could be attached to the rate-prayer on the passing of the rule or on the commencing of the official year by mere force of that rule without any step having been taken by the municipality. ( 12 ) ON behalf of the plaintiffs it was very vehemently contended that all taxing statutes must be construed very strictly. The proposition is too well entranced to be called in question. The question however is what is meant by the taxing statute ? Does it mean not only the enabling provision. but also the procedural provision ? ( 12 ) ON behalf of the plaintiffs it was very vehemently contended that all taxing statutes must be construed very strictly. The proposition is too well entranced to be called in question. The question however is what is meant by the taxing statute ? Does it mean not only the enabling provision. but also the procedural provision ? The question has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in this connection by its judgment in the case of M/s. MURARILAL MAHABIR PRASAD and ORS. V. SHRI B R. VAD AND ORS. A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 313. The opinion of the two Judges of the Supreme Court Chandrachud J. as he then was and Sarkaria J. is as follows :"the true implication of the principle that a taxing statute must be construed strictly (viz. the subject is not to be taxed unless the charging provision clearly imposes the obligation) is often misunderstood and the principle is unjustifiably extended beyond the legitimate field of its operation. It does not apply where the court is concerned with the provision which prescribes the machinery for the computation of tax and not with a charging provision of the sales tax Acts. In the latter case the rule is that construction should be preferred which makes the machinery workable". ( 13 ) IT is no longer in controversy before me that the liability to pay taxes arises from the date specified in a notice under sec. 103 of the Municipal Act 1963 Both the sides are not on divergence on this point before me. The question as set out by me is whether the notices Ex. 85 and 94 can be said to be the notices specifying such dates from which the tax would be imposed. ( 14 ) AS said by me above there is no divergence between the contending parties that the liability to pay tax arises from the date specified as the date for imposing the tax. The controversy is confined to the interpretation of the above-mentioned notices Exs. 85 and 94. That is the moot question before me. ( 15 ) EVEN a casual glance at sec. 103 of the Municipal Act 1963 is sufficient to convince one that no date is required to be specified for the Rules to come into force. The controversy is confined to the interpretation of the above-mentioned notices Exs. 85 and 94. That is the moot question before me. ( 15 ) EVEN a casual glance at sec. 103 of the Municipal Act 1963 is sufficient to convince one that no date is required to be specified for the Rules to come into force. They become statutory rules on the sanction being given but if the municipality wants to exploit that power conferred by the Act and then by the Rules it has to apprise the persons likely to be prejudiced thereby of the fact that such rules are there duly made by the municipality and duly sanctioned by the concerned authority. The rules cannot be said to be coming into force from a date to be specified. They become rules and competent for all purposes the day they are sanctioned by the Government. In order to push them further towards the actual realisation of the tax a procedural aspect or to put in the words of the Supreme Court an aspect of machinery is to be resorted to. A procedural step is to be taken under the first part of sec. 103 about informing the people who were already informed earlier about the municipalitys intention to make the rules that the rules are in effect made and duly sanctioned by the competent authority. Even if they are to be brought into force they come into. force from the date of publication of notice of those rules. It is therefore evident that no date is required to be mentioned as the date on which the rules will come into force. To this extent Mr. Daru who argued for the appellant-municipality was right. Mr. Mehta for the respondents however urged that even if this mentioning of the date of coming into force of the rules is not the requirement of law it could at best be said to be a redundant superfluity on the part of the municipality but he submitted that it could not be extended to mean that what was intended to be communicated to the citizens was that as per those rules tax liability would accrue or would be imposed from that particular date. I do not agree. I do not agree. The rules to a common man when said to be coming into force or operation from a particular date would convey only one meaning that they must be ready to fill the impact of those rules from a particular date. Mr. Mehta was right in saying that his notice is meant for the common people but it is to be remembered that they are the common people in urban areas and not in backward rural areas. It is a notice to the people who were earlier apprised of the municipalitys intention that house tax as one of the taxes is to be imposed. It is a notice to those people who were also told of the draft rules. It is a notice to those people who had been called upon to have their say one way or the other regarding the constitution of those rules. It is the notice to those people who were expected to know the law namely sec 103 of the Municipal Act 1963 The only conceivable idea behind telling the people that the rules will come into force from a particular date would be the intention to tell them that the taxes will be imposed under the rules from those respective dates. To me it appears that the lower court and the lower appellate court had wrongly been carried away by the alleged strict interpretation of this procedural or machinery aspect of the law and that is why they stuck to the letters of sec. 103 and ignored the substantial compliance part which is the only thing to be insisted upon when the procedual part of such taxing statute is to be examined Had the learned appellate Judge been conscious of the legal position as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Murarilal (Supra) he perhaps would not have taken too rigid an attitude unto that part. ( 16 ) MR. Mehtas one argument in this connection however requires to be examined. He states that the conduct of the municipality should be examined before an inference is drawn one way or the other about the intention behind fixing the date of the notices Ex. 85 and 94. As said above I have taken the attending circumstances into account. Mehtas one argument in this connection however requires to be examined. He states that the conduct of the municipality should be examined before an inference is drawn one way or the other about the intention behind fixing the date of the notices Ex. 85 and 94. As said above I have taken the attending circumstances into account. He however urged that this very municipality had in the year 1957 published duly sanctioned rules but had rested there even thorough it was notified then that from 1-5-57 those rules would apply. Why this inaction on the part of the municipality was then there is difficult to be assessed because at that time there were peoples representatives at the helm of affairs of the municipal administration. The resolution passed by the administration shows that those rules were invalid and illegal and hence the undergoing fresh exercise. Perhaps because of this notion on the part of those persons-in-charge of the municipal administration the further steps of preparing the assessment list inviting objections and levying of the house tax might not have been taken. The earlier inaction of the year 1957 cannot be a relevant circumstance for deciding the import of the notices Exs. 85 and 94. On the contrary the subsequent steps taken by the Administrator in the year 1965 in preparing the assessment lists and calling for the taxes with effect from 1-4-65 which was sought to be challenged in these suits amply bear out that the Administrator intended to treat 1-4-65 in Ex. 85 and 1-7-67 in Ex. 94 as the dates communicated to the people from which their liability to pay the house tax would arise. In the facts and circumstances of the case therefore the dates mentioned in Exs. 85 and 94 are to be interpreted as the dates on which the tax was to be imposed and not the dates on which the rules were to come into force. Even at the costs of repetition I would say that no dates are required to be specified for the purpose of bringing the rules into force. They become rules in force from the day they receive sanction. Even at the costs of repetition I would say that no dates are required to be specified for the purpose of bringing the rules into force. They become rules in force from the day they receive sanction. The municipality become equipped to levy the tax by virtue of the taxing provision passing of the resolution selecting the tax then preparing the draft rules notifying them for objections con- sidering them finalising the rules transmitting them to the Government and then sanction by the Government or the competent authority to those rules. The rules come into force for all other purpores (except for the purpose of demanding tax) from the day they receive sanction from the competent authority. They can be said to be rules in force but not ful-fledged in one sense of the term. They cannot be said to be dead letters because if they are followed by a public notice under sec 103 and the intimation to the public that from a particular day the lax liability will accrue they are fully competent rules. ( 17 ) THE result is that the first contention that found favour with the lower courts does not stand in good stead to the plaintiffs. ( 18 ) THIS brings me to the second ground regarding the entire procedure followed under the Bombay District Municipal Act as having been obliterated on the advent of the new Act with effect from 1-1-65. As said by me above the lower appellate court was impressed by this plea put forward on behalf of the plaintiffs. It is truism to state that whenever a repealing statute is enacted and a new statute dealing with the same subject matter is brought into being the saving clause is provided for. In sec. 279 of the Municipal Act 1963 there is such a clause with details to be found in sub-sec. (2) thereof. The said clause (2) in relevant part reads as follow :- Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Acts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x x x x x x (b) (vi) any appointment notification notice tax fee order scheme licence permission rule by-law. (2) thereof. The said clause (2) in relevant part reads as follow :- Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Acts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x x x x x x (b) (vi) any appointment notification notice tax fee order scheme licence permission rule by-law. or form made issued imposed or granted in respect of the said boroughs or districts and in force immediately before the date of the commence ment of this Act shall in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act be deemed to have been made issued imposed or granted under this Act in respect of the borough and shall continue in force until it is superseded or modified by any appointment notification notice tax fee order scheme licence permission rule by-law or form made issued imposed or granted under this Act. x x x x x x x x x x _ (ix) all proceedings pendings before the old Municipalities shall be deemed to have been instituted and to be pending before the new municipalities and shall be heard and disposed of by the said municipalities under this Act". I have already held above that the rules were in force a little prior to 1 Even if it is held that the said rules cannot be said to be in force because of the want of publication under sec. 103 clause (ix) is there to protect such a step. Under the said clause all proceedings pending before the old municipalities are to be deemed as having been instituted and pending before the new municipalities. The meeting of a municipality is a proceeding of the municipality. An enquiry against the charges of corruption against its servant also is a proceeding but Mr. Mehta submitted that the word instituted occurring in clause 9 above shows that such proceedings must be the proceedings that have been brought into existence at the instances of a third party. He drew a line of distinction between initiation and instituted. According to him if some proceedings are before the municipality at the instance of a third party the proceedings can be said to be instituted but if the municipality itself starts some chapter on some topic it will be initiation of the proceedings. To my mind this is a difference without any distinction. According to him if some proceedings are before the municipality at the instance of a third party the proceedings can be said to be instituted but if the municipality itself starts some chapter on some topic it will be initiation of the proceedings. To my mind this is a difference without any distinction. In common parlance it can well be said that the third party has initiated the proceedings before the municipality. Similarly it can be said that the municipality has instituted some proceedings before it when the municipality starts its plan to levy some tax and goes ahead with various steps stage by stage in order to reach culmination. In my view therefore clause 9 would govern such a situation. ( 19 ) EVEN if the various clauses enumerated in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 279 cannot be pressed into service on behalf of the municipality sec. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act will come to the succour of the municipality. The said sec. 7 reads as under :" 7. Where this act or any Bombay Act (Gujarat Act) made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made than unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not (a) x x x x x x x x x (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything done or suffered thereunder; (emphasis by me) x x x x x x x x x "under Clause (b) anything duly done under the repealed Act shall not be obliterated but it shall remain as a live entity. Mr. Mehta however in this connection urged that sec. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act was subject to a very important condition and the condition is that sec. 7 will be operative unless a different intention appears. It cannot be gainsaid that if in the repealing Act there is positive indication displayed to the effect that things done under the old Act shall be treated as non est there will be no saving of the things done under the old Act. The question is: Is there anything in the repealing Act from which we can say that a different intention is manifested According to Mr. Mehta the enumeration of various saved items in sec. 279 (2) itself is a proof of a contrary intention of the Legislature. However it is not so. The question is: Is there anything in the repealing Act from which we can say that a different intention is manifested According to Mr. Mehta the enumeration of various saved items in sec. 279 (2) itself is a proof of a contrary intention of the Legislature. However it is not so. By way of abundant caution and despite there being on the statute an Act like the Bombay General Clauses Act the Legislature as the recent trend discloses made specific provisions for certain things to be saved. We cannot jump to the conclusion therefrom that whatever is not specifically saved in those saving provisions in those repealing Act of necessity is intended not to be saved. From a positive set of circumstances this sort of negative conclusion cannot he drawn. If any authority on this proposition is needed we can advert to the case of the Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF PUNJAB V. MOHAR SINGH PRATAP SINGH A. I. R. 1955 S. C 84. As held by the Supreme Court there whenever there is a repeal of an enactment the consequences laid down in sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless as the section itself says a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The court cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation Sec. 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. (emphasis supplied by me ). Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. (emphasis supplied by me ). ( 20 ) SOME authorities like the one in the case of M/s. CHAKKOBHAI GHELABHAI V. STATE OF ORISSA and ORS A. I. R. 1956 ORISSA 7 were relied upon on behalf of the respondents. No doubt above is a judgment of the division Bench of the Orissa High Court and therefore of considerable persuasive value but it cannot have any sway in view of the categorical exposition of the law by the Supreme Court. To me it appears crystal clear that enumeration of various items saved is not in any way suggestive of the legislatures intention to make that list exhaustive. It cannot be so from the very nature of things also when a new and comprehensive municipal legislation substitutes an earlier similar piece of legislation because of the new needs and requirements felt with the passage of time and development of the society. By no stretch of imagination could it be said that the Legislature even by remote implication wanted to suggest that all such elaborate procedural steps should be totally obliterated or wiped out and the body should be made to start their cumbersome procedural steps de novo. This is repugnant to the common sense also. I therefore hold that the lower appellate court was in error in holding that the earlier stages of the procedural steps towards imposing house tax had disappeared from the scene altogether making the subsequent publication of the rules and fixing the dale from which the tax will be imposed (as I have interpreted) as idle and barren exercise on the part of the municipality. . ( 21 ) THIS brings me to the third contention which as raised by Mr. Mehta for the respondents in exercise of the respondents right under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. It cannot be gainsaid that a successful respondent is at liberty to sustain the judgment even by pressing into service the points which were decided against him by the courts below. The question is about the offending rules both of the wear 1964 and of the year 1957 were conspicuously silent about the provisions for remissions. Mr. Mehta urged that sec. The question is about the offending rules both of the wear 1964 and of the year 1957 were conspicuously silent about the provisions for remissions. Mr. Mehta urged that sec. 114 of the Municipal Act 1963 makes it obligatory for the municipality to give remission in the house tax in respect of the premises that have remained vacant and unproductive of rent throughout the year or portion of the year. It cannot be gainsaid that there is inescapable duty of the municipality to grant remissions as provided for in sec. 114 of the Act. Even under sec. 271 it is one of the duties of the municipality while framing the rules to make provision for the exemptions and remissions in taxes. Admittedly on both the occasions no such provision was made. The question however is: can this omission render the entire body of rules as ineffective and therefore inoperative ? As noted above sec 114 itself enjoins upon the executive Committee of the municipality to deal with prayers for remissions and refund upto not more than half of the amount of tax. Whether rules are there or not remission would follow as a matter of course by virtue of the mandate of sec. 114 of the Act. If the Rules are not there the municipality would be liable to pay the maximum provided for. It is obvious that it cannot discriminate and grant say 1/10th of the amount by way of refund to one party 1 to another and 112nd to a third party. It is therefore obvious that under sec 114 of the Act and in the absence of any rules laid down the norms of refund the executive committee would be bound to refund half of the amount of tax that is the maximum provided for in sec. 114 of the Act. For want of any such provision the entire body of rules cannot be jettisoned overboard lock stock and barrel. ( 22 ) LASTLY Mr. Mehta for the original plaintiffs urged that in the year 1967 the tax was imposed as interpreted by me above with effect from 1-7-67 and that the taxes on the basis of those rules would be levied only for the three remaining quarters of that year 1967-68. Mr. Mehta complained that despite this clean-cut legal provision made in the proviso appended to sec. Mr. Mehta complained that despite this clean-cut legal provision made in the proviso appended to sec. 103 of the Municipal Act 1963 the appellantmunicipality had claimed tax for the whole of the year 1967-68. If the municipality had done so that levy if based on the rules as newly introduced in the year 1967 would obviously be bad. Mr. Mehta had invited my attention to Ex. 235 and particularly Rule 8 thereof. No doubt Rule 8 speaks of the four quarters but these rules were not for that particular year 1967-68 but they were expected to roll from year to year. On behalf of the municipality it was clarified that the taxes were levied as per the new rules with effect from 1-7-67 and for the quarter from 1 to 30-6-67 the tax was levied on the basis of the rules that were in vogue prior thereto. In this view of the matter no relief could be granted to the plaintiffs in that regard. ( 23 ) THE last comes the question of costs. It is very clear from what has been stated above that the then Administrator in-charge of the municipal affairs had contributed considerably towards bringing up of this litigation. Had he been more careful in drafting the notices Ex. 85 and 94 perhaps the plaintiffs would not have been encouraged to go to the court of law. In this view of the matter I order that parties should be left to bear their own costs throughout though the plaintiffs suits would be dismissed by me by allowing all these appeals. ( 24 ) THE result is that all these appeals are allowed. The respective suits filed by the plaintiffs are dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout. ( 25 ) THE status quo maintained during the pendency of the appeals shall continue to be operative upto 30-9-78 to enable the respondentsplaintiffs to have their further recourse in accordance with law if they are so advised. The agreement between the parties that was there at the time of confirmation of the application for stay by this court also will be operative till that day. This was conceded to by Mr. Mehta for the plaintiffs-respondents. .