JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J :- This writ petition is directed against a judgment of the IVth Additional District Judge, Agra dated October 15, 1977. By the said judgment the appellate authority allowed the appeal of Bhagwandas, respondent No. 2 and granted the prayer made in the application under section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 filed by the said respondent. 2. The shop in dispute belonged to Bhagwandas, respondent no. 2. An application under section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by him for release on the ground that the same was required by him for his son Rajendra Kumar. According to the allegation, Rajendra Kumar was unemployed and that he was required to be settled in a business, which was proposed to be started in the premises in dispute. In this application respondent no. 2 further stated that the petitioner, who was a tenant, had another shop in his possession and that he did not require the shop in dispute for the purposes of his occupation. 3. The application was resisted by the petitioner. He did not only challenge that the need of Bhagwandas was not genuine but also claimed that one of his sons Narain was doing business of utensils in the premises in dispute and in the other shop situated in Arya Samaj Building, the tenant himself was doing dry cleaning business. In this way, the petitioner attempted to prove that both the shops were occupied by him and if he was required to vacate the premises in dispute, be was likely to suffer greater hardship. 4. The application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority. The appeal preferred by respondent No. 2 was allowed and the proper for release made by the said respondent was granted. Aggrieved, the tenant has filed the present writ petition. 5. Two questions arose for decision before the appellate authority and still arise in the present writ petition. The first was whether the need of respondent no. 2 was bona fide. Shri B. D. Madhyan, counsel for the petitioner contended that as Rajendra Kumar, for whose benefit the application was filed, had taken up service with a bank, the ground for release had vanished. Although in reply filed on behalf of respondent no. The first was whether the need of respondent no. 2 was bona fide. Shri B. D. Madhyan, counsel for the petitioner contended that as Rajendra Kumar, for whose benefit the application was filed, had taken up service with a bank, the ground for release had vanished. Although in reply filed on behalf of respondent no. 2, the fact that Rajendra Kumar had taken up employment was admitted, but the said respondent stated that as Rajendra Kumar was sitting idle, he joined the service for a temporary period. In the affidavit, the averment made further was to the effect that, if the premises were released in favour of Rajendra Kumar, the letter would resign from the service. In view of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 2, I am not prepared to hold that the need, for which the application was filed by the said respondent No. 2, had vanished and that the finding given by the court below to the effect that need of respondent no. 2 was bona fide is liable to be set aside on that ground. I have no reason to hold that respondent No. 2 would not abide by the assurance given in the affidavit, filed on his behalf. In our province, a litigation takes a long period to come to a final and hence there was no jurisdiction for thinking that since he needed the shop, he should have remained unemployed. 6. The next question that arises for decision is whether respondent no. 2 was likely to suffer greater hardship from the rejection of the application that what would have been suffered by the petitioner by its acceptance. In the present case, the District Judge appears to have erred, while giving a finding on the said controversy in favour of respondent No. 2, and against the petitioner. Two considerations weighed with the appellate authority. One of them was that as the petitioner had an alternative accommodation available, the need of additional requirement of respondent no. 2 had to be liberally construed. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner had two shops in his possession. One is situated in the Arya Smaj Building and the other is the disputed one. One of them was that as the petitioner had an alternative accommodation available, the need of additional requirement of respondent no. 2 had to be liberally construed. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner had two shops in his possession. One is situated in the Arya Smaj Building and the other is the disputed one. The case of the petitioner was that in the disputed shop Narain Das, one of the sons of the petitioner was doing utensil business and the other shop was in his possession and that he was doing dry cleaning business in it. Applying rule 16(l)(c) the appellate authority thought that as the petitioner had, apart from the shop in dispute other accommodation, the landlord's claim had to be liberally construed. The learned Judge committed an error in relying on Rule 16(1)(c) in the present case. Sub rule (1) of Rule 16 applies to a case of a residential building for non-residential purpose. This wrong application of law has vitiated the judgment. 7. Another ground given by the appellate authority was since the petitioner had two shops, he could shift the business of the disputed shop to the other. It has come in evidence that two separate businesses are done in these two premises. The question which was required to be decided by the appellate authority was, whether the space, in the shop of Arya Smaj Building, was sufficient for doing both the businesses. If the accommodation of the said shop was not sufficient, merely because the petitioner had another shop, that could not be a ground for holding that no hardship was likely to be caused to him. The appellate authority should have examined the evidence from this angle. As this was not done, the finding of the question of hardship is also vitiated. As the Appellate Authority did not go into this aspect of the matter, it appears appropriate to quash the order of the appellate authority and to set aside the finding given on the question of comparative hardship. I, however, wish to make it clear that if the appellate court finds that the two businesses could not be accommodated in one shop, it will decide the question of hardship independently of this aspect as well. I, however, wish to make it clear that if the appellate court finds that the two businesses could not be accommodated in one shop, it will decide the question of hardship independently of this aspect as well. In doing so, it will examine the evidence of the parties and record a finding as to whether hardship would be caused to the landlord by the granting or refusal of the application. 8. For these reasons, the writ petition succeeds partly and is allowed. The order of the appellate authority dated 15.10.1977, so far as it relates to the consideration of comparative hardship is quashed. The appellate authority shall examine the question of comparative hardship afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. There shall be no order as to the costs.