JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. This is a defendant's application in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order of the Additional District Judge, Dehradun, refusing to record compromise. The plaintift opposite party filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant applicant. The defendant contested the suit. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit for recovery of Rs 1800/ as arrears of rent with a direction that the defendant shall pay future issue profits, damages at the rate of 50/ per month till the date of delivery of possession in addition to the decree for ejectment. The defendant filed appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court. During the pendency of the appeal before the Additional District Judge, Dehradun, the parties appear to have entered into an agreement on 28. 4. 1976 outside the court. The terms of the agreement were signed by the defendant applicant as well as by the plaintiffopposite party. The defendant made an application before the Additional, District Judge for deciding the appeal in terms of the agreement. The plaintiffopposite party filed an objection and asserted that there was no adjustment of the suit and the agreement could not be given effect. The learned Additional District Judge refused to decide the appeal in terms of the agreement on the ground that the terms of the agreement did not make any adjustment of the suit either wholly or in part. The obligation to be performed by the parties to the suit depended on a third person who was not connected with the suit at all and the agreement placed heavy obligations on the landlord in whose favour a decree has already been passed by the trial court. Learned counsel for the defendantapplicant urged that the lower appellate court refused to exercise its jurisdiction in refusing to record the agreement and to dispose of the suit and appeal in terms thereof. Under order XXIII rule 3 the lower appellate court was under a legal duty to dispose of the suit in accordance with the terms of the agreement order XXIII rule 3 is in the following terms: "3. Under order XXIII rule 3 the lower appellate court was under a legal duty to dispose of the suit in accordance with the terms of the agreement order XXIII rule 3 is in the following terms: "3. What it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit." Under the aforesaid provision, if a compromise is filed before the court and a request is made to pass a decree in accordance with the terms contained therein, the court is under a duty to satisfy itself, firstly, that under the terms of the agreement or compromise the stands adjusted wholly or in part and the agreement or compromise is lawful and is not prohibited by any law or public policy and the defendant has satisfied the plaintiff in respect of whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit and that the agreement and compromise relate to the suit. If these conditions are satisfied the court before which the compromise is filed is under a legal duty to pass decree in accordance with the terms of the agreement or compromise, but if the court is of the opinion that any of the aforesaid conditions are not satisfied it would not be under any duty to decree the suit in accordance with the terms contained in the agreement or compromise. Further, if one of the parties disputes the compromise on the ground of deceit or fraud it is the duty of the court to investigate the same and if it is found that the agreement or compromise was not vitiated by fraud or deceit and that the same is lawful and relates to the subject matter of the suit, and otherwise it fulfills the requirements of order XXIII rule 3 the court shall pass a decree in accordance with the terms of the agreement or compromise even though one of the parties may have resiled from the agreement or compromise. In the instant case, the parties appear to have entered into a written agreement on 28. 4. 1976. The agreement is in the following terms: "We the undersigned agree to the following terms: 1. That S. Prem Singh will deposit Rs. 71OO/ (seven thousand one hundred) with S. Tirath Singh in cash within a period of one month. 2. That S. Sampuram Singh will vacate the House of S. Prem Singh under his tenancy within three months from the date of deposit of the amount. 3. That after the vacation of the house and possession given to S. Prem Singh, the deposited amount will be donated to Sri Guru Singh Sabha, Guru Nanak Academy, Raipur, Sri Gurunanak College, Dehra Dun and Sri Gurudwara Govind Nagar equally divided. Receipt will be in favour of S. Prem Singh and S. Sampuran Singh. 4. That S. Prem Singh will withdraw all cases pending in the court." The first question which arises for consideration is as to whether there was a completed agreement between the parties to the suit as a result of which the suit has been adjusted wholly or partly. As noted earlier, the trial court had decreed the plaintiff's suit for Rs. 1800/ as arrears of rent and a decree for damages and mesne profits had also been passed in his favour till the date of delivery of possession and also certain unpaid costs of adjournment. According to the trial court the total decreetal amount would approximately come to Rs. 8250/. The plaintiff was entitled to this amount as well as to possession of the house in dispute under the decree of the trial court. Under the terms of the agreement as quoted earlier, the plaintiff undertook to deposit Rs. 7100/ with Sardar Tirath Singh, a stranger to the suit within one month from the date of agreement i. e. 24. 8. 1 976. If the plaintiff deposited the amount in cash within stipulated period the defendant Sardar Sampuran Singh undertook to vacate the house under his tenancy within three months from the date of deposit. Under clause 3 of the ageement the amount of Rs. 7100/ was required to be donated to various institutions named in clause 3 of the agreement and the plaintiff undertook to withdraw alt pending cases from court. The agreement, however, does not contain any term with regard to the decree of Rs. Under clause 3 of the ageement the amount of Rs. 7100/ was required to be donated to various institutions named in clause 3 of the agreement and the plaintiff undertook to withdraw alt pending cases from court. The agreement, however, does not contain any term with regard to the decree of Rs. 8250/ to which the plaintiff was entitled. As the plaintiff was required to deposit a sum of Rs. 7100/ he was thus required to forego a sum of more than Rs. 15000/. Delivery of possession of the house to the plaintiff' was alleged to be the consideration for the agreement although under the trial court's decree the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the house. These facts clearly show that there was no adjustment of the suit wholly or partly. No doubt order XXIIL, rule 3 gives unlimited latitude to the parties to the suit to settle the dispute between them, but the settlement must show that the suit has been adjusted wholly or partly. The finding of the lower appellate court that the agreement did not make any adjustment of the suit either wholly or partly is not vitiated by any jurisdictional error. Order XXIII rule 3 presupposes existence of a complete agreement amounting to adjustment in whole or in part of the suit itself. Where the agreement merely prescribes certain contingency for the adjustment of the suit, it cannot be said to be a completed agreement. In the instant case, the agreement contemplated certain things to be done by the parties as well as by a third person who was stranger to the suit and was completely out of the control of the court. A decree even if passed in pursuance of the agreement could not be executed as Sardar Tirath Singh who is not a party to the suit, could not be bound by the decree if passed in terms of the agreement. Further, if Sardar Tirath Singh with whom the plaintiff" deposited Rs. 7100/ refused to donate the same to the institutions named in clause 3 of the agreement, the parties to the suit could not force him to do so in execution proceedings and the court would be helpless in the matter. Tha agreement could, possibly be enforced by a separate suit as against Sardar Tirath Singh. 7100/ refused to donate the same to the institutions named in clause 3 of the agreement, the parties to the suit could not force him to do so in execution proceedings and the court would be helpless in the matter. Tha agreement could, possibly be enforced by a separate suit as against Sardar Tirath Singh. Therefore, the agreement was incomplete, it did not adjust the suit as contemplated by order XXIII rule 3. Learned counsel for the defendantapplicant urged that the parties to the suit are free to settle their dispute in any manner they like and if the terms of agreement are not unlawful, the court is bound to pass decree in terms of the agreement. He placed reliance en Ram Sunder Misra v. Jai Karon Singh and others (A. I. R. 1925 Alld. 271) Narain swamy v. President, Board of Religious Endowment (A. I. R. 1930 Mad. 629) Nageshwar Rao v. S. Krishnaiya (A. I. R. 1967 A. P. 69). On a careful scrutiny of these cases, I find that none of these authorities are applicable to the present case. In Ram Sunder Misra's case, the main issue of dispute was as to whether Ram Sunder was legitimate son of Bhikha. Ram Sunder plaintiff produced one Dukh Haran Dubey in the witness box to support his claim. The defendant made an offer that if Dukh Haran Dubey, the plaintiff's witness, ate food served by the plaintiff the suit may be decreed. The offer was accepted by the plaintiff and Dukh Haran Dubey ate food served by the plaintiff, thereupon the suit was decreed. The Bench observed that it was open to a litigant at any stage of proceedings to make offer to the other side to bring litigation to a close but the court observed that the case had nothing to do with the adjustment of the suit within the meaning of Order XXIII rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Narainswamy's case (supra) it was observed that while considering the question of adjustment of a suit under order XXIII rule 3 the court should ask itself the question whether there has been in fact a compromise and if so the adjustment was a legal one. In Narainswamy's case (supra) it was observed that while considering the question of adjustment of a suit under order XXIII rule 3 the court should ask itself the question whether there has been in fact a compromise and if so the adjustment was a legal one. Even if the court has reason to think that one of the parties was foolish enough to agree to certain conditions it has no option but to accept the offer if voluntarily made. The court further observed that the court has power to subject the compromise to scrutiny and reject the compromise for valid reasons. In making this observation the court upheld the order of the District Judge refusing to record compromise and pass a decree accordingly as it was found against the interest of the temple. The observations made by the Bench are not applicable to the instant case. In Nagesliwar Rao's case (supra) a compromise was arrived at between the plaintiff and defandant in a suit filed on the basis of a promissory note according to which the defendant agreed to deposit the money in a temple and the plaintiff was to take the same in the presence of the deity. The court held that the case was not covered by order XXIII rule 3. This case, is, therefore, not relevant for the controversy in question. There is good authority for the proposition that if the terms of the agreement or compromise do not relate to the subject matter of the suit or that the suit is not wholly or partially adjusted by the terms of the agreement or compromise, the suit cannot be decreed in terms of the agreement. In Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. (A. I. R. 1919 P. C. 79) the Privy Council while considering section 375 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 (present Order XXIII rule 3) observed that the agreement or compromise in whole and not in part has to be recorded and the decree is then to confine its operation to so much of the subject matter of the suit as is dealt by the agreement. The terms of the agreement which do not relate to the subject matter of the suit cannot be incorporated in the decree. The terms of the agreement which do not relate to the subject matter of the suit cannot be incorporated in the decree. In Sundar Sahu v. Chamra Sahu (A.I.R. 1954 Orissa 80.) a Division Bench held that where an agreement remains executary or merely prescribes a procedure for the adjustment of the suit, there cannot be said to be a completed agreement. Where an agreement contemplated something to be done by the parties through a person stranger to the suit and thus sought to take the suit completely out of the control of the court, the agreement was incomplete and indefinite and could not be regarded adjustment of the suit as contemplated by order XXIII rule 3. In Trilok Chand Kapoor v. Daya Ram Gupta (A.I.R. 1967 Cal. 541.) a Division Bench held that if the terms of a compromise do not relate to the suit the compromise cannot be incorporated in the decree as it cannot be enforced in execution. In the instant case, the plaintiffopposite party did not fulfil condition No. 1 of the agreement as he failed to deposit the amount of Rs. 7100/ within one month of the agreement with Sardar Tirath Singh. The other two conditions are dependant on the fulfilment of the first condition. Since the first condition has not been fulfilled the agreement cannot be enforced even if the agreement is recorded and a decree is passed in terms of the compromise. Moreover, it is significant to note that though the appeal had been filed by the defendant applicant he did not undertake to withdraw his appeal. There has been no element of give and take relating to the subject matter of the suit, instead the agreement relates to matters which are outside the ambit of the suit. The trial courts' decree was in plaintiff's favour, his agreement to deposit Rs. 7100/ with Sardar Tirath Singh was without any consideration. For all these reasons the dispute in the suit had not been adjusted and the court below rightly refused to record 'the agreement and dispose of the appeal in terms of the agreement. In the result the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.