JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. This is a tenant's writ petition riled against a judgment of the District Judge, Moradabad, allowing an appeal preferred by Respondent 3, the landlord, under section 22 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. The dispute is with respect to a portion of house No. 16B/3, situate in Mohalla Katra Pooran Jat, Moradabad. An application under section 21 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 was filed by respondent 3 for release of the portion in possession of the petitioner as a tenant, on the ground that the same was required by him for occupation by himself and his family members. The respondent 3 alleged in the application that his family consisted of six members. They included himself Yogi Raj, his son, his daughter Km. Pushpa, his daughter inlaw and a child of his son. The respondent 3 claimed that he had three rooms in his occupation and those three rooms were insufficient for accommodating the members of "his family. The application was resisted by the petitioner. He challenged that the need of respondent 3 was bona fide. He also claimed that his requirement for the premises was greater than that of the landlord. Both the parties filed affidavits and documents in support of their respective cases. Apart from asserting that the need of respondent 3 was bona fide, the said respondent also filed affidavits to show that since the petitioner had purchased a building at Moradabad, the requirement of the premises by the petitioner was not liable to be considered. The Prescribed Authority held that the need of respondent 3 was not bona fide, and rejected the application. Against the aforesaid order of the Prescribed Authority, respondent 3 went in appeal. In the appeal, the learned District Judge held that as the petitioner had purchased two shops in the names of his sons and thereafter made certain constructions over the same, his need was not required to be compared with that of the landlord. It may, however, be stated that respondent 3 had even taken up the case of construction in the application filed under Section 21. The petitioner denied that the shops were purchased by him. He stated that the shops were purchased by his sons and as he had strained relations with the sons, he could not shift to the same. It may, however, be stated that respondent 3 had even taken up the case of construction in the application filed under Section 21. The petitioner denied that the shops were purchased by him. He stated that the shops were purchased by his sons and as he had strained relations with the sons, he could not shift to the same. The District Judge found that although the saledeed was executed in the names of his sons Hari Om and Hari Kant, but actually the funds had been provided by the petitioner, and that the constructions were also made by him. In this background, the District Judge held that Explanation (i) to Subsection (1) of Section 21 applied to the facts of the present case. He, accordingly, allowed the appeal and granted the release in favour of respondent 3. Aggrieved by the judgment of the District Judge, the tenant has filed the present writ petition. Two questions arise for determination in this case. The first is whether the need of respondent 3 was bona fide. An application under Section 21(1) (a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 can succeed only if the landlord has succeeded in establishing that he requires the premises genuinely for his occupation. Sri V. P. Goel, counsel for the landlord, however, contended that since the petitioner made certain constructions in the property purchased by him, the landlord was not even required to establish that the premises was bona fide required by him. The submission made is not acceptable to me. Explanation (i) of Section 21(1) lays down that objection of a tenant against an application filed under section 21(1) (a) shall not be entertained. It would only mean that a tenant who is covered by this Explanation will not be entitled to set up his own need and cannot press for the comparison of his need with that of the landlord. A landlord will still be required to establish his bona fide requirement. It must, however, be remembered that the said Explanation can be applied only if a residential building has been acquired in the manner prescribed in the Explanation after the coming into force of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. In the instant case, the District Judge while dealing with the question of bona fide requirement held that as respondent 3 was a landlord a reasonable measure of latitude had to be given to him. In the instant case, the District Judge while dealing with the question of bona fide requirement held that as respondent 3 was a landlord a reasonable measure of latitude had to be given to him. For taking this view, the learned District Judge relied on two cases of the Bombay High Court reported in Bhagwandas Magan lal v. Kaikhushru Adarji (A. I. R. 1921 Bombay 212) and N. H. Pathak v. Shri Niwas Prabhu (A. I. R. 1922 Bombay 222). Being of the opinion that a landlord is entitled to a certain measure of latitude in the matter of an application filed by him under section 21(1) (a), he did not examine the bona fide need of the premises by the landlord. He simply contended himself by observing that since a landlord is not bound to be kept out of his house, he is entitled to the release. These observations made by the District Judge are not correct. In giving the finding on the question of bona fide requirement of the preimses by the landlord, the learned District Judge forgot to take into account the object for which U. P. Act XIII of 1972 was enacted. The object of this Apt is to regulate letting and rent as well as eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situate in urban areas. It is for this purpose that the Act provides that a tenant cannot be evicted at the whim or caprice of a landlord. He will have to establish the grounds mentioned in Section 20 and 21 before a tenant occupying a building belonging to him can be evicted. Section 21(a) provides that a release can be made in favour of a landlord if the building is bona fide required either in the existing form or after demolition and new construction. The use of the word "required" indicate that mere desire on the part of a landlord is not enough to entitle him to get a release order made in his favour, under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. There should be an element of need. of course, the need of the landlord should not be capricious, unfair or absurd. The use of the word "required" indicate that mere desire on the part of a landlord is not enough to entitle him to get a release order made in his favour, under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. There should be an element of need. of course, the need of the landlord should not be capricious, unfair or absurd. While dealing with the bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord, the learned District Judge held that a landlord should be allowed a reasonable measure of latitude to decide how much space is required by him for his occupation. This does not appear to be a correct approach to the problem. Section 21(1) (a) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 does not justify the aforesaid conclusion of the District Judge. Under Clause (a) of Section 21(1), what is required to be established whether the need of the landlord is bona fide. It is neither strict nor liberal construction of the need which is to be made in such a case. The approach required is to find objectively whether his need is bona fide. Its determination cannot be made on the basis of subjective satisfaction or the ipse dixit of a landlord. The two Bombay cases relied upon by the learned District Judge do not embody the principle which he was seeking there from. In none of the two cases the Bombay High Court held that a landlord is entitled to a latitude in the matter of determination of his requirement. These cases were wrongly relied upon by the learned District Judge. If the approach of the learned District Judge that a landlord is entitled to a certain amount of latitude is accepted, that would result in extending the meaning of the language employed in Section 21(1) (a) to the situations not convered by it. It is neither strict nor liberal construction of the need of the landlord which is required to be made. The approach while considering the question of his need should be reasonable which has to differ from case to case. Accordingly, the appeal of respondent 3 could not be allowed by the District Judge without finding that the need of respondent 3 was bond fide. As the District Judge did not record any categorical finding on the said controversy, the decision given by him is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the appeal of respondent 3 could not be allowed by the District Judge without finding that the need of respondent 3 was bond fide. As the District Judge did not record any categorical finding on the said controversy, the decision given by him is liable to be set aside. The second controversy which arises for decision in this case is about the applicability of Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the Act. Sri B. D. Madhyan, counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that as what was purchased by the sale deed was a shop, the provisions of the said Explanation did not apply. Had the things been only confined to the same, there would have been no difficulty in accepting the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the instant case, however, the evidence was brought on record to show that certain constructions meant for residence has been made on the building purchased by the petitioner, Accordingly, Explanation (i) would apply to the facts of the present case because of the construction of a residential building made above the shop purchased by the petitioner. It was also attempted to be argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the shop was not purchased by the petitioner himself, but by the sons of the petitioner. But, when he was faced with the situation that Explanation (i) will apply even if the shop was purchased by the son, he had no explanation to offer. It would, therefore, be seen that the finding of the learned District Judge that Explanation (i) to Section 21 (I) of the Act applied to the case and, consequently, the need of the petitioner was not required to be compared, cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the judgment of the learned District Judge is liable to be set aside. As I have confirmed the finding about the applicability of Explanation (i), the District Judge will only go into the question of bona fide requirement. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The judgment of the District Judge is quashed, and he is directed to decide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made above. The District Judge is directed to decide the appeal within four months. No order as to costs.