JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a tenant's writ petition filed against the judgment of the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Kanpur dated 7.2.1977 dismissing an appeal filed by the petitioner. 2. Shrimati Kastoori Devi Jain, respondent No. 3 filed an application under section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972") for release of a portion of house no. F-27, Shansi Nagar, Cantonment, Kanpur, which had been let out to the petitioner. In the application she stated that additional accommodation was needed for residential purposes of her family members. The application was resisted by the petitioner. He alleged that the accommodation, already in possession of respondent No. 3 and her family members, was sufficient to meet their requirements. The Prescribed Authority found that the need of the respondent No. 3 for additional accommodation was bonafide, and allowed the application. He did not consider the question of comparative hardship. The petitioner took the matter in appeal. The appeal was dismissed. The learned District Judge confirmed the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the need of the respondent No. 3 was bonafide and also found that she was likely to suffer greater hardship from the rejection of the application. Aggrieved the tenant has filed the present writ petition. 3. Shri R.N. Bhalla. counsel appearing for the petitioner alleged that as the purpose indicated in the application for which the premises in occupation was required by respondent No. 3 was non-residential, the application tiled by her was barred by the second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The said proviso lays down that no application under sub- section (1) shall not be entertained in the case of a residential building for occupation for business purpose. It is a common case of the parties that the portion in occupation of the petitioner was a residential one. 4. The question that is now required to be considered is whether the need for which the application was filed by respondent No. 3 was for non-residential purpose. Referring to paragraph 6 of the release application, Shri R.N. Bhalla contended that the need disclosed was that Anil Kumar who had passed his M.B.B.S. Examination, was required to be settled as a doctor in the portion in occupation of the petitioner. Referring to paragraph 6 of the release application, Shri R.N. Bhalla contended that the need disclosed was that Anil Kumar who had passed his M.B.B.S. Examination, was required to be settled as a doctor in the portion in occupation of the petitioner. This does not appear to be a correct reading of the application of respondent No. 3. This paragraph has to be read along with subsequent paragraphs 9 and 16. Reading all these three paragraphs together, no doubt is kit that the application was filed by respondent No. 3 essentially and fundamentally for the requirement of residence for the members of the family. In support of her need, respondent No. 3 also alleged that some space was required by her for providing to Dr. Anil Kumar for his profession. It is not possible to infer from the application that the same was filed mainly for the purpose of the said doctor to open a clinic. If the main purpose for which the application was filed was residential, the same would not be barred by the proviso referred to above. 5. Shri R.N. Bhalla, counsel appearing for the petitioner referred a Division Bench decision of this court reported in Dr. Bashiruddin v. Additional District Judge Bulandshahar, 1978(1) R.C.J. 199. and urged that as in that case it was held that the need of a doctor was a commercial or business need, this court should also find in agreement with the decision of the Division Bench that the need of respondent No. 3 was non-residential one. I have already held above that the main need of the respondent No. 3 was a residential one. That apart, Dr. Bashiruddin's case (Supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner was one where the entire premises was required by the petitioner of that case for the purpose of opening a clinic, whereas in the instant case only one of the rooms would be used for that purpose. This is clear from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge in which he held that the use of a room by the doctor will not convert the house form a residential to non-residential. 6. This is clear from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge in which he held that the use of a room by the doctor will not convert the house form a residential to non-residential. 6. In Ramlal and others v. M/s. Pyarelal Govidram and others, 1974 R.C.C. 430, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider a similar controversy, in connection with an objection filed by a judgment debtor under the Punjab Relief and Indebtedness Act. In that case the Judgment-debtor claimed that the house in which he was residing was residential one, the same was not liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree. The objection was contested by the decree-holder on the ground, inter alia, that as the Judgment debtor was doing business in a pact of the premises, the later was not entitled to the protection granted by the Relief Act. The Supreme Court repelled the objection of the decree holder and found that even it' the Judgment debtor was using a portion of the house for business purpose that would not convert the nature of the house from residential to non-residential. While dealing with this controversy, the Supreme Court observed that the use of a part of a house by a lawyer for his office and the rest of it for a residential purpose could not be considered to be a commercial purpose. Similarly, taking the illustration of a doctor the Supreme Court found that the use of a room for the purposes of consultation by a doctor could not render the house into a non-residential one. The enunciated by the Supreme Court applies with full force in the present case. Even in Bashirudin's case the Division Bench distinguished the case where only a portion of the premises was being used by a lawyer or a doctory. 7. The next submission made was that the finding about the genuineness of the need given by the courts below was erroneous. It was pointed out that respondent No. 3 had sufficient accommodation in her possession and that her son Anil Kumar and others could be accommodated in the same. The learned counsel contended that no additional accommodation was required by the said respondent. This matter has been thrashed out by the two courts below. The finding recorded by the courts below that the need of respondent No. 3 is bonafide is one of fact. The learned counsel contended that no additional accommodation was required by the said respondent. This matter has been thrashed out by the two courts below. The finding recorded by the courts below that the need of respondent No. 3 is bonafide is one of fact. It is not possible for me to reappraise the evidence filed by the parties and to record a finding of my own different than that has been given by the appellate authority. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited to seeing whether the judgment of the subordinate authority suffers from a manifest error of law or is perverse or not. This Court does not have jurisdiction to correct an error of fact, even though the same may be erroneous. This being so, the second contention of the petitioner also fails. 8. For these reasons the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The petitioner is granted 10 months time to vacate the premises.