JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---The only question arising in the above First Appeal was whether the learned Additional Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Bombay was right in decreeing the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff, on September 2, 1960 for the declaration that the defendants were the trespassers, in respect of the suit premises from January 1, 1959, and for an injunction restraining the defendant-appellants from occupying the premises or using the same. 2. It was the case of the plaintiff that the defendants were allowed to occupy the suit premises consisting of a portion of a shop 10 x 30 under the agreement of leave and licence, Exhibit-A, dated January 1, 1958 which was revoked as the defendants failed and neglected to pay to the plaintiff any licence fee as agreed in the said agreement for a period of three consecutive months of October, November and December 1958, though the agreement provided inter alia as follows: "(a) That the licensors shall grant his leave and licence to the licensees to use and occupy portion admeasuring 10 x 30 ft., falling on the West side of the said Signal Hill Avenue Road, Bombay. (b) The aforesaid lease and licence shall be deemed to have been revoked if the licensees commit any default in payment of the licence fees for any three consecutive months. (c) The licensees shall on determination as stipulated in para 4 of this agreement shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession of such portion or portions used by the licensees under these presents." 3. The plaintiff has further stated that by his letter dated November 15, 1958, the plaintiff had called upon the defendants to give vacant possession of the suit premises; and in reply to the letter sent on November 28, 1958, the defendants had denied having executed the agreement of leave and licence as alleged in the plaintiffs letter; and falsely contended that the defendants were allowed to occupy the premises, which they occupied permanently on their paying certain amount by way of rent. 4. 4. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants, the defendants set out the circumstances in which the agreement of leave and licence came to be executed, but contended that they were not the trespassers; that it was agreed and understood between the plaintiff and the defendants that the defendants would be the sub-tenants, in respect of the premises, in occupation of the defendants, having regard to the fact that the defendants, were in possession of the premises, including the premises, which the plaintiffs had occupied from 1952. According to the defendants, the true intention of the parties was that the defendants were to be the plaintiffs sub tenants in respect of the suit premises; and in substance the true relationship created between the parties was that of the landlord and the tenant. It was further contended that the premises were separated from the rest of the premises by corrugated iron sheets; and had a separate entrance; and the defendants were prior to January 1958, and even thereafter, in exclusive possession of the premises. The defendants, therefore, submitted that the plaintiffs suit was liable to be dismissed with costs. 5. The learned trial Judge framed as many as 12 issues. But the main issue was whether the plaintiff granted any such leave and licence to the defendants to use the premises under the agreement dated January 1, 1958, which will hereinafter be to as Exhibit A; and whether the said licence was revoked, as contended by the defendants, or whether the defendants were the suit-tenants of the plaintiff, as contended by the defendants. 6. On behalf, of the plaintiff, Nagindas Bhagwandas Shah, a distant uncle of the plaintiff, who had attested the document, Exh. A; and Chandrakant Hiralal Shah, the plaintiff himself, gave evidence, fully supporting the case made out in the plaint. On behalf of the defendants, a carpenter by name Hansraj Jiva Katalia, who claimed to have constructed the partition, first in October 1957; and thereafter sometime in January 1959, at the instance of the defendant was examined. Girdharlal Vora, the proprietor of the defendants firm also gave evidence. 7. The learned Judge, by his judgment and decree, dated March 30, 1970, disbelieved the defendants witnesses, believed the plaintiff and his witnesses, who supported the plaintiffs case, based on the agreement Exh. Girdharlal Vora, the proprietor of the defendants firm also gave evidence. 7. The learned Judge, by his judgment and decree, dated March 30, 1970, disbelieved the defendants witnesses, believed the plaintiff and his witnesses, who supported the plaintiffs case, based on the agreement Exh. A; and decreed the plaintiffs suit, as stated above, declaring that the defendants were trespassers; and restraining the defendants from occupying the premises and granting the other prayers in the plaint. The decision is challenged in the above first appeal. 8. Mr. Morje, the learned Counsel appearing for the defendants very strongly relied on the admitted possession of the defendants from 1952 and also on the admission of the plaintiffs witness Nagindas about the execution of the agreement, Exh. 1 in Gujarati on September 30 1957, which contained a specific clause, that the leave and licence which was to be granted to the defendants was never to be revoked; and submitted relying on the facts and circumstances in the case, firstly on the exclusive possession of the defendants and secondly on the probability, particularly having regard to the application, made for overhead electric wire as per Exh. 9; and all the other circumstances of the case, including the mention of the word rent in Exh. A, which clearly indicated that the intention of the parties in executing the agreement, that Exh. A was intended by the parties to create a lease and not a licence Mr. Sali, the learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff contended that the Rent Act had no application to the suit premises as the land on which the suit premises were situate, belonged to the Port Trust; and drew my attention to the cogent and valid reasons given by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, for disbelieving the defendants and their witnesses; and for coming to the conclusion that even the exclusive possession was not established the defendants and that the fact that the partition was prepared in 1959 by his witness Hansraj was irrelevant for determining the intention of the parties on the date of the Agreement, Exh. A. 9. A. 9. The principles, which should guide the Court in deciding whether a particular agreement or transaction between the parties, with regard to the occupation of the premises given on leave and licence, is in fact a lease are, with profound respect, very ably and authoritatively, laid down in (Qudarat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly)1, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 396, and it is not necessary to repeat them here particularly because Mr. Morje was unable to point out any error in any of the reasons given by the learned Judge in paras 12 to 15 for totally disbelieving the defendants witness Girdharlal, whom the learned Judge had the advantage of seeing and hearing in the witness box; and about whom the learned Judge formed an adverse opinion as to the honesty of his case; and set out the reasons, which Mr. Morje found it impossible to demolish. All that Mr. Morje could argue against the finding of the dishonesty of Girdharlal was that Girdharlal would not know all the forensic sublities between the lease and the licence; and he gave a consistent story of his being a sub-tenant in the premises, notwithstanding the various discrepancies pointed out by the learned Judge, which led the learned Judge, according to Mr. Morje, to wrongly disbelieve the defendants. He also contended by referring to the various authorities, which were referred to in the judgment of the learned Judge that the learned Judge had not correctly applied the principles, which could be followed by the courts, for determining whether a particular agreement is a lease or a licence; and that the agreement in the present case at Exh. A, did not contain even the limited period of the licence, as is generally done. 10. In my opinion, all these arguments, made by Mr. Morje on the basis of the Gujarathi agreement between the defendants, Girdharlal and one D.U. Shah is irrelevant because the clause about the irrevocability of the licence was not incorporated in Exh. A, and the question of deciding whether the agreement was a leave and licence or a lease, as contended by the defendants also cannot survive, in view of the finding, recorded by the learned Judge that the defendant Girdharlal was an unreliable person, who went on changing his story from stage to stage so often that it was impossible to believe any of his stories. I find that in paras 12 to 15 the learned Judge has given as many as 10 reasons, which are as follows : (1) That the defendant made out a new case in the witness box, which he had not made out in the written statement. (2) Although he had included the original document, Exh. A in his affidavit of the documents, he had the cheek to deny having been in possession of it; and having not entrusted it to the Advocate who drafted the affidavit. (3) That although he stated that he had given Exh. 4 to the original landlord, he himself produced it; (4) The letter drawn on the stamp-paper also issued to Advocate P.S. Bhat to whom also the stamp-paper for the agreement was issued. (5) Having admitted in the Advocates reply dated 28-11-1958, the execution of the agreement, Exh. 4, the defendant pretended that he did not know the contents thereof, though different stories were put to the witnesses; and the defendant himself made out an altogether different story in the evidence given by him. (6) He further changed in the cross-examination the whole case by saying that the contents of Exh. A were explained to him by his Advocate, as incorporating the previous agreement in Gujarati at Exh. 1, which is impossible to believe, having regard to the contents of Exh. A. (7) When this was pointed out to Girdharlal, whom the learned Judge has characterised as "a shrewd businessman" on watching his demeanour in para 12 of his judgment, he said that the defendant Advocate explained to him that in no case would he be asked to vacate the premises, even though there was a clause that the licence would be revoked. (8) That he further said in his evidence in the cross-examination, making out an entirely new case, that he had a talk with the plaintiff, that the plaintiff had assured him that he would not have to vacate the flat at any time; and that he was a sub-tenant; that in the examination-in-chief also he had stated that he had at no time a talk either with the plaintiff or any one else. (9) In view of these pretensions and having regard to the production of the stamp paper in the name of P.S. Bhat whom admittedly the defendants had engaged some time before, it was difficult to believe that the agreement, Exh. A which was prepared on the stamp paper purchased in the name of P.S. Bhat, Advocate was prepared by the plaintiffs Advocate. (10) That it was also difficult to believe even the story about the agreement, Exh. A intended to be made in accordance with the Gujarathi agreement being true; and that the theory about the story about the sub-tenancy could be accepted in as much as even the gujarati agreement, Exh. 1 no where refers to any sub-tenancy. 11. Mr. Sali and Mr. Morje have taken me through the relevant record; and I find everyone of the reasons given by the learned Judge for finding that Girdharlal is unreliable and made pretences before the Court is well founded. The finding is supported by very convincing, cogent and valid reasons. It is well-settled that the Appellate Court will not rightly interfere with the appreciation of the oral evidence made by the trial Court, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses in the box; and in these circumstances, I find it impossible to reverse the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge. 12. Once this finding is accepted, the entire case of the defendants, which is not supported by anything in the agreement, Exh. A must fail because whatever he had stated about the exclusive possession or use of the word rent, or the intention of the parties, must be held to be unbelievable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. Mr. Morje tried to argue that the principles laid down by the courts in the cases, which are referred to in the lower Courts judgment and in the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment are not correctly followed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court about the nature of the exclusive possession of the defendants and about the history of possession of the defendants from 1952; and all other facts and circumstances, which according to Mr. Morje clearly indicated the intention on the part of the parties to create a sub-tenancy or lease for whatever was stated in the agreement Exh. A. I did not permit Mr. Morje clearly indicated the intention on the part of the parties to create a sub-tenancy or lease for whatever was stated in the agreement Exh. A. I did not permit Mr. Morje to go into these matters in detail because it was not necessary to do so inasmuch as once the defendants are disbelieved, the plaintiffs case must be held to be proved, particularly when the defendant was not even able to make out a consistent story about the intention of the parties, when the agreement was executed in January 1968; and when he came out with a number of stories, which led the learned Judge rightly to disbelieve him as a dishonest person. The question of looking at the substance of the document arises as a matter of equity; and he who comes for equity must come with clean hands. A dishonest person like the defendant cannot ask the Court to ignore what is stated in Exh. A and accept his story, which has been rightly disbelieved by the trial Court in the present case for very weightly and convincing reasons. 14. It was argued by Mr. Morje that even looking at the agreement and the exclusive possession of the defendant, no matter what the defendant stated in the course of his evidence, it was clear that the intention of the parties was to create a lease and not merely a leave and licence, which was revoked by the plaintiff. The argument must be rejected not only for the above reasons but also for the reasons that the exclusive possession or the use of word "rent" in the agreement cannot be conclusive. It is true that the agreement, Exh. A does not specify the period of leave and licence, but even in the absence of any period under section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1852, the licence may be revoked at any time. The agreement Exh. A also provided that it shall be deemed to be revoked, if the licensee did not pay what the agreement calls as rent in three months. In these circumstances, there is nothing in the agreement, Exh. A which will justify the argument of Mr. Morje that the agreement was nothing but an agreement of lease or an irrevocable licence. 15. A also provided that it shall be deemed to be revoked, if the licensee did not pay what the agreement calls as rent in three months. In these circumstances, there is nothing in the agreement, Exh. A which will justify the argument of Mr. Morje that the agreement was nothing but an agreement of lease or an irrevocable licence. 15. In the circumstances, I find no error in the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge, although I have not found it necessary to repeat what the learned Judge has said about the exclusive possession, because even if the exclusive possession is established, it is not sufficient in the facts and circumstances of the present case to hold that what the defendant is saying before the Court is true. 16. Before parting, it is necessary to point out that Mr. Sali also tried to argue that the plea of sub-tenancy is not available to the defendants in view of section 4(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947; and made a grievance of the fact that the learned Judge had not decided that point. I find no substance in the point section 4(1) cannot apply to the suit premises inasmuch as the premises viz. a part of the building in possession of the defendants, does not belong to the Port Trust although the land may be belonging to the Port Trust and section 4(4) excludes such a building. Further it makes no difference as to whether the Bombay Rent Act applies or not because if the defendants were to succeed in establishing that notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, Exh. A, what was intended by the parties was lease and not a licence, then it would not be open to the plaintiff to call the defendants trespassers, as the lease was not terminated by the plaintiff as required by law. The plaintiff is entitled to succeed only because the defendants plea that Exh. A was intended to create a lease is not accepted for the reasons stated hereinabove. 17. In the result, the above first appeal is dismissed with costs. 18. Mr. Morje says that his client, defendant desires to appeal against this judgment and requests that sometime may be given to them to remain in the premises, till they obtain necessary orders in appeal, which is to be filed. Mr. 17. In the result, the above first appeal is dismissed with costs. 18. Mr. Morje says that his client, defendant desires to appeal against this judgment and requests that sometime may be given to them to remain in the premises, till they obtain necessary orders in appeal, which is to be filed. Mr. Sali objects to this. However, in the interests of justice, I direct that the judgment and order passed to-day shall not be executed till June 30, 1978, to enable the appellants move in appeal against this judgment, if so advised. The respondent is free to execute the decree for costs and for arrears of rent or compensation, if any, as directed by the lower Court. -----