Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner had 5 or 6 vegetable shops in different parts of Trivandrum. His business failed. He then surrendered possession of all the rooms in which the said shops were run except the one owned by the respondent herein. He was not carrying on any business in this room from the beginning of May to December 18th, 1975 on which date the respondent applied to the Rent Control Court to evict him on the ground that he ceased to occupy the building continuously for six months without reasonable cause. The Appellate Authority and Revisional Court agreed in holding that he failed to substantiate his case that he was ill during May to August end and that thereafter the respondent obstructed him from doing business in the room in question in so far as there is no evidence in that behalf except that of the revision petitioner. This is a finding of fact and is, therefore, beyond challenge in this Court. 2. It is contended that as held by the Rent Control Court the revision petitioner must beheld to be occupying the room in question though he was physically absent therefrom for a continuous period of six months since be has the intention to possess and occupy the same. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on Wigley v. Leigh (1950) 2 K.B. 305 C.A The facts of that case reveal that a caretaker was installed to look after the building, that he kept if ready for occupation at any time and that the evidence made it clear that Mrs. Leigh, the statutory tenant, intended to return there to live when her health improved, though after leaving England in 1945 because of pulmonary tuberculosis and on medical advice, she had resided in the house only once, for three months in the summer of 1947. Therefore it was held that she was in occupation of the house as a statutory tenant. This case is an instance of the application of the formula, animus possidendi and corpus possessions, evolved and used by Asquith L. J. in Brown v. Brash (!948) 1 A.E.R. 922 C.A. There Lord Asquith said : "We are of opinion that a "non-occupying" tenant prima facia forfeits bis status as a statutory tenant. But what is meant by "non-occupying"? This case is an instance of the application of the formula, animus possidendi and corpus possessions, evolved and used by Asquith L. J. in Brown v. Brash (!948) 1 A.E.R. 922 C.A. There Lord Asquith said : "We are of opinion that a "non-occupying" tenant prima facia forfeits bis status as a statutory tenant. But what is meant by "non-occupying"? The term clearly cannot cover every tenant who for however short a time, or however necessary a purpose, or with whatever intention as regards returning, absents himself from the demised premises. To retain possession or occupation for the purpose of retaining protection the tenant cannot be compelled to spend 24 hours in all weathers under his own roof for 365 days in the year. x x x x x Nevertheless, absence may be sufficiently prolonged or un-intermittent to compel the inference, prima facie of a cessor of possession or occupation. The question is one of fact and of degree." and formulated a rule of practical application, namely, that, if the tenant proves his animus possidendi (intention to possess) and a corpus possessions viz. some visible state of affairs in which the animus possidendi finds expression such as leaving the building in the hands of a caretaker or the tenant leaving his furniture in the buildings not some token pieces of furniture, but the tenant leaving the house substantially furnished so that at any time he can return and reside there, the presumption of cessation of occupation arising from the physical absence of the tenant from the premises will stand rebutted. The Court of Appeal applied this formula, besides in the wigley case cited by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner in Dixon v. Tommis and Another 1952(1) A.E.R. 725 C A. and in Beck v. Scholz 1953 (1) Q.B. 570 C.A. In Dixon's case Evershed M.R. in his concurring judgment pointed out that'if the tenant does not in the eye of law retain his possession, an intention, however truthfully and sincerely entertained, to return there at some future date will not suffice'. The same Master of the Rolls in Beck v. Scholz observed: "But as Jenkips L. J. observed, the mere use of the phrase animus possidendi requires the further explanation, animus possidendi as what? The same Master of the Rolls in Beck v. Scholz observed: "But as Jenkips L. J. observed, the mere use of the phrase animus possidendi requires the further explanation, animus possidendi as what? as a convenience, as a resort, or as a home?" meaning thereby that what the tenant has to establish is animus possidendi as a home (The English cases cited above concerned residential buildings) and not as a mere convenience or as a resort, and, generalising the principle to comprehend all classes of buildings, residential and non-residential, it may safely be said that what is to be proved is, animus possidendi to use the building for the purpose for which it is let, residential purpose or non-residential purpose, as the case may be. 3. S.11(4) (v) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 enables a landlord to evict a tenant'if the tenant ceases to occupy the building continuously for six months without reasonable cause'. Under this provision the tenant removing bis physical presence from the building during intermittent periods less than six months in duration will not rouse the presumption of his occupation of the building and the provision, thus recognizes the fact that law does not expect that the tenant should be under the roof of his rented building all the 24 hours of the day and all the 365 days in the year. However, his physical absence therefrom continuously for six months will arouse the presumption that he has ceased to occupy the building and that he has abandoned it. Once this presumption arises the onus is on the tenant to dislodge the same by establishing bis de facto intention to possess it for the purposes for which it is let to him and also, facts constituting outward expression of the intention of possession in fact, (for what matters so far as statutory tenancy is concerned is, in the words of Asquith L. J. in the Brown case, possession in fact and not possession in law) so that despite the physical absence of the tenant from the building continuously for six months or more, the Court is satisfied that he is occupying the building by retaining possession infact thereof. This I suppose is the sense in which the expression: 'without reasonable cause', is used in S 11 (4) (v) of the Act The burden of proving 'reasonable cause' for non-occupation of the building continuously for six months is on the tenant, and 'reasonable cause' would only be such cause as would enable the Court to come to the conclusion that the tenant has not abandoned the premises and that he still retains de facto possession of the same though he is not physically present thereon. 4. The only fact constituting an outward expression of the de facto intention the civil revision petitioner is said to have entertained, that is sought to be pressed into service by his learned counsel is that, as spoken to by Pw 2, the tenant occasionally cleaned the premises. This, at the most, may suggest that he had an intention to use the room (for what purpose?, it is not clear) at some future time, as and when it suits him, but would not indicate that he is in occupation of the building. He failed to establish any reasonable cause for his non-occupation of the room for ever six months continuously. Dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.