Pandurang Shivaram Narvekar v. Hansa D. Singh and others
1978-04-27
M.P.KANODE
body1978
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - M.P. KANADE, J.:---The petitioner is the original respondent in the proceedings initiated by Dinanath Singh in the Small Causes Court at Bombay in Ejectment Application No. 547 of 1970. 2. Dinanath Singh died during the pendency of the appeal and his heirs have been brought on the record who are respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in this petition. In the judgement application it was contended that the suit premises consisting of a room, Shop No. 9, situate in Chawl at Swami Vivekanand Road, Jogeshwari (West), Bombay 400 006. It was contended in the said application that the petitioner herein was a licensee of the said premises and the licence agreement was executed in June 1967. The licensee was to pay Rs. 40/- per month. The agreement of leave and licence of June 1967 was for a period of 11 months and thereafter the petitioner herein continued to be the licensee for a further period of two years. There is no dispute that an amount of Rs. 1,000/- was deposited by the petitioner under the agreement of leave and licence of June 1967. The petitioner herein was to pay to the licensor a further sum of Rs. 500/-. The licensor by a notice dated November 20, 1969, revoked the licence of the petitioner herein, and thereafter filed the aforesaid proceedings under section 41 of the Bombay Presidency Small Causes Courts Act. The respondents resisted the said application. He denied that he was a licensee. He also denied that he had executed any leave and licence in favour of the said Dinanath Singh. The petitioner further contended that the alleged agreement of leave and licence has been obtained by misrepresentation, coercion and by practising fraud upon him. The petitioner set up a plea that he is the tenant of the suit premises from one Ramdhin Balgovind Singh, the uncle of the deceased Dinanath Singh, and there is a Regular Civil Suit pending in respect of the suit premises between Dinanath Singh and Ramdhin Singh. 3. The matter came before the Small Cause Court on November 13, 1972 for hearing. The petitioners Advocate Shri Nagori withdrew his appearance on the ground that the petitioner wanted to engage another Advocate, and the said oral application of Nagori was granted and he was allowed to withdraw his appearance.
3. The matter came before the Small Cause Court on November 13, 1972 for hearing. The petitioners Advocate Shri Nagori withdrew his appearance on the ground that the petitioner wanted to engage another Advocate, and the said oral application of Nagori was granted and he was allowed to withdraw his appearance. Then the petitioner applied for adjournment on the ground that he wanted to engage another Advocate. However, the said oral request was rejected by the trial Court, and as the Court refused to adjourn the case, evidence to the respondents was recorded, and it appears that some questions were put to the petitioner and his statement was also recorded on the same day. Thus, the entire trial seems to have been concluded on November 13, 1972. The learned Judge of the trial Court disposed of that application on the same day by judgment and order directing the petitioner to vacate the suit premises on or before January 30, 1973. The petitioner thereafter feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the trial Court preferred an appeal to the Bench of the Small Causes Court at Bombay bearing Appeal No. 634/E of 1972. The said appeal was heard by two Judges of the Small Causes Court and they confirmed the findings recorded by the trial Court by judgment and order dated September 27, 1973. Against the said judgment and order of the Appellate Court, the present Special Civil Application has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Mr. Tendulkar, who appears on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that there is no proper inquiry in the ejectment application before the Small Causes Court. On the date of the hearing, viz. November 13, 1972, Advocate Nagori was allowed to withdraw his appearance and in the absence of any assistance of an Advocate, the petitioner was directed to conduct the case before the learned trial Judge. He further submitted that the procedure followed by the trial Court amounted to a violation of the principles of natural justice in the matter of giving hearing in the Ejectment Application. The Appellate Court in paragraph 5 of the judgment has stated : "Granting or refusing an adjournment is a matter which is within the discretion of the Court.
He further submitted that the procedure followed by the trial Court amounted to a violation of the principles of natural justice in the matter of giving hearing in the Ejectment Application. The Appellate Court in paragraph 5 of the judgment has stated : "Granting or refusing an adjournment is a matter which is within the discretion of the Court. The learned trial Judge has appointed out in its order that there was nothing to prevent the appellant from engaging another Advocate prior to that date of hearing. It is not shown that the said discretion was not judicially exercised by the trial Court." It is true that the Appellate Court should not interfere with the discretion used by the trial Court in granting adjournment or refusing adjournment, but the Court must see that the discretion is judiciously exercised. I find that the trial Court has not judiciously exercised the jurisdiction vested in it in refusing the adjournment. Even if the Advocate wants to withdraw his appearance from the proceedings, he must inform his client of his intention of withdrawing his appearance from the proceedings. Secondly, he must obtain a sanction from the Court to withdraw his appearance. While grating such sanction to withdraw appearance, the Court must exercise its judicious discretion as to whether to grant permission to the Advocate to withdraw or not to withdraw. When once the Court grants permission to the Advocate to withdraw his appearance, then it is the duty of the Court to inform the party to the proceedings that it should engage an Advocate or conduct the case and should give him an opportunity to engage another Advocate and conduct the proceedings according to law. A litigant may not know the intricacies of the Court proceedings and the art of cross-examination, or even may not know as to what kind of questions should be put in the cross-examination having regard to its own pleadings in the case. Such a trial, without the assistance of an Advocate, will to be justified having regard to the facts of this case. The trial Court ought to have granted a very short time to engage the Advocate and peremptorily fix the case for hearing as the same appeared to be an old case.
Such a trial, without the assistance of an Advocate, will to be justified having regard to the facts of this case. The trial Court ought to have granted a very short time to engage the Advocate and peremptorily fix the case for hearing as the same appeared to be an old case. In my view, it was not at all proper on the part of the trial Court, as there was clearly a violation of the principles of natural justice in refusing the party to engage an Advocate to conduct the case before the trial Court. The Appellate Court has committed an error in observing that in any event, even, assuming that the learned trial Judge was wrong in refusing the appellants request for an adjournment on 13-11-1972, to enable him to engage another Advocate, we have no jurisdiction to interfere with that order of the trial Court as an appeal before us can lie only against the finding recorded by the trial Court on a preliminary issue, as provided under section 42(1) of that Act. 5. The Appellate Court while exercising jurisdiction of the Appellate Court has to see as to whether the trial has conducted the case in accordance with law and in accordance after notice to the parties. The petitioner is directed to deposit the entire areas, if any, of compensation at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month on or before the date of hearing. The trial Court will file up the arrears in the presence of the parties and direct the petitioner to deposit the same on the date to be fixed by the trial Court. 6. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. -----