Indira Finance Corporation v. Prem Shankar Awasthi
1978-09-15
K.N.GOYAL
body1978
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER K.N. Goyal, J. - This is a tenants revision directed against an order passed under O. XV, R. 5 of the Civil P. C., as substituted by the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976, (U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as the Uttar Pradesh Act). The order dated 3rd August, 1977, passed by the trial Court has been upheld on revision by the District Judge by his order dated 21st Feb, 1978. 2. On facts, it is undisputed before me that the provisions of O. XV, R. 5 are clearly attracted. Learned counsel for the applicant has however contended that this provision itself should be deemed to have been repealed by Section 97 (1) of the Civil P. C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, (Act No. 104 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act). 3. It may be noted here that U. P. Act 57 of 1976 received the assent of the President of India on Dec. 30, 1976, and that the Act was enforced with effect from Jan., 11, 1977. The Central Act had been passed and assented to' by the President even earlier, but it was enforced with effect from a later date namely, Feb. 1, 1977. Thus, although in point of time the Presidents assent was given to the Uttar Pradesh Act later, the legal effect of these different dates of enforcement is that for purposes of Cl. (2) of Art. 254 of the Constitution, the Central Act has to be treated as later in point of time. Accordingly, Section 97 of the Central Act will prevail over the Uttar Pradesh Act and not vice-versa. Section 97 (1) of the Central Act is as follows : "(1) Any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court before the commencement of this Act shall, except in so tar as such amendment or provision is consistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by this Act, stand repealed." 4. Even if this provision had not been made, the same result would have followed from the provision of Art. 254 of the Constitution, for the word "repugnancy" used in the body of that Article has the same meaning as the word "inconsistency" used in the marginal heading of that Article and in Sec. 97 (1) quoted above.
Even if this provision had not been made, the same result would have followed from the provision of Art. 254 of the Constitution, for the word "repugnancy" used in the body of that Article has the same meaning as the word "inconsistency" used in the marginal heading of that Article and in Sec. 97 (1) quoted above. The reason why the Parliament considered it necessary to make a special provision in Section 97 (1) as aforesaid, apparently, was that some transitory and saving provisions were also to be made in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 97, and in that context it was considered necessary to make a specific; provision as aforesaid with a view to making the whole section a self-contained one so far as practicable. 5. The substance of O. XV, R. 5, inserted by the Uttar Pradesh Act, is contained in sub-rule (1) thereof, which omitting the explanation thereto is reproduced below: "5. Striking off defence on failure to deposit admitted rent, etc. - (1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a leasee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), strike off his defence." 6. It may be mentioned here that no R. 5 existed in the original Code, but a rule was inserted for the first time by another Uttar Pradesh Amendment .which was U. P. Act XXXVII of 1972. The subject-matter of that rule was also the same as that of R. 5 as substituted by the Uttar Pradesh Act (of 1976). The latter Act merely made some improvements in the provision inserted in 1972. The Central Act did not make any provision in this behalf. 7.
The subject-matter of that rule was also the same as that of R. 5 as substituted by the Uttar Pradesh Act (of 1976). The latter Act merely made some improvements in the provision inserted in 1972. The Central Act did not make any provision in this behalf. 7. It is, however, contended that the said provision made by the Uttar Pradesh Act is inconsistent with the Code as amended by the Central Act because of the existence of Order XXXIX, R. 10 and O. VI, R. 16. These provisions are as follows: "Order XXXIX, R. 10. Deposit of money, etc., in Court. Where the subject-matter oi a suit is money or some other thing capable of delivery and any party thereto admits that he holds such money or other thing as a trustee for another party, or that it belongs or is due to another party, the court may order the same to be deposited in Court or delivered to such last named party, with or without security, subject to the further direction of the Court." Order VI, R. 16. Striking out pleadings. - The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended by any matter in any pleading - (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or. vexatious, or (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court". 8. In the context of Article 254 of the Constitution, three tests have been laid down for ascertaining repugnancy or inconsistency namely, (1) whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions, (2) whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and (3) whether the law made by the Parliament and law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field. (See Deep Chand v. State of U. P. (1959) Supp 2 SCR 8 : AIR 1959 SC 648 ). 9. It is obvious that there is no direct conflict between the provisions of O. XV, R. 5, as inserted by the Uttar Pradesh (Amendment) Act, and O. VI, R. 16 and O. XXXIX R. 10 quoted above. O- VI, R- 16 deals with the power of the Court to strike off defence for other reasons.
9. It is obvious that there is no direct conflict between the provisions of O. XV, R. 5, as inserted by the Uttar Pradesh (Amendment) Act, and O. VI, R. 16 and O. XXXIX R. 10 quoted above. O- VI, R- 16 deals with the power of the Court to strike off defence for other reasons. Those reasons are distinct and are valid in themselves, and it cannot be said that the same power should not be exercisable in the special situation mentioned in O. XV, R. 5. Likewise, O. XXXIX R. 10 gives power to the Court to order a party to deposit an admitted amount in Court and to pay the same to the party to whom it is due. That is a general provision. In the case of landlords and tenants, a special additional provision was made by the Uttar Pradesh Act. (Compare, for instance, Tabernacle Permanent Building Society v. Knight, 1892 AC 298). This special provision deals with the subject-matter covered by it and in considerable detail. There is obviously no inconsistency between this special provision and the general provision contained in O. XXXIX, R. 10. While the general provision is of an enabling nature this special provision is mandatory in effect. 10. The second test of repugnancy mentioned above is also not attracted in this case. Section 97 (1) itself leaves many amendments made by the State Legislature and High Courts before the commencement of the Central Act intact. The section does not say that all earlier local amendments shall stand repealed. It clearly says that only those local amendments shall stand repealed which are inconsistent with the principal Act as amended by the Central Act. Not only this even the power of the High Court, by way of delegated legislation, to make further amendments in the provisions of Schedule as amended by the Central Act has been left untouched. It is open to the High Court under Section 122 of the Code to annul, alter or add to any of the rules in the First Schedule, including those added or amended by the Central Act. There is nothing sacrosanct about the amendments made in the Schedule to the Code by the Central Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject-matter replacing all previous Acts of different State Legislatures. 11.
There is nothing sacrosanct about the amendments made in the Schedule to the Code by the Central Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject-matter replacing all previous Acts of different State Legislatures. 11. Again, as pointed out while discussing the application of the first mentioned test, the provisions contained in O. XXXIX, R. 10 and O. VI, R. 16 do not occupy the same field as that contained in O. XV, R. 5, though they may deal with cognate and allied matters. It is well settled that the onus of showing the State Legislation to be repugnant to the Central Legislation is on the party attacking the validity of the former. There is a presumption in favour of its continuing validity and every effort has to be made to reconcile them and construct both so as to avoid their being repugnant to each other, and care has to be taken to see whether the two do not really operate in different fields without encroachment. If it appears that the federal law is intended to be supplementary to or cumulative upon the State law, then no inconsistency can be said to arise- Inconsistency does not lie in the mere co-existence of two laws which are susceptible of simultaneous obedience. The subject-matter of the three provisions quoted above being separate and distinct, though of a cognate and allied character, it must be held that there is no inconsistency between them. 12. A similar view has been taken by Honble Prem Prakash, J. in Balbir Singh v. Atma Ram (1977 All WC 449), though by a different process of reasoning, while holding that the amendment of O. II, R. 2 made by the Uttar Pradesh Act remains unaffected by Section 97 (1) of the Central Act. 13. I, accordingly, find no force in this revision. It is hereby dismissed. No order is made as to costs.