JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This petition is directed against the order dated 23-12-1972 passed by the Assistant Sugar Commissioner, Central Zone, Sitapur in proceedings relating to assessment of sugar cane purchase tax. An order of assessment was passed against the petitioner by the Assessing Authority on 6-4-1971. This order was communicated to the petitioner on 23-4-1971. Under sub-sec. (5) of Section 3 of the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 the petitioner could file appeal within 30 days. This period of 30 days expired on 23-5-1971. It is not in dispute that 23rd May, 1971 was Sunday and the office of the Assistant Sugarcane Commissioner, opposite party No. 2, was closed on that date. The appeal was, accordingly, filed on 24-5-1971. This appeal was rejected by the impugned order by opposite party No. 2 on the basis that it was beyond time by one day. Another basis for rejecting the appeal was non-compliance of the proviso to sub-sec. (5) of Section 3 of the Act. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner Dr. R. K. Srivastava and Shri S. C. Misra learned counsel holding State brief. It was urged by Dr. Srivastava that the period of 30 days having expired on a closed day, the appeal could validly be filed on the next day. We find force in this argument. No arrangement has been brought to our notice under which the appeal could be filed before opposite party No. 2 on a closed day. In this view of the matter, the filing of the appeal on 24-5-1971 cannot be said to be in violation of the period of limitation prescribed by sub-sec. (5) of Section 3 of the Act 3. In taking the above view we are not oblivious of the tact that the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 (hereinaiter referred to as the Tax Act) is a special Act and the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been specially applied to the period of limitation prescribed under this Act and that under this Act there is no provision similar to one contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Tax Act prescribes its own forum for appeal and its own period of limitation. The Tax Act prescribes its own forum for appeal and its own period of limitation. But we are of the view that the principles contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act would be applicable even in cases where the provisions of Limitation Act do not apply. We take this view because otherwise we would be compelling the citizens to do the impossible. Under the Tax Act the period of limitation prescribed is of course, 30 days and an office may not remain closed for the entire period of limitation. But there may be special Acts prescribing shorter periods of limitation and during this entire period of limitation the office may remain closed. If we do not hold that an appeal in such a case could be filed on the reopening day, the citizen will be deprived of the right of appeal conferred upon him under statutory provisions- Obviously, when the office is closed and no arrangement has been made tor receiving the memorandum of appeal the citizen will not be able to file it anywhere and he will have to wait till the office is reopened. A situation similar to the one we are faced with in the present case came up before the Calcutta High Court in Hossein Ally v. Donzellee ((1880) ILR 5 Cal 906). The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court took the view that the principle that an application, appeal or suit may be filed on the reopening day even though there was no specific provision in that behalf was a rule of general application and should be applied even though no statutory provision existed in that behalf. Hossein Allys case (supra) was a case in which the defendant had been ordered to pay the arrears of rent due from him within fifteen days of the date of the decree. The decree further provided that on failure to deposit the amount within the specified period the defendant would be evicted from his holding. This order was made just two days before the closing of the Munsifs Court. The decree had been passed on 23-9-1978 and the Court of the learned Munsif was to reopen after closure on 28-10-1978. On 28-10-1978 when the Court reopened the defendant deposited the amount which he had been ordered to deposit within fifteen days under the decree dated 23-9-1978. The decree had been passed on 23-9-1978 and the Court of the learned Munsif was to reopen after closure on 28-10-1978. On 28-10-1978 when the Court reopened the defendant deposited the amount which he had been ordered to deposit within fifteen days under the decree dated 23-9-1978. There was no statutory provision which enabled the defendant to deposit the amount on the next working day but the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court applied the rule which now finds statutory recognition in Section 4 of the Limitation Act and held that the deposit was within time. In taking the view the learned Judges relied upon the decision reported in Mayer v. Harding ((1867) 2 QB 410) where the Queens Bench acted upon the rule that the law will not compel the doing of impossibilities. In our opinion, this rule of law is applicable to the facts of the present case also. In Nijabutoolla v. Wazir Ali, ((1882) ILR 8 Cal 910) it was observed by the learned Judge as follows: - "We think that the proper interpretation to be put upon Section 5 of the Limitation Act, considered along with Section 6, is that, except as defined in S- 6, the general provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to cases for which periods of limitation are specially provided by local or special laws; and that therefore Section 5 of the Limitation Act ought to have been allowed to operate in the present case." In this case a plaint was presented on the reopening day after the limitation had expired during the period when the Court was closed. 4. We are in respectful agreement with the observations made by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court and we adopt them in deciding the present writ petition. 5. The second ground for rejection of the appeal is related to the first proviso to sub-sec. (5) of Section 3 of the Tax Act which reads as follows: - . "Provided that except in the case of tax recoverable in accordance with Section 3-A appeal shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of payment of the amount admitted by the appellant to be due from him." The question for consideration is as to what is the true meaning to be assigned to the words "no appeal shall be entertained" occurring in the above proviso. Do these words refer to the entertainment of meme-randum of appeal or to appeal as distinguished from memorandum of appeal. If the word appeal refers to a memorandum of appeal, the appeal will be incompetent if it is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of payment and this proof of payment will have to be furnished at the time of filing the appeal. In other words, the proof of payment will also have to be furnished within the same time within which the appeal is to be preferred. If, however, entertainment of appeal connotes the stage when the authority concerned applies its mind to the merits of the appeal, the proof of payment of tax can be furnished up to the time the hearing of the appeal on merits starts- The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the latter interpretation would be the correct one. In support of his contention he cited a decision rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Asst. Commr. (Judicial), Kanpur, 21 STC 154 : ( AIR 1968 SC 488 ). This judgment was given in a case arising under Section 9 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. A provision very much similar to the proviso to sub-sec. (5) of Section 3 of the Tax Act occurs in Section 9 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. Under sub-sec. (1) of Section 9 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, an aggrieved party can file appeal before the appellate authority within 30 days from the date of service of the copy of the order, or notice of assessment- as the case may be. The first proviso to this sub-section reads as follows: - "Provided that no appeal against an assessment shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due or of such instalments thereof as may have become payable." 6. Thus under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Section 9 of the Sales Tax Act also entertainment of appeal is barred if satisfactory proof of payment is not furnished. Thus under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Section 9 of the Sales Tax Act also entertainment of appeal is barred if satisfactory proof of payment is not furnished. Interpreting the language of this proviso their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows (at p. 493 of AIR SC): - "It is quite obvious that the section as it stands only requires that at the time of the consideration of the appeal, there should be satisfactory proof that the admitted tax has been deposited." 7. Applying the dictum laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case, we find that the appeal was filed on 214-5-1971 and it came up for hearing before opposite party No. 2 on 18-12-1972. Before this date of hearing the amount of tax which the petitioner was required to deposit under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Tax Act was deposited on 22-10-1972. In view of the dictum laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the appeal was entertained on 18-12-1972 and before it was entertained the amount of tax had already been deposited. Thus the petitioner had complied with the requirements of the proviso to sub-sec. (5) of Section 3 of the Tax Act. In this view of the matter, the appellate authority committed a manifest error in rejecting the petitioners appeal for non-compliance of the said proviso. 8. In view of the above, the writ petition succeeds. It is hereby allowed and the order dated 23-12-1972 passed by opposite party No. 2 a copy of which is Annexure 5 to the writ petition is quashed. Opposite party No. 2 will now decide be appeal preferred by the petitioner in accordance with law.