JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - In this writ petition we are concerned with the interpretation of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent No. 4 Sri T. P. Singh was employed as an Office Assistant in the petitioner firm which carried on its business at 110, Factory Area, Fazalgan, Kanpur. It was alleged that the reason for appointment of the aforesaid respondent was that there were some disputes amongst the partners of the firm. Later, however, when those differences were resolved, the partners chose to perform the duties of the Office Assistant themselves and this made that post superfluous. In these circumstances the petitioner retrenched respondent No. 4 after serving on him retrenchment notice dated 4-2-1970. In the said notice the respondent No. 4 was asked to collect one month's salary as well as compensation as required under the provisions of the Act. The respondent No. 4 did not, however, approach the petitioner to collect the amount offered to him and consequently the petitioner by money order remitted one month's salary to the respondent No. 4 which he accepted. A very material circumstance in this case is that admittedly the respondent No. 4 had taken from the petitioner an advance of Rs. 725/- and Rs. 200/- as tour allowance. Thus, it is admitted that a total amount of Rs. 925/- had been received by the respondent No. 4 from the petitioner. 2. Since, however, a dispute arose between the parties and the Conciliation Officer failed to bring about a conciliation, the State Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court, Gorakhpur, Camp at Kanpur for adjudication by its referring order dated 28-8-1970. In those proceedings the respondent No. 4 raised a plea that he was given Rs. 170/- per month as official pay but over and above that he was also being paid a sum of Rs. 100/- per month, although the latter amount was never mentioned in writing. Thus, according to the respondent No. 4 his emoluments were Rs. 270/- per month. Another plea taken by the respondent No. 4 before the Labour Court was that his retrenchment was illegal and invalid, inasmuch as he had not paid one month's salary and the retrenchment compensation as required under the law. Thus, according to the respondent No. 4 his emoluments were Rs. 270/- per month. Another plea taken by the respondent No. 4 before the Labour Court was that his retrenchment was illegal and invalid, inasmuch as he had not paid one month's salary and the retrenchment compensation as required under the law. The respondent No. 4, however, clearly admitted before the Labour Court that he had worked with the firm for two years and three month's and he had accepted Rs. 170/- per month remitted to him by money order, which amount had been sent by the petitioner and that he had also taken an advance of Rs. 925/- from the petitioner firm. While dealing with the question of retrenchment the Labour Court was of the view that the respondent No. 4 had bolstered up a deliberately false case, that he had been receiving only Rs. 170/- per month's as salary and the contrary contention raised by him was false, that he had also taken Rs. 925/- from the petitioner as advance, that the respondent No. 4 had been paid one month's salary which he had accepted in lieu of retrenchment. However, after recording these findings the Labour Court came to the conclusion that since the retrenchment compensation for 15 days had not been actually paid to the respondent No. 4 and had, according to the petitioners allegation, to be adjusted with the advance given to the respondent No. 4, the retrenchment of the respondent No. 4 was invalid. Since, however, the Labour Court had also held that the respondent No. 4 had put up a case which was false throughout "from the beginning to the end," it did not consider it desirable to foist such an employee on the management. Hence, in spite of retrenchment the only relief granted by the Labour Court to the respondent was payment of salary for fourteen month's by the petitioner. In these terms the award dated 17-7-1972 was made by the Labour Court and published in the U.P. Gazette dated 23-9-1972 (Annexure A-1 to the writ petition) which has been impugned by the petitioner. 3. In these terms the award dated 17-7-1972 was made by the Labour Court and published in the U.P. Gazette dated 23-9-1972 (Annexure A-1 to the writ petition) which has been impugned by the petitioner. 3. Since on facts there is hardly any controversy between the parties, the sole point which arises for determination in this case is as to whether the petitioner was entitled to adjust the compensation for retrenchment payable to the respondent No. 4 in the amount of advance which the said respondent had admittedly taken from the management or was it imperative under the law that the amount of retrenchment compensation should be paid in cash to the employee. 4. Section 6-N of the Act reads : "6-N Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. - No workman employed in any industry who has been "in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer, until- (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice: Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies the date for the termination of service; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months, and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the State Government." 5. A plain reading of the above proviso would indicate that its underlying object is to give monetary assistance to a workman who is faced with the spectre of retrenchment. It cannot be doubted that retrenchment is a bleak event in the life of a workman as it deprives him of his ostensible means of livelihood. That is why, the Legislature has provided wholesome safeguards with the aid of which it may be possible for him to emerge unscathed from the crisis. The provisions of Section 6-N and the conditions (a) and (b) incorporated therein, are thus calculated to cushion the blow of retrenchment. They must, therefore, be regarded as conditions precedent to retrenchment and non-compliance with them, would vitiate the order of retrenchment. The provisions of Section 6-N and the conditions (a) and (b) incorporated therein, are thus calculated to cushion the blow of retrenchment. They must, therefore, be regarded as conditions precedent to retrenchment and non-compliance with them, would vitiate the order of retrenchment. Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 also prescribes the conditions precedent to the retrenchment of workmen and uses more or less the same phraseology. It provides :- Section 25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. - No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until : (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice wages for the period of the notice: Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent for 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six month's and; (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). 6. Clause (b) of the above section makes it incumbent upon the employer to pay compensation before effecting retrenchment. More or less analogous are the provisions of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The policy underlying the various Industrial Legislations clearly appears to be to afford financial aid to a workman who is suddenly deprived of his employment. That is why, whenever such a situation is imminent, Industrial Statutes take care that before the blow actually falls, the workman is provided some kind of financial sheet anchor on which he can fall back. 7. Section 33 (1) says that during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings etc., the conditions of service must remain unchanged, but sub-section (2) is an exception and permits the alteration of such terms in certain circumstances. 7. Section 33 (1) says that during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings etc., the conditions of service must remain unchanged, but sub-section (2) is an exception and permits the alteration of such terms in certain circumstances. This is, however, hedged in with a proviso which is very material: "Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer." The word 'paid' occurring in the proviso has been construed in numerous cases and it has been held that it is a condition precedent to an action contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 33, and the manner in which such payment may be made has also been considered in various rulings. Likewise, the word paid occurring in Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act or Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act has also been the subject of judicial interpretation. In Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, (1964) 1 Lab LJ 351 : ( AIR 1964 SC 1617 ), the Supreme Court held, "that clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F were obligatory and they had to be satisfied before a workman could be retrenched, that the hardship resulting from retrenchment had been partially redressed by these two clauses and there was every justification for making them conditions precedent." The object, as we have already observed, was to give some immediate relief to the workman in distress, and, as observed by the Supreme Court in Syndicate Bank Limited v. K. Ramnath v. Bhat ( AIR 1968 SC 231 ) : (1968 Lab IC 207) which again was a case dealing with the provisions under Section 33-B of the Industrial Disputes Act; "the payment of one month's salary or wages is to soften the rigour of unemployment that will face the workman against whom an order of discharge or dismissal has been passed." 8. The same passage was quoted in the Patna case which has been relied upon by the Tribunal in the instant case, but the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. The same passage was quoted in the Patna case which has been relied upon by the Tribunal in the instant case, but the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. In S. K. Chatterji v. District Signal Tele-Communication Engineer (1970) 21 FLR 37 : (1970 Lab IC 629), a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that the condition laid down in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F were mandatory and conditions precedent to retrenchment and if no retrenchment compensation was paid before the workmen were asked to go, the retrenchment order was bad in law and invalid. But it will be noticed that in that case no compensation was paid at all prior to the retrenchment. It was, in fact, paid after the order of retrenchment. The main grievance of the petitioner was that at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof, in excess of 6 months, had not been paid before the petitioners were retrenched. The admitted position in the case was that no such compensation before the retrenchment i. e. before the petitioners were asked to go, had been paid. No doubt, except one, the other petitioners had been paid compensation after the filing the writ petition in the High Court. But it was held that the entire order of retrenchment was invalid in law and subsequent payment of compensation could not validate it. In these circumstances the petitioners were ordered to be reinstated. 9. In the instant case the Labour Court in its impugned award placed special reliance on another Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Muzaffarpur Electricity Supply Company Limited v. S. K. Dutta (1970) 21 Fac LR 321, which reiterated the dictum that one month's wages must be paid or offered in full without any deduction or adjustment of any allegedly past dues and non-compliance with these provisions would render dismissal invalid. This Division Bench decision was regarded by the Tribunal as an authority for the principle that payment of wages or compensation for retrenchment provided by law must be actually made and the law did not permit any deductions or adjustment and that deductions or adjustments could not be regarded as equivalent of payment. This Division Bench decision was regarded by the Tribunal as an authority for the principle that payment of wages or compensation for retrenchment provided by law must be actually made and the law did not permit any deductions or adjustment and that deductions or adjustments could not be regarded as equivalent of payment. It is, however, essential to point out that it appears from the facts mentioned in the reports that there was some dispute between the parties as to whether the workmen owed money to the management on account of a loan. The employer's had deducted the amount on account of the balance of the Famine loan. Since however, the question of balance of Famine loan was a matter of dispute and not admitted, the view taken was that the deduction of the balance of such loan would not be a compliance with the Proviso to Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The ratio of the case is quite clear; where the facts are not admitted and the parties join issue on the question as to whether any previous loan is due, it cannot be said that prior to retrenchment or at the time of retrenchment the balance stands paid up by adjustment. The controversy in this regard can be resolved only subsequently in appropriate proceedings, and if the retrenchment order has already been passed, it would be a case of retrenchment without making the payment, which is a condition precedent. It can be easily culled from the various authorities, dealing with the conditions precedent to retrenchment that later payment would not validate such retrenchment. Where, however, the factum of an outstanding previous loan and its quantum is admitted by the workman and there is no need of any adjudication on that point, there is nothing in law or equity which may justify preclusion of adjustment because in such event, the effect of adjustment would be simultaneous liquidation of the loans. That is the vital distinction which must be drawn between the case in hand and the one decided by the Patna High Court which has been the basis of the Labour Court's Award. 10. That is the vital distinction which must be drawn between the case in hand and the one decided by the Patna High Court which has been the basis of the Labour Court's Award. 10. On a careful analysis of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, it appears to us that its main emphasis is on the point of time at which the retrenchment compensation must be paid and not the mode in which it is paid. The vital condition for effecting the retrenchment is that the compensation is made either simultaneously with or prior to the order of retrenchment. That alone would constitute sufficient compliance of the provisions of law. If the payment takes place after the retrenchment, the order would be vitiated. The same principle has been accepted as fully applicable to cases arising under Section 33 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. As held in the case of Straw Board Manufacturing Company v. Gobind (1962) 1 Lab LJ 420 : ( AIR 1962 SC 1500 ) by Wanchoo, J, "all the three things, namely, dismissal or discharge, payment of wages and making of an application for approval must be simultaneous and be parts of the same transaction." 11. The reason for not placing a literal, interpretation on the word 'paid' which has found favour with the Courts, is that such interpretation would militate against the canons of equity and justice. It is clear that an employer cannot compel an unwilling employee to accept one month's wages or the retrenchment compensation provided by law. If a literal interpretation is accepted, every act of retrenchment under Section 6-N would be easily defeated by the simple devise on the part of a workman of refusing to take the offered amount. In order to guard against such situation the consensus of authorities is that it is only the tender or offer of the retrenchment compensation which is a condition precedent to a valid order of retrenchment. The requirement of law, therefore, is merely this that the employer should tender the compensation to the concerned workman and that would amount to payment, for otherwise the workman can make this section nugatory by refusing to take the amount of compensation. The requirement of law, therefore, is merely this that the employer should tender the compensation to the concerned workman and that would amount to payment, for otherwise the workman can make this section nugatory by refusing to take the amount of compensation. The obvious fact that the employer can only tender the amount before the dismissal or retrenchment but cannot force the employee to receive the payment, is an unanswerable argument in favour of payment in the form of tender or offer. Thus, where such tender or offer has been proved, it will be a substantial compliance with Section 6-N and the order of retrenchment would be valid in law. 12. We have not been shown any provisions of law which militates against the acceptance of payment by adjustment as equivalent of payment where an outstanding debt is unequivocally admitted. In ordinary parlance payment means either actual payment in cash etc. or otherwise, including settlement of a debt. The legislature has advisedly used he expression paid and not actually paid. There is intrinsic indication in the labour Laws also which lends support to this ordinary connotation of the term paid. Thus for instance, under the Payment of Wages Act, wages have been defined as all remuneration (whether by way of salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money, or capable of being so expressed which would, if the terms of employment express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of Ins employment or of work done in such employment. Section 7 of the same Act deals with the deductions which may be made from wages and sub-sec. (2) thereof, enumerates the various kinds of deductions which may be legally made. Cl. (f) of sub-section (2) relates to "deductions for recovery of advances of whatever nature including advances for travelling allowance or conveyance allowance and the interest due in respect thereof, or for adjustment of over payment of wages." This shows that Industrial Law places a restriction as to the extent to which deductions from wages may be legitimately made. Wages, as the definition shows, include allowances also, but deductions from wages "including allowances etc." are expressly permitted by law. This indicates that in Industrial Law, the policy of the Legislature has not been to insist invariably on actual payment of remuneration etc. Wages, as the definition shows, include allowances also, but deductions from wages "including allowances etc." are expressly permitted by law. This indicates that in Industrial Law, the policy of the Legislature has not been to insist invariably on actual payment of remuneration etc. By analogy the same principle should be adopted in case of retrenchment also and the word 'paid' should be liberally construed so as to include notional payment where the facts are not disputed. 13. It is trite that the essence of law is its substantial compliance and a literal interpretation which would either lead to absurdity or have the effect of defeating the very object of a provision or making it a dead letter must be discarded. To quote only one instance in support of this proposition, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Nanak Chand Jain, (1964) 1 Lab LJ 392 : ( AIR 1965 SC 122 ). The dispute arose under the Sastri Award. Para 521 (2) (c) of the Sastri Award required payment of three month's pay and allowances in cases of termination of services, covered by the said provision. The workman concerned was paid three month's salary on the termination of service in lieu of notice in terms of paragraph 521 (2) (c) of the Sastri Award. An application for approval in respect of the employee was made, as required by the proviso to Section 33 (2) (b). The Tribunal putting a literal construction on the proviso rejected the application on the ground that one month's wages had not been paid, as required. It will be seen that in accordance with the terms of the Sastri Award, salary for three month's was paid, still the Tribunal did not approve of the application on the ground that the literal terms of Section 33 (2) (b) namely, one month's wages, had not been satisfied. The Supreme Court in appeal by Special Leave, held that three month's salary in such cases would include the payment of one month's salary, as required, hence no separate payment of one month's salary need be made. 14. The Supreme Court in appeal by Special Leave, held that three month's salary in such cases would include the payment of one month's salary, as required, hence no separate payment of one month's salary need be made. 14. Thus, on a careful consideration of the facts of the present case and the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, we are satisfied that the retrenchment of the respondent No. 4 Sri T. P. Singh did not contravene the provisions of law which had been substantially, complied with and the retrenchment order was, therefore, not invalid or illegal. 15. This petition, therefore, succeeds and a writ of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned award dated 17th of July, 1972. As no one has appeared on behalf of the respondent, we make no order as to costs.