RUKMANI DEVI KABRA v. NARENDRA KUMAR SUKHCHAND SHA
1978-12-04
C.P.SEN, FAIZAN UDDIN
body1978
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent preferred by the defendants against the decree for eviction passed against them by the Courts below and affirmed by the learned Single Judge. ( 2. ) THE plaintiffs case is that they are owners of the suit house situated in the main market of Sagar, the house having fallen to their share in the family partition of 23-11-1967. The original defendant Bansidhar was tenant in the suit house on a monthly rent of Rs. 34, his tenancy commencing on the 1st of each English calendar month. He was doing business in Ghee in the suit house. By notice Ex. P-13 dated 1-3-68 the plaintiffs terminated the tenancy of the defendant with effect from 31-3-68. The notice was received by the defendant on 6-3-68. Since the defendant did not vacate the suit house, this suit has been filed claiming eviction on the ground that the plaintiffs require the suit house for carrying on their money-lending business. The suit has been filed on 17-4-68. The defendant in his written statement submitted that the tenancy was from Diwali to Diwali every year and the rent was also payable on Diwali. The suit was decreed by the trial Court, affirmed by the lower appellate Court and further affirmed in second appeal by this Court holding that the tenancy was monthly and it commenced on the 1st of each English calendar month and it has been validly terminated by quit notice Ex. P. 13. The plaintiffs bona fide require the suit house for starting their money-lending business. The 2 documents Exs. D. 1 and D. 2 were inadmissible in evidence as they purported to create yearly lease but were not registered. ( 3. ) THE only question for consideration in this appeal is whether the defendants tenancy was validly terminated by quit notice Ex. P. 13. ( 4. ) THE contention of the appellants is that since the lease was from diwali to Diwali, it required no registration i e. governed according to lunar year. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act requires that a lease for year or more or reserving yearly rent has to be by a registered instrument. year according to General Clauses Act is the British calendar year i. e. 365 days, whereas lunar year is less than 365 days.
Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act requires that a lease for year or more or reserving yearly rent has to be by a registered instrument. year according to General Clauses Act is the British calendar year i. e. 365 days, whereas lunar year is less than 365 days. This being the position, the lease could be created without a registered instrument. Exs. D. 1 and d. 2 are only rent receipts and it has been wrongly held by the Courts below that these documents could not be looked into for want of registration. These documents clearly show that the tenancy commenced on the next day of diwali i. e. on 3-11-67 and, as such, the tenancy would terminate on the 2nd of next month. The quit notice is invalid as it terminated the tenancy on the last date of the month and not on the 2nd of the next month. The respondents on the other hand contended that the tenancy was monthly and as per Ex. P. 13 the tenancy was terminated with effect from 31-3-68 or from any such other date falling after 15 days of the receipt of the notice which, according to the defendant, is the last date of the tenancy month. ( 5. ) IT is not possible to construe the word year mentioned in section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act to be the year according to English calendar, year to year means period consisting of 12 months, it may be according to Samvat year or English calendar year. It is true that section 3 in General Clauses Act defines year as English calendar year. Section 3 is only applicable to all Central Acts and Regulations which have been enacted after the enactment of the General Clauses Act. General Clauses Act was enacted in 1897 while Transfer of Property Act is of the year 1882. The transfer Property Act being enactment of the earlier period, the definition given in section 3 cannot be strictly applied to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a matter of contract between the parties as to which year, Samvat or English Calendar, that has to govern lease in a particular case.
The transfer Property Act being enactment of the earlier period, the definition given in section 3 cannot be strictly applied to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a matter of contract between the parties as to which year, Samvat or English Calendar, that has to govern lease in a particular case. Section 107 of the Transfer Property Act requires that a lease from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving yearly rent can only be made by a registered instrument. Here, there is no registered instrument creating a lease in favour of the defendant. The only documents relied upon by the defendant are the rent receipts Exs. D. 1 and D. 2 showing payment of annual rent on the Diwali every year. These documents do not create any lease but they are only evidence of payment of rent, but these documents were wrongly shut out from evidence on the wrong assumption that they were compulsorily registerable. Even if these 2 receipts are taken into consideration showing payment of rent annually, this will not prove any annual lease in favour of the defendant. The Supreme Court in Ram kumar v. Jagdish Chandra, (AIR 1952 S C 23.) has held that if a lease is inoperative under law, mere acceptance of yearly rent will not make it an annual lease. Tenancy from month to month arises by implication of law. In the present case, tenancy was not for agricultural or manufacturing purposes and, therefore, tenancy could be validly terminated under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act by giving 15 days notice terminating it at the end of the tenancy month. Though the plaintiff proceeded with the assumption that the tenancy commenced on the lst of each English Calendar month and accordingly the tenancy was terminated with effect from 31-8-68, but an option was given to the defendant to treat the tenancy terminated on such other date, which according to the defendant terminated the tenancy month, such a notice is quite a valid notice. A Division Bench of this Court in Rochaldas v. Ratanchand, (1954 N L J 436.) has held that notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act has not to be given with all the particularity of a pleading. Naturally, therefore, it is not subject to strict interpretation.
A Division Bench of this Court in Rochaldas v. Ratanchand, (1954 N L J 436.) has held that notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act has not to be given with all the particularity of a pleading. Naturally, therefore, it is not subject to strict interpretation. A liberal construction has to be put upon the notice so as to find out the true intention of the party giving the notice and whether the party served with the notice could understand it in the sense meant by the giver of the notice. It has further been held that the tenant never disclosed what was the term of his tenancy. He was only interested in denying what the landlord alleged. In such circumstances the landlord could do no better than leave the tenant to decide for himself on which day of the month his tenancy would terminate, because in the case of a monthly tenancy he can delay the process at the utmost by 31 days and the notice was valid. In the present case, the appellants in their memo of appeal have pleaded that the tenancy commenced from 3-11 67 i. e. the day after the date of Diwali in that year. Therefore, the tenancy month terminated on the 2nd of next month. As per quit notice ex. P. 13 the tenancy stood terminated on 2-4-68 as per the option given to the defendant and not on 31-3-68 as alleged in the notice. Under the circumstances, the notice in question validly terminated the tenancy of the defendant. No other question arises in this appeal. ( 6. ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee as per schedule, if certified. Appeal dismissed.