JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a landlord's writ petition filed against a judgment of the Third Additional District Judge, Nainital dated 22-9-1977. 2. Haji Mumtaz Hussain, the petitioner was the owner of a three stories building situated at Kashere Bazar, Haldwani. One of the shops of this building had been let out to Sardar Trilok Singh respondent No. 3. On 30th April, 1975 the whole of the building, including the shop which had been tenanted by Sardar Trilok Singh, respondent No. 3 was completely destroyed by a fire. On 2nd June, 1975 an application under Section 21(1) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972) was filed by the petitioner for release of the shop which had been let out to respondent No. 3. In this application the petitioner alleged that the shop which had been let out to respondent No. 3 was required by him for setting up his sons. The application was contested by respondent No. 3. He challenged that the need of the petitioner was bonafide and also claimed that under Section 29 of the U.P Act No. XIII of 1972 the respondent no. 3 had a right to construct the shop in place of the one which was gutted by fire and that the application filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application against which respondent No. 3 went up in appeal to the District Judge. The appeal was allowed and the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was set aside. Consequent upon the allowing of the appeal, the application filed by the petitioner stood dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition. 3. The main question that arises for determination in this writ petition is about the maintainability of the application filed by the petitioner under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. An application under section 21 of the Act can be filed by a landlord for release of a building let out to a tenant on the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of the said section. It is important to be noted that an application under this section can be filed for the eviction of a tenant from the building under this tenancy. It is important to be noted that an application under this section can be filed for the eviction of a tenant from the building under this tenancy. The word "building" has been defined in section 3(i) of the said Act. It means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes : (i) Any land (including any garden) garage and out houses pertaining to such building ; (ii) Any furniture supplied by the landlord for use and such fitting (iii) Any fittings and fixtures affixed to such buildings for more beneficial enjoyment thereof ; It would, therefore, be seen from the definition given above that in order to attract section 21, it is necessary that the building in respect of which an application can be filed under section 21 must be a residential or non- residential roofed structure. In the instant case the whole of the building was gutted by fire and that only open piece of land was left. In this background it appears that the application filed under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not maintainable. It is only where a building exists that the question of applying clause (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 21 can arise. Under clause (a) a landlord is required to establish that his requirement is bona fide for the purposes of satisfying his need, in the present form or after demolition and reconstruction, whereas under clause (b) an application can be filed only where the building is in a dilapidated condition. For attracting clause (a) or. (b) therefore, an existence of a building is necessary. If a building, let out to a tenant is completely destroyed in consequence of a fire, tempest, flood or excessive rain-fall or due to collective disturbances etc. an application under section 21 of the Act is not required to be filed. In such an event, there would be no occasion for the authorities to determine either that the need of a landlord for occupying the building is genuine or that the building is required to be demolished. Thus section 21 can be applied only when a building exists. 4. In Sitaram v. R.A. Muni, 1965 A.L.G. 689. a similar controversy came up for decision, before this court. In that case the defendant was let out an Aliuta. Thus section 21 can be applied only when a building exists. 4. In Sitaram v. R.A. Muni, 1965 A.L.G. 689. a similar controversy came up for decision, before this court. In that case the defendant was let out an Aliuta. This was acquired by the State Government under the U.P. Land Acquisition Act M.P. Act No. 26 of 1958). After acquiring the Alrata, the State Government demolished the entire constructions. It, however, appears that the acquisition made by the State Government was challenged by the owner of the house in this court. The challenge succeeded and the notification acquiring the land was quashed. There upon the State Government released the land vide notification and gave its possession to the tenant. Thereafter the owners determined the lease and filed a suit for ejectment. One of the controversies which arose in the suit was whether the suit of the plaintiff was maintainable without complying with the requirement of section 3 of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. Dealing with this controversy, a learned Single Judge of this count held that for being an accommodation it was essential that there should have been a building in existence and since no building existed, the suit could be filed for dispossession of the tenant without complying with the requirement of section 3 of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. 5. The word "building" as defined is akin to the word 'accommodation' used in section 3 of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. The statutory definition of the word 'building' is not in any manner inconsistent with the normal meaning of the building as used in common parlance i.e. an edific or structure. In Purshottanidas v. VIII Additional District Judge, 1976 A.W.C. 308, a learned single Judge held that the term "building" has the same meaning which could be equated with accommodation. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Modh. Shafi v. Additional District Judge, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 836. 6. It would thus appear that as no building existed on the spot in dispute the application filed by the petitioner for release of the premises was not maintainable. 7. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Modh. Shafi v. Additional District Judge, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 836. 6. It would thus appear that as no building existed on the spot in dispute the application filed by the petitioner for release of the premises was not maintainable. 7. Sri S. P. Gupta, counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that since respondent No. 3 was claiming protection on the basis of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Act and was asserting that he had a right to construct on the site of the old premises, the petitioner had no alternative but to prefer an application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It takes us to the consideration of the right which was asserted by respondent No. 3. Sub-section (2) of section 29 reads as under :- "(1) * * * (2) Where in consequence of fire, tempest, flood or excessive rain- fall any, building under tenancy is wholly or partly destroyed, the tenants shall have the right to re-erect or repair it wholly or partly as the case may be, at his own expenditure after giving a notice in writing to the landlord within a period of one month from such injury Provided that the tenants shall not be entitled to avail himself of the benefit of this provision ; (a) If x x x (b) In respect of any re-erection or repair made before he has given a notice as aforesaid to the landlord or before the expiration of a period of fifteen days after such notice, or if the landlord in the meantime makes an application under section 21, before the disposal of such application ; or (c) x x x (3) x x x (a) x x x (b) x x x (c) x x x Provided that no application shall be maintainable under section 21 in respect of any such building on the ground mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1) thereof within a period of three years from the completion of such re-erection." It would be noticed that the right conferred by sub-section (2) of section 29 is only with respect of "any building under tenancy". Accordingly, a tenant can construct a building if it is destroyed by one or more of the reasons mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 29 by following the procedure laid down therein. Accordingly, a tenant can construct a building if it is destroyed by one or more of the reasons mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 29 by following the procedure laid down therein. He does not have a right to construct a portion of a building which had not been let out to him. The right conferred by sub-section (2) of section 29 can be applied only to a situation covered by the aforesaid provision. It cannot be extended or applied to a matter or situation which is not covered under it. The point can be illustrated by taking a simple example. Supposing that a tenant was let out the first floor of a building having three stories. If this building is destroyed the tenant will not be able to base his claim of construction on the basis of sub-section (2) of section 29. To concede the right of construction to such a tenant would amount to putting a construction of sub-section (2) of section 29 which is not warranted by its language or the context. 8. Sri L.P. Naithani, counsel for the tenant, however, contended that since the right of construction has been given to a tenant of a building which had been let out to him, respondent No. 3 was entitled to construct the shop at the place where it originally stood. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 does not appear to be correct. As already observed above, if the whole of the building which has been let out to a tenant, is destroyed by any of the reasons mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 29, the tenant would certainly have a right to construct the building. But where, as here, a portion of the building alone was let out, the tenant cannot have a right to reconstruct. By accepting the submission made by respondent No. 3 the right of ownership of a building by a landlord or owner would be seriously affected. This cannot be the purpose of sub-section (2) of section 29. A court is not entitled to make an interpretation of a provision which may lead to absurd results. This being so, the building of which the shop in dispute was a part being a three storied building the respondent No. 3 could not be conceded the right to construct his shop. 9. A court is not entitled to make an interpretation of a provision which may lead to absurd results. This being so, the building of which the shop in dispute was a part being a three storied building the respondent No. 3 could not be conceded the right to construct his shop. 9. Sri S. P. Gupta, counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, pointed out that as the tenancy of respondent No. 3 was frustrated because of the fire, the petitioner had a right to evict respondent No. 3. The submission was made on the basis of section 56 of the Transfer of Property Act. It has been held by the Supreme Court in two cases reported in :- (1) Smt. Sushila Devi and another v. Hari Singh and others, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1756. (2) Raja Dhruv Deo Chand v. Harmohinder Singh, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1024. that section 56 of the Transfer of Property Act applies only to a case of an agreement and does not apply to a case of a completed contract. According to the view taken in these cases it is clear that once a valid lease come into existence, the agreement to lease disappears. It was observed in this case "there is a clear distinction between a completed conveyance and an executory contract. Events which discharge a contract do not invalidate a concluded transfer." 10. In the instant case it would be seen that the house was let out by the petitioner to respondent No. 3 much before the house was destroyed by fire. The relationship of landlord and tenant was in the existence and a lease from month to month was in operation. Accordingly, the question of applying section 56 of the Transfer Property Act did not arise. 11. Reference was next made to section 108(c) of the Transfer of Property Act which deals with the rights and liabilities of a tenant and landlord. Section 108(e) reads : "108(e) - If by fire tempest or flood, or, violence of an army or of a mob, or other irresistible force, any material part of the property be wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purpose for which it was let, the lease shall at the option of the lessee, be void." Section 108 of the Transfer or Property Act governs the rights and obligations of a lessor and lessee. By this section an option has been left with the tenant or lessee to treat the lease as void and to surrender the possession of the property to the lessor. The destruction of the lease of whole property under the circumstances mentioned in section 108 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act by itself does not amount to a determination of the lease under section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. It would mean that upon the destruction of the property the tenancy is not automatically determined. The lessee being a sufferer the legislature has left open to such a lessee to continue in a premises as a tenant if he so desires. It, therefore, appears that in the event of a happening mentioned in clause (c) of Section 108 the Transfer of Property Act, the lessee rights of a tenant did not come to an end and that the option is left with him to continue in possession. That being so, respondent No. 3 although was a tenant but as the building let out to him did not exist the application filed by the petitioner under section 21 was liable to be dismissed. 12. In view of what I have said above, it is not necessary for inc to examine the respective cases of the parties and to decide whether the petitioner was entitled to the release of the premises under section 21 of U P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Similarly, the Prescribed Authority and appellate authority should have also rejected the application on this ground. 13. Subject to the above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to the costs.