ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the Civil Judge Jalaun at Orai, dated 11-4-1977 in Ceiling Appeal No. 413 of 1976 Ram Sanehi v. State of U. P. as well as in Ceiling Appeal No. 412 of 1976, Shri Bishambhar Nath v. State of U. P. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details the following facts give rise to the present writ petition: - Notice under Sec. 10 (2) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act was served upon Ram Sanehi, petitioner No. 1, to show cause as to why 42.51 acres land may not be declared as his surplus area. The aforesaid Ram Sanehi filed objections to the effect that certain plots belonging to his sons were wrongly indicated as the holding of the aforesaid tenure-holder (Ram Sanehi). He has also contended that he has gifted some plots to his sons, hence the same should have been treated as the property of the donees. He also filed objection to the effect that certain plots were ancestral property in which his sons had share and their share should be excluded from the holding shown in the name of the petitioner No. 1 (Ram Sanehi tenure-holder). 3. Another objection on behalf of Bishambher Nath and Vinai Kumar, sons of the tenure-holder namely Ram Sanehi, was filed wherein they had also asserted that they had share in ancestral property and that they had purchased certain plots in their own names and that they were separate from their father, hence, their plots were wrongly clubbed with the holding of their father and the same should be excluded from the holding of their father and that they were not possessed of any surplus area. 4. The prescribed authority through its judgment dated 30-6-1976 declared 41.08 acres surplus area of the petition No. 1 (Ram Sanehi-tenure-holder). The prescribed authority substantially rejected the contentions raised on behalf of the objectors. In appeal, the appellate authority through its judgment dated 11-4-1977 accepted the contention of the objectors to this extent that the petitioner No.1 (Ram Sanehi-tenure-holder) had only l/3rd share in the plots which were coming down from the time of their ancestors. In the aforesaid plots the share of petitioner No. 1 was held as l/3rd and to this extent the judgment of the prescribed authority was modified by the appellate authority. In the aforesaid plots the share of petitioner No. 1 was held as l/3rd and to this extent the judgment of the prescribed authority was modified by the appellate authority. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate authority the petitioners have come to this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the appellate authority has patently erred in holding the petitioners unirrigated land as irrigated one. 6. Secondly, he has contended that the property even purchased by the father (petitioner No. 1) in the name of his sons (petitioners Nos. 2 and 3) has been erroneously held to be the exclusive property of the petitioner No. 1. 7. Thirdly, he has contended that if a son of the petitioner No. 1 had got a decree against third person in respect of a plot, that plot should never have been treated as the property of the father and in this way he has emphasised that the appellate Authority has patently erred in treating even that plot as the property of petitioner No. 1. 8. The learned counsel for the State has tried to refute the contentions, raised on behalf of the petitioners and he has submitted that the findings of fact recorded by the appellate authority in the present case should not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction of this Court. 9. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I think that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners have force. As regards the petitioners contention with regard to unirrigated land, I quote the following finding given by the appellate authority which is in the following words: - "................ I have mentioned it be- cause of the fact that a lot of confusion was sought to be introduced by learned counsel for the appellant while arguing this point, while showing the irrigated land has wrongly been calculated each and every time it was repeated that it was khata of Bishambhar Nath and Vinaya Kumar with the result it cannot be ascertained at any time during the course of argument in spite of repeated reminders whether the point of separate title was raised on calculation of irrigated and single crop irrigated land was being challenged. However, I have made my best endeavours to check the calculation of these plots from the extract of Khasra and have found that there is no mistake in them. In my opinion the matter would have been more clarified if the learned counsel has paid heed to my request to keep the matter separate. But so far as I am able to ascertain the calculation of the learned Prescribed Authority are quite justified." 10. The Prescribed Authority has dealt with the question of unirrigated land claimed by the petitioner in the last paragraph of its judgment. Perusal of the aforesaid para does not give me an idea that the Prescribed Authority has examined the petitioners claim with regard to unirrigated land in consonance with the dictum of law laid down by this Court in AIR 1978 All 9 Ghasi Ram v. State nor the Prescribed Authority has also indicated the class and composition of the soil which may be termed as capable of producing two crops in any of the relevant years. The Prescribed Authority has not examined the petitioners claim in the light of the dictum of law laid down in 1978 All WC 205: (1978 All LJ NOC 18) Mahendra Singh v. State. Thus I find that the determination of petitioners unirrigated land as irrigated one, suffers from mistake of law apparent on the face of the record. The Prescribed Authority has failed to indicate as to whether the provision of Section 4-A firstly or Section 4-A thirdly is applicable to the facts of the present case and the Prescribed Authority has not indicated the essential ingredients which were necessary for determining a particular plot as irrigated one in view of the provisions of Section 4-A of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The judgment of the Prescribed Authority being patently erroneous on the aforesaid point should have been disturbed by the appellate authority but the appellate authority has also queerly held that the calculation of the learned Prescribed Authority was quite justified. Mere look at the relevant extracts, i.e. 1378 Fasli to 1380 Fasli would have indicated that the plots could be termed as irrigated or not but none of the authorities have given the details of the entries the area over which two crops had been grown. In this way their judgments are untenable in law and deserve to be quashed. 11. In this way their judgments are untenable in law and deserve to be quashed. 11. As regards the petitioners contention that the property purchased by the father in the name of the sons should have been treated as exclusive property of the tenure-holder, namely petitioner No. 1, I think that the contentions have force. Even if the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 were members of a joint Hindu family and if the property was purchased by the father with joint family funds in the name of his sons, the property cannot be treated as exclusive property of the father. All the sons with their father will have right in the property, if it has been purchased by the joint family fund even in the name of any of the sons. Though ordinarily when a property stands in the name of a tenure-holder presumption is that it is his property. In the present case I do not find that the appellate authority has recorded any categorical finding that the purchase in the name of the sons was either Benami or fictitious. In this view of the law it is proper that the appellate authority should re-examine the petitioners claim with regard to the plots standing in the name of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 and it should record a categorical finding as to whether those plots were ostensibly held by the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 or they had share in the property or they were exclusive owners of the property if those plots were acquired by their separate income. Since necessary findings are wanting in the present case I think it proper to ask the appellate authority to examine the claim of the petitioners in the light of the evidence on record and the observations made above. 12. Lastly, the appellate authority has repelled the contention of the petitioner with regard to an area of 1.16 acres which was claimed by Bishambhar Nath petitioner No. 2 on the basis of a decree against Smt. Lakshminiya. The claim of petitioner No. 2 was negatived on the ground that the separation alleged by petitioner No. 2 was not established. 12. Lastly, the appellate authority has repelled the contention of the petitioner with regard to an area of 1.16 acres which was claimed by Bishambhar Nath petitioner No. 2 on the basis of a decree against Smt. Lakshminiya. The claim of petitioner No. 2 was negatived on the ground that the separation alleged by petitioner No. 2 was not established. It is well known that even if a member of a joint Hindu family can acquire property separately, if the aforesaid area had really been acquired by Bishambhar Nath, there is no reason why that decree should not be accepted at its face value unless the appellate authority comes to the conclusion that, that acquisition by Bishambhar Nath was also in representative capacity or for the joint family or it was only in the name of Bishambhar Nath and really it was obtained by petitioner No. 1. I think that the appellate authority has not approached the problem from correct angle. Hence, its findings deserve to be quashed. 13. As I have indicated above, the petitioners claim with regard to unirrigated land and its finding on other points are also not an correct appraisal of the situation involved, it is desirable that the appellate authority should be asked to redetermine the claim of the petitioner afresh. 14. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the appellate authority is hereby quashed and the appellate authority is directed to decide the claim of the petitioners afresh in the light of the observations made above. No order as to costs.