JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE short point for our decision is about the meaning of the word imposition occurring in section 159 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats act, 1962 (here-in-after called the Act ). The question is whether the word imposition in the context means only the stage commencing with assessment or quantification of tax with reference to an ascertained person after authority to levy it has been acquired or also the initial stage of acquisition of authority to levy the same. ( 2. ) THE relevant facts, which have led to the filing of this petition, are these: The Janapada Panchayat, Rehli, District Sagar, passed a resolution to impose a tax called show tax as permitted by section 157 (b) of the Act with effect from 1-4-1973 at rates which were specified in its resolutions (Annexures A and B ). The respondent No. 2 is the owner of Kalpna Talkies at Rehli. As a result of this imposition, the respondent No. 2 became a person liable to pay the tax with effect from 1-4-1973. Accordingly, an intimation Annexure-C dated 1-3-1973 was sent by the Janapada Panchayat to respondent No. 2 intimating the fact that the tax would become recoverable from 1-4-1973 and for this purpose the Janapada Panchayat requested the respondent No. 2 to furnish certain details of the number of cinema-shows every month in the cinema-hall of respondent No. 2. It is significant that no demand of any specific amount was made therein for the obvious reason that the tax was to be payable only from a future date. The respondent No. 2 replied by Annexare- D dated 8-3-1973 requesting the Janapada Panchayat to reconsider the question of imposing this levy. Apart from this, the respondent No. 2 filed as appeal annexure- F to the Collector, Sagar, under section 159 of the Act, since the collector is the prescribed authority for hearing the appeals under that provision. Before the Collector, it appears, the Janapada Panchayat agreed to give a hearing to respondent No 2 and not to recover any tax till then. Consequently, such a consent order Annexure- J dated 23-7-1973 was passed by the collector to this effect. ( 3. Before the Collector, it appears, the Janapada Panchayat agreed to give a hearing to respondent No 2 and not to recover any tax till then. Consequently, such a consent order Annexure- J dated 23-7-1973 was passed by the collector to this effect. ( 3. ) THE Janapada Panchayat has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the Collectors order annexure- J dated 23-7-1973 passed in the appeal under section 159 of the Act. The only argument of Shri P. C. Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that such as appeal was incompetent under section 159 of the Act since the provision of appeal does not permit any challenge to the authority to levy the tax but only to an assessment or demand of tax from any particular person after the same has become payable. It is argued that such a situation had not reached in the present case and the only challenge by the respondent No. 2 in his appeal being to the authority to levy tax and not to any assessment or specific demand made from him after acquisition of that authority, the appeal was not maintainable. The reply on behalf of respondent No. 2 is that the word imposition occurring in section 159 is wide enough to permit a challenge also to the authority to levy tax, so that a person like the respondent No. 2, who would become liable for payment of the tax after its enforcement, can file an appeal under section 159 of the Act challenging merely the acquisition of that authority or, in other words, the decision to impose the tax under section 157 of the Act. This is how the above point arises for our decision. ( 4. ) CHAPTER XIII of the Act relating to "imposition of taxes and fees and recovery of claims" contains sections 157 to 165 The sections relevant for our purpose are sections 157, 158, 159 and 165, which are as follows :- "157. Levy of taxes and fees.- Subject to the provisions of this Act, and to such conditions and exceptions as may be prescribed, every Janapada Panchayat shall impose the following taxes, namely :- (a) a toll on new bridges constructed by the Janapada Panchayat; (b) a tax on theatres, theatrical performances and other shows for public amusement. 158. Levy of taxes and fees.- Subject to the provisions of this Act, and to such conditions and exceptions as may be prescribed, every Janapada Panchayat shall impose the following taxes, namely :- (a) a toll on new bridges constructed by the Janapada Panchayat; (b) a tax on theatres, theatrical performances and other shows for public amusement. 158. Power of State Government to regulate terms.- The State Government may, by rules made under this Act, regulate the imposition, assessment and collection of taxes mentioned in section 157 and matters ancillary thereto. (2) No objection shall be taken to any assessment nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned otherwise than in accordance with the provision of this Act or of the rules made thereunder. 159. Appeal against taxation.- Any person aggrieved by the imposition of any tax imposed under section 157 may appeal to the prescribed authority in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, and his decision shall be final. 165. Power of State Government in matters of taxation.- The State Government may, after consultation with the Janapada Panchayat at any time by notification,- (a) reduce the rate of any tax; (b) exempt from the payment of any such tax, any person or any class of persons or any property or class of properties; (c) suspend or thereafter re-impose any tax; (d) abolish or thereafter re impose any tax; subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be specified in the notification. " ( 5. ) SECTION 157 enables the Janapada Panchayat to impose the taxes known as toll tax and show tax. Sub section (1) of section 158 enables the state Government to frame rules to regulate the imposition, assessment and collection of these taxes and to provide for ancillary matters. Sub-section (2) then lays down that no objection to any assessment or to the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder. Obviously, section 159 provides the manner of taking such an objection spoken of in sub-section (2) of section 158. Sub-section (2) then lays down that no objection to any assessment or to the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder. Obviously, section 159 provides the manner of taking such an objection spoken of in sub-section (2) of section 158. It may here be mentioned that while subsection (1) of section 158 speaks of imposition, assessment and collection as three distinct stages in the process of taxation, sub-section (2) does not speak of any objection being permitted against imposition, i. e. the initial stage of acquiring authority to levy the tax, but contemplates an objection only from the subsequent stage of assessment of the tax. Section 159 provides an appeal against taxation and says that the appeal lies against imposition of the tax in the manner prescribed. The expression used in section 159 is imposition alone and that is how the difficulty arises. However, for a harmonious construction, the appeal provided in section 159 should be confined only to the extent permitted under section 158 (2 ). Section 165 also throws light on this problem. It reserves to the State Government the right, inter alia to reduce, suspend, abolish or re-impose the tax. Section 165, therefore, is an express provision enabling the State Government after the tax has been imposed to exercise any of these powers which permit a reduction in the rate of tax, its suspension for any period of time, its total abolition and subsequently its re-imposition. It is, therefore, clear that by virtue of section 165, at any time after authority to levy the tax has been acquired by the Janapada Panchayat, the State Government can exercise any of these powers if it deems fit to do so. In other words, it is not as if there is no provision in the Act to control the action of the Janapada Panchayat after the tax has been duly imposed and brought into force. This power has been expressly given to the State Government. If the counsel for respondent No. 2 is right, then the power so given to the State Government under section 165 will also be exercisable by the prescribed authority, i. e. Collector while deciding an appeal under section 159 of the Act at the instance of any tax-payer. ( 6. This power has been expressly given to the State Government. If the counsel for respondent No. 2 is right, then the power so given to the State Government under section 165 will also be exercisable by the prescribed authority, i. e. Collector while deciding an appeal under section 159 of the Act at the instance of any tax-payer. ( 6. ) THE question, therefore, is whether we should accept this position simply because the only word used in section 159 is imposition which ordinarily is wide enough to include also the initial stage of acquisition of authority to levy the tax. There is yet another consequence which would follow if we accept the construction suggested on behalf of respondent No. 2. The result would be that every tax payer would be entitled to file a separate appeal challenging even the authority to levy the tax and this can go on endlessly after the tax has been brought into force. May be, every tax-payer can also repeat his challenge with each demand for payment of the tax. This appears to be a very unusual consequence and unless such a construction is inevitable, it would be appropriate to reject the same for the absurdity it would lead to. ( 7. ) SECTION 159 provides for an appeal in the manner prescribed. As such, the rules framed for the purpose also are relevant for construing the word imposition occurring in section 159. Two sets of rules framed by the state Government known as the madhya Pradesh Janapada Panchayats theatre Tax (Regulation of the Imposition, Assessment and Collection) Rules, 1963 (here in after called the 1963 Rules) and those framed in 1962 under section 159 may also be referred to. The 1963 Rules use the word imposition loosely in connection with the tax as appears from Rule 3 even though the heading speaks of imposition, assessment and collection as three distinct stages, similar to sub-section (1) of section 158. Thereafter, Rule 8 therein provides for the mode of recovery of the tax by giving a written notice calling upon the defaulter to pay the same within the specified period The 1962 appeal rules framed under section 159 are to regulate the manner of filing and disposal of the appeals. Rule 2 therein requires an appeal to be filed within thirty days from the date on which the demand for such tax is made. Rule 2 therein requires an appeal to be filed within thirty days from the date on which the demand for such tax is made. The demand for tax can be made only after it has become due and not earlier. Rule 3 requires that all taxes due up to the date of such appeal must be paid before the appeal can be entertained. It further lays down that the appellate authority may, after hearing the parties, confirm, vary or set aside the imposition of the tax. These rules throughout refer to imposition of tax while meaning assessment and collection. The significant things are that no appeal can be filed till after a demand for payment of the tax is made and that the appellate authority can also vary or set aside the imposition if a case for its confirmation is not made out. These powers are ordinarily to be exercised while hearing an appeal against assessment. Thus, in these rules also the word imposition appears to have been used not in its ordinary sense of also including the authority to levy tax but confined to the stage commencing with the assessment and ending with collection of the tax. In this connection the third set of rules which also throw some light are m. P. Janapada Panchayat Toll on New bridges (Regulation of Imposition, Assessment and Collection) Rules, 1964. these are the corresponding rules for toll Tax. Incidentally Rule 4 therein while laying down the procedure for imposition of toll Tax provides for publication of the proposal to impose the tax, filing of objections and consideration of these objections before decision to impose the tax is taken. No such provision in case of show tax is made. But the provision of appeal in section 159 is common to both these taxes. In view of this provision for objections in case of toll Tax it cannot be doubted that the scope of ah appeal in connection with toll Tax cannot include a challenge to authority to levy tax. That being so, the same word cannot be given a larger meaning in relation to an appeal pertaining to show tax. ( 8. ) IN Municipality of Anand v. State of Bombay and another, AIR 1962 SC 988 . That being so, the same word cannot be given a larger meaning in relation to an appeal pertaining to show tax. ( 8. ) IN Municipality of Anand v. State of Bombay and another, AIR 1962 SC 988 . while dealing with the meaning of the word impose in relation to the levy of a tax, in the context in which it appeared, it was held by Sarkar J. as follows:- "hence, in our view, impose in section 59 means the actual levy of the tax after authority to levy it has been acquired by rules duly made and sanctioned. " Ayyangar J. , in a separate concurring judgment, stated as under:- "in my judgment the imposition of a tax is a continuing power in the sense that so long as it is in force, it points to the existence of and derives vitality from the power of the authority to impose it. When the municipality levies the tax in the sense of quantifying it with reference to an ascertained person and thereby creating a statutory debt payable by the tax-payer, it is in reality exercising the power to impose the tax, for it is the continued existence of the imposition that furnishes the legal basis for the levy when made. " Thus, it has been authoritatively held that the word impose depending on its context means also the stage in taxation subsequent to acquisition of authority to levy tax, and that it does not always include necessarily the initial stage of acquiring power to levy the tax. It is settled that a word has to be construed in the context or setting in which it occurs. ( 9. ) IN the present case, in view of the context or the setting in which the word imposition occurs in section 159 of the Act, it must be construed to mean the stage of taxation commencing with the assessment or quantification of tax with reference to an ascertained person and it does not include the initial stage of decision to levy the tax itself or acquisition of that power. Such a construction is quite permissible, it being held authoritatively, that the meaning of the word imposition does not necessarily include the initial stage of acquisition of authority to levy the tax. Such a construction is quite permissible, it being held authoritatively, that the meaning of the word imposition does not necessarily include the initial stage of acquisition of authority to levy the tax. Such a view would avoid the absurdity resulting from the other view, as indicated earlier, and would be in harmony with section 158 (2) also. ( 10. ) WE are, therefore, of the opinion that section 159 of the Act does not permit an appeal against the decision to levy the tax and that it lies only against the assessment or quantification of tax made against any tax-payer after the levy has been brought into force. On this conclusion, there is no dispute that the appeal filed before the Collector by the respondent No. 2 was wholly incompetent and consequently the order Annexure- J dated 23-7-1973 passed by the Collector was without jurisdiction and must be quashed. ( 11. ) IT was also contended on behalf of respondent No. 2 that the impugned order Annexure- J having been passed with the consent of parties, no challenge to the same should be permitted. This is a case in which we are not inclined to refuse the relief only on this ground. In the first place, the impugned order was wholly without authority. Secondly, the question involved being of frequent occurrence, it would be more desirable to decide the same and not to leave it open. This objection is, therefore, rejected. ( 12. ) IN the result, the petition is allowed. The order Annexure- J dated 23-7-1973 passed by the Collector, Sagar, is quashed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.