JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - These two connected writ petitions arise from an order of the District Judge, Dehradun dated 6-8-1977. By the said judgment, the learned District Judge, allowed the appeal of the landlords and remanded the case to the Prescribed Authority for deciding it afresh. 2. House no. 2-A Convent Road, Dehradun consisted of one Kachcha and one pucca houses numbered as House No. 2 and 2-A. The southern portion of the pucca house had been let out to R.P. Dobhal, respondent no. 3 whereas the northern portion of the said house was let out to C.L. Sikka, respondent No. 4 (hereinafter referred to as Respondents 3 and 4 respectively). 3. An application under section 21 (1-A) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by the petitioners for release of the premises in occupation of respondents 3 and 4. The Petitioner No. I had retired from the post of the Deputy Director of Employment Exchanges, Directorate General of Employment and Training, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi in the year 1976. During the course of his employment, he had been given a public building situated in Chankyapuri, New Delhi and that he was still in occupation of the said building in August, 1976, when he filed the present application for release. The petitioners alleged that on account of the cessation of the employment of the petitioner No. 1 the allotment of the said public building to him has been cancelled on 3-4-1976 and that he had been required to vacate the same by 30th September, 1976. He claimed that the northern and southern portions of 2-A Convent Road were required by him for his family and therefore, the same be released to him. 4. The application was resisted by respondents 3 and 4. They claimed that the application filed by the petitioners was not maintainable. They also claimed that the need for the petitioners was not genuine. 5. The Prescribed Authority held that the need of the petitioners was not genuine and they had sufficient accommodation in their possession for their use and occupation. On this finding, the application filed by the petitioner was rejected by him on March 28, 1977. Against the said judgment of the Prescribed Authority, the petitioners went up in appeal. 5. The Prescribed Authority held that the need of the petitioners was not genuine and they had sufficient accommodation in their possession for their use and occupation. On this finding, the application filed by the petitioner was rejected by him on March 28, 1977. Against the said judgment of the Prescribed Authority, the petitioners went up in appeal. The appeal was allowed and the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was set aside and the case was remanded to him for a fresh decision. While remanding the appeal, the learned District Judge directed the Prescribed Authority : "The case may be decided afresh according to law after taking into account the other properties at Dheradun owned by the applicants solely or jointly with others and the manner of their use and occupation. The exact nature of the title of the landlords to the properties in dispute has to be determined........." Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the District Judge, the petitioners preferred writ petition No. 1542 of 1977. As the tenants were also not satisfied with the judgment of the District Judge, they also filed another writ petition numbered as writ petition No. 1591 of 1977. 6. The first question that arises for decision in this case is about the scope of section 21(1-A). Section 21(IA) was added by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. The said section reads as under :- "21(1-A) Not with sanding any thing contained in section 2, the prescribed authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf older the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupations of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment, provided that an application under this sub- section may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction on such application shall take effect only on the date of his actual cessation". Sub-section (3) of Section 21 lays down that no order under sub-section (1A) shall be passed except after giving to the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Sub-section (3) of Section 21 lays down that no order under sub-section (1A) shall be passed except after giving to the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Sub-section (5) however provides that after an order under sub-section (1A) was passed, the premises or building shall stand released in favour of the landlord. 7. Sub-section (1A) of section 21 is a special provision dealing with a contingency not covered by sub-section (1) of section 21. The object of sub- section (1A), as shown from the language, is to confer a right on a landlord to recover possession of building belonging to him and which is in occupation of his tenant. It is a provision dis-similar to sub-section (1) of section 21, under which it is necessary for a landlord to establish his bonafide requirement of the premises. Under the fourth proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21, it is further necessary that the hardship of a landlord should be greater than that of the tenant. This requirement is not necessary to be fulfilled in the case of an application under section 21(1-A) of the Act. This provision has been made with a view to rehabilitate a Government servant in his own house, if he is required to vacate the public building or Government accommodation obtained by him during the term of his service. For succeeding in a case filed under this provision, a landlord is required to establish :- (i) That he was in occupation of a public building for residential purpose ; (ii) That he had to vacate that building on account of cessation of his employment ; (iii) He is the landlord of the building from which the eviction of the tenant is being sought. A landlord, filing an application under this provision, is not required to satisfy that his need for the premises is bonafide. Under this provision, a landlord is entitled to get possession of any building owned by him which he may choose for availing the right conferred upon him. The right of the landlord to get possession of a building under this provision is exhausted immediately on his succeeding in proceedings under section 21(1-A). 8. Apart from sub-section (1-A) of section 21, the Legislature also provided for summary trial of certain applications by inserting Chapter IV-A by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. The right of the landlord to get possession of a building under this provision is exhausted immediately on his succeeding in proceedings under section 21(1-A). 8. Apart from sub-section (1-A) of section 21, the Legislature also provided for summary trial of certain applications by inserting Chapter IV-A by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. Section 24-B of the Act makes provision for a landlord to apply for release of his residential building if he had obtained a public building. This section 24-B is in pari materia with Section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act (Act No. 59 of 1958). Sub-section (1-A) of section 21 although applies to a contingency different than the one covered by section 24-B, but in essence the two provisions are the same. Sub-section (1A) of section 21 applies to a case of retirement of a Government servant whereas Section 24-A will apply where a person is in service but has otherwise acquired or obtained a house in the same city where he is posted. 9. Section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act has been a subject matter of decision by the Supreme Court in Kanta Goel v. V.P. Pathak, AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1599. The Supreme Court held that this emergency provision is available to put a Government servant back into his own residential accommodation and it cannot be used as a weapon for evicting several tenants if he has many houses to let out to various persons. The principles of the aforesaid case, to my mind, apply to an application filed under sub-section (1-A) of section 21. By this provision, a landlord has been made entitled to get his residential house vacated from a tenant for the purposes of rehabilitating himself. For filing an application under sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, the cause of action is the cessation of employment and the consequential order to vacate as well as the urgency to recover his own building. Landlord, filing an application under this provision, represents to the authority that he has been asked to vacate the premises of the Government and he is in immediate necessity of occupying his own house. 10. A landlord is entitled tinder this provision to get the house as he was required to move out of the Government premises. Landlord, filing an application under this provision, represents to the authority that he has been asked to vacate the premises of the Government and he is in immediate necessity of occupying his own house. 10. A landlord is entitled tinder this provision to get the house as he was required to move out of the Government premises. But if after vacating the Government premises, a landlord succeeds in obtaining possession of a vacant house of his own, he cannot thereafter demand benefit of section 21(1-A). Even after getting possession of a vacant house if he wants additional accommodation, he will have to take resort to sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Act. 11. In Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T. Alenghani, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1569, while dealing with the scope of Section 14-A, the Supreme Court held :- "Underlying the whole legislative plan and provision is the fundamental anxiety to recover, for the officer's occupation, his own premises. Once we grasp this cardinal point, the officer's application for eviction under section 14-A can be entertained only on his averment that he having been asked to vacate, must get into possession of his own. For instance, if he has a vacant house of his own and, on getting an order to vacate, lie moves into his vacant house, he cannot thereafter demand recovery under section 14-A". The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case apply to a case covered by clause (1-A) of section 21 also. Sub-section (1-A) of section 21 did not either mean to provide a handle to a landlord to evict all the tenants or to bye pass the requirement of sub-section (1) of section 21, in case of additional need of the premises. For filing an application under this provision, the cause of action is that a tenant has been required to vacate and that he has no other place to live in. At this place, I wish to clarify that a temporary occupation of a landlord entitled to the protection of sub-section (1-A) of section 21 as a licensee or at the mercy of some one, will not disentitle him to get the benefit of sub-section (1-A) of section 21. At this place, I wish to clarify that a temporary occupation of a landlord entitled to the protection of sub-section (1-A) of section 21 as a licensee or at the mercy of some one, will not disentitle him to get the benefit of sub-section (1-A) of section 21. But at the same time, if a landlord succeeds into getting his own house he cannot take help of sub-section (1-A) of section 21 for getting the house vacated, even if the accommodation in that house may not be sufficient for his requirement. If he needs additional accommodation such a landlord will have to approach the Prescribed Authority under section 21(1) of the Act. Since the object of sub-section (1-A) of section 21 is achieved once a landlord recovers possession of his premises in pursuance of an application filed under sub- section (1-A) of section 21, he will not be entitled to avail that right by filing another application. 12. In view of what I have said above, I find that it is not necessary for a landlord filing an application under section 21(l-A) to establish his requirement or need of the premises just like under section 21(1)(a) and the Prescribed Authority would not be justified in examining the need of the landlord. It will have to allow the application filed by a landlord if he fulfils the requirements mentioned above. 13. Shri L.P. Naithani, counsel, for the tenants brought to any notice an order dated 29th March, 1976 releasing a portion of house No. 2 in favour of the petitioner and contended that since the petitioner No. 1 has already obtained possession of the house released under the said order, the present application filed under sub-section (1-A) of section 21 was not maintainable. This point had not been raised on behalf of the tenant either before the Prescribed Authority or before the Appellate Authority. It, however, appears from the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the landlords in writ petition No. 1591 of 1977, that possession of the house, released under the said order, was not with J. C. Gupta but with his brother P. C. Gupta. It has also been the case of J. C. Gupta that he did not have possession of any building in his own rights. It has also been the case of J. C. Gupta that he did not have possession of any building in his own rights. Since this question had not been raised either before the Prescribed Authority or appellate authority and no decision was given thereon, it appears appropriate that the said controversy be left undecided so that this matter may also be examined by the Prescribed Authority himself and a finding be given thereon. 14. By the remand order, the learned District Judge has further directed the Prescribed Authority to inquire into two things (i) as to the number of properties owned by the petitioners and (ii) the exact nature of the title which the petitioners have over the property in dispute. In my opinion, the direction given by the learned District Judge suffers from a manifest error of law. 15. So far as the ownership of the petitioners over other properties was concerned, that was foreign to the scope of the application filed under section 21(1-A). For deciding the application filed under sub-section (1-A) of section 21, it was not necessary to find the number of properties which were owned by the petitioners solely or jointly. At the most, the inquiry should have been directed towards possession of the house in which the petitioner No. 1 was presently residing. If the Court finds that the petitioner No. 1 was living in his own right in any premises, the application under sub-section (1-A) of section 21 would he liable to be rejected in that event. But the mere fact that the petitioner was the co-sharer or owner of other proper ties, was wholly immaterial for the purposes of deciding the present application. The petitioner No. 1 had a right to choose one out of the several buildings for the purposes of his occupation. In my view, therefore, it is not necessary to go into the said question in the manner directed by the District Judge. 16. Some doubt was caused by the learned District Judge on the oral partition which was pleaded by the petitioners and on the basis of which they claimed that they were the exclusive owners of the same. The doubt of the learned District Judge is unjustified. It is indisputable that an oral family settlement can be entered into by the members of a family to put an end to a dispute amongst themselves. The doubt of the learned District Judge is unjustified. It is indisputable that an oral family settlement can be entered into by the members of a family to put an end to a dispute amongst themselves. Such a family settlement does not amount to a transfer inasmuch as by the settlement no interest in the property is created. If an oral family settlement had been arrived at the same could not be ignored on the ground that it was not permissible in law. A family settlement amongst Hindus is a well recognised mode of division of the joint family property. Accordingly the learned District Judge was not right in holding that the property in dispute could not be obtained by the petitioners in pursuance of an oral petition. 17. It, however, appears that since there was no dispute between the parties on this controversy before the Prescribed Authority the petitioners did not file evidence about the same. B controversy having now been raised it will be open to the petitioners to file evidence in proof of the family arrangement. 18. Shri B.D. Agrawal, counsel for the petitioners, however, also contended that since the respondents 3 and 4 had been paying rent of the premises to the petitioners and had accepted their title in respect of the premises in dispute, they were estopped from challenging that the petitioners were not the owners of this property. As 1 am sending back the case to the Prescribed Authority, I do not consider it necessary to express my opinion on the same. It will be open to the petitioners to bring evidence on record to establish the plea of estoppel raised before me. 19. The only other point that remains to be discussed is whether the petitioner No. 1, being a co-sharer, could be considered to be a landlord so as to be entitled to file application under section 21(I A) of the Act. A similar controversy was raised before the Supreme Court in Kanta Goel v. V. P. Pathak (supra) where the Supreme Court held that one of the co-sharers who was a Government servant could avail a right conferred by section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Supreme Court found that a co-owner is as much a owner of the entire premises as a sole owner of the property. The Supreme Court found that a co-owner is as much a owner of the entire premises as a sole owner of the property. In taking this view the Supreme Court has followed its earlier decision given in Shri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and others, 1977(1) R.C.J. 494 . In this case the Supreme Court observed :- "Jurisprudentially, it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that be is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property...... It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff, who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of section 13(1)(f). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purposes of section 13(1)(f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time acknowledged landlord of the defendant." After having quoted the above observations with approval, the Supreme Court held that the contention that the absence of other co-owners on record dis-entitled the landlord of that case from suing for eviction has no substance. In this view of the matter, even if the building belonged to several persons that would not dis-entitle the petitioner No. 1 from claiming benefit of sub- section (IA) of section 21. In deciding the application the Prescribed Authority is directed to be guided by the law laid down in this judgment. 20. The only other thing that remains to be discussed is the writ petition filed by the tenants. So far as the writ petition filed by the tenants is concerned, after hearing counsel for the petitioners in support of it, I am unable to find any substance in it. The order of remand could not be set aside on the grounds taken in this writ petition. 21. Subject to the above, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. But under the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.